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CANCER’S IP*
JACOB S. SHERKOW**
The state of publicly funded science is in peril. Instead, new
biomedical research efforts—in particular, the recent funding of
a “Cancer Moonshot”—have focused on employing publicprivate partnerships, joint ventures between private industry and
public agencies, as being more politically palatable. Yet, publicprivate partnerships like the Cancer Moonshot center on the
production of public goods: scientific information. Using private
incentives in this context presents numerous puzzles for both
intellectual property law and information policy. This Article
examines whether—and to what extent—intellectual property and
information policy can be appropriately tailored to the goals of
public-private partnerships. It shows that the success of the
Cancer Moonshot, and other similar public-private partnerships,
turns on data-sharing—the production, disclosure, and ultimate
use of data. Consequently, encouraging private participation in
data-sharing will likely require some form of patents, trade
secrets, and regulatory exclusivities, appropriately limited to
further the program’s public aims. The Article concludes by
using the Cancer Moonshot to draw broader lessons about this
new turn in research funding, public-private partnerships
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“The only bipartisan thing left in America is the fight against
cancer.”
—Former Vice President Joe Biden1

INTRODUCTION
In a time of unprecedented political polarization around
scientific research and funding, both sides seem to readily agree on
one thing: curing cancer. In December 2016, former President
Obama, for the last major bill-signing of his presidency, signed into
law the 21st Century Cures Act2 with “overwhelming bipartisan
support,” the most significant overhaul of the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration (“FDA”) in decades.3 The Act included $1.8 billion of
federal funding towards a remarkable new initiative: a “moonshot” to
cure cancer.4 As currently structured, the Moonshot is a wide-ranging
effort empowered to “mak[e] the most of Federal investments,
targeted incentives, private sector efforts from industry and
philanthropy, patient engagement initiatives, and other mechanisms
to support cancer research and enable progress in treatment and
care.”5 But unlike other government research programs—like the
Moonshot’s namesake effort to put a man on the moon in 1969—
“curing” cancer has no clear endpoint.6 Rather, the core of the
Cancer Moonshot’s engine produces information about the disease to

1. Rick Berke, Joe Biden Urges SXSW Crowd to Put Innovation to Work to Cure
Cancer, STAT (Mar. 12, 2017), https://www.statnews.com/2017/03/12/joe-biden-cancermoonshot-sxsw/ [https://perma.cc/Z9R4-7WSX].
2. 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 144-255, 130 Stat. 1033 (2016).
3. Jeannie Baumann, Obama Signs Bill to Speed Medical Breakthroughs, Boost NIH
Funding, BLOOMBERG BNA (Dec. 13, 2016), https://www.bna.com/obama-signs-billn73014448613/ [https://perma.cc/NK7W-4LS4]; Adam Gaffney, Congress Just Quietly
Handed Drug Companies a Dangerous Victory, NEW REPUBLIC (Dec. 14, 2016),
https://newrepublic.com/article/139328/congress-just-quietly-handed-drug-companiesdangerous-victory [https://perma.cc/SA2W-LVEJ] (comparing the Act to the FDA’s 1962
Kefauver-Harris Amendments).
4. 21st Century Cures Act § 1001(b)(2)(A), 130; Obama Signs 21st Century Cures
Act into Law, STAT (Dec. 13, 2016), https://www.statnews.com/2016/12/13/21st-centurycures-obama-signs/ [https://perma.cc/SHB6-85N2]; see also Address Before a Joint Session
of the Congress on the State of the Union, 2016 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 12 (Jan. 12,
2016).
5. Memorandum on the White House Cancer Moonshot Task Force, 2016 DAILY
COMP. PRES. DOC. 24 (Jan. 28, 2016) [hereinafter Memorandum].
6. See Jarle Breivik, We Won’t Cure Cancer, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 2016, at A21
(“Every time we cure a person of cancer, we produce a person with an increased
probability of getting cancer again. It is the Catch-22 of oncology. If this is such a basic
fact, why are we still talking about moonshots?”).
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“use the power of data to generate real solutions for treating cancer.”7
To achieve this, the Cancer Moonshot will be structured as a series of
public-private partnerships; joint efforts between private industry and
public agencies to achieve public goals.8
In economic terms, the Moonshot’s goal of collaboration
between the public and private sectors seeks to produce a public
good: scientific information.9 And like all truly public goods, scientific
information lacks two of the core elements of property, excludability
and rivalrousness.10 Unless they keep such information secret,
researchers cannot exclude others from making use of their findings
and the use of scientific information by one researcher does not rival
another’s ability to make use of the same. The Moonshot’s call to
develop cancer information, therefore, presents numerous puzzles for
both intellectual property law and information policy. What
incentives can be deployed to encourage private participation? What
form of intellectual property, if any, is appropriate for producing
scientific information? How should the information generated from
such a project be standardized? Who will be responsible for
safeguarding sensitive health information derived from a publicprivate partnership? Using cancer research as an emblem of the
difficulties in encouraging the private production of scientific

7. Greg Simon, The Cancer Moonshot: Achieving Lift Off, MEDIUM (May 24, 2016),
https://medium.com/cancer-moonshot/the-cancer-moonshot-achieving-lift-off-aa22a1b37c43
#.9rn90d3mc [https://perma.cc/VTF8-NPFQ] (emphasis added).
8. See Martha Minow, Public and Private Partnerships: Accounting for the New
Religion, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1229, 1237 (2003) (discussing the aims of public-private
partnerships); FACT SHEET: At Cancer Moonshot Summit, Vice President Biden
Announces New Actions to Accelerate Progress Toward Ending Cancer As We Know It,
WHITE HOUSE (June 28, 2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-pressoffice/2016/06/28/fact-sheet-cancer-moonshot-summit-vice-president-biden-announcesnew [https://perma.cc/KD35-XFWG]; see also Press Release, Nat’l Cancer Inst., New Drug
Formulary Will Help Expedite Use of Agents in Clinical Trials (Jan. 11, 2017),
https://www.cancer.gov/news-events/press-releases/2017/nci-formulary-launch [https://perma.cc
/N39J-Z3XZ].
9. See Paul M. Romer, Endogenous Technological Change, 98 J. POL. ECON. S71,
S74 (1990) (“By definition, public goods are both nonrival and nonexcludable. Because
they are nonexcludable, they cannot be privately provided or traded in markets. Public
goods can be introduced into a model of price-taking behavior by assuming the existence
of a government that can levy taxes. Basic scientific research is an example of a public
good that could be provided in this way and that is relevant for modeling growth.”).
10. Jorge L. Contreras, Constructing the Genome Commons, in GOVERNING
KNOWLEDGE COMMONS 99 (Brett M. Frischmann, Michael J. Madison & Katherine J.
Strandburg eds., 2014) (defining a “public good,” like the sequence of the human genome,
as “a resource provisioned by the state that is susceptible to neither exclusion nor
depletion by use”); Romer, supra note 9, at S74.
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information, this Article answers these questions through a synthesis
of intellectual property and information policy—here, cancer’s IP.11
Cancer’s special salience to information policy derives, in part,
from its vast complexity, a “colossal diversity” of typology, genetics,
environmental factors, and idiosyncrasies.12 Since the turn of this
century—when genetic sequencing became a routine and mature
technology13—cancer researchers have recognized the disease as
“complex almost beyond measure.”14 As a consequence, “cancer
research has seen an increasing trend towards high-throughput
techniques and translational approaches”15—that is, a move from
traditional laboratory and clinical practices into the realm of “big
data.”16 This signals an epochal shift in cancer research, a field
11. To be certain, numerous other incentive regimes may come to bear on the success
of the Cancer Moonshot, including drug-price rebate programs, demand-side treatment
innovation, and R&D tax credits. See generally Rebecca S. Eisenberg & W. Nicholson
Price II, Promoting Healthcare Innovation on the Demand Side, 4 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 3
(2017) (examining promotion of innovation by health insurers); Daniel Jacob Hemel &
Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Beyond the Patents-Prizes Debate, 92 TEX. L. REV. 303 (2013)
(discussing R&D tax credits); Rachel E. Sachs, Prizing Insurance: Prescription Drug
Insurance as Innovation Incentive, 30 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 153 (2016) (discussing rebates).
But these are, simply, not the focus of this Article. Instead, this Article’s aim is limited to
unpacking, and hopefully resolving, the immediate complexities governing currently
existent incentive regimes—e.g., intellectual property—on the Cancer Moonshot and
other public-private partnerships.
12. See SIDDHARTHA MUKHERJEE, THE EMPEROR OF ALL MALADIES: A
BIOGRAPHY OF CANCER 173 (Schribner ed. 2010) (“[C]ancer, a shape-shifting disease of
colossal diversity, [has been] recast as a single, monolithic entity.”).
13. See Elaine R. Mardis, The Impact of Next-Generation Sequencing Technology on
Genetics, 24 TRENDS IN GENETICS 133, 133 (2008) (“[S]equencing of DNA has undergone
a steady metamorphosis from a cottage industry into a large-scale production enterprise
that requires a specialized and devoted infrastructure of robotics, bioinformatics,
computer databases and instrumentation.”); Michael L. Metzker, Sequencing
Technologies—The Next Generation, 11 NATURE REV. GENETICS 31, 31 (2010) (“The
major advance offered by [Next Generation Sequencing technology] is the ability to
produce an enormous volume of data cheaply . . . . This feature expands the realm of
experimentation beyond just determining the order of bases . . . .”); Erwin van Dijk et al.,
Ten Years of Next-Generation Sequencing Technology, 30 TRENDS IN GENETICS 418, 418–
19 (2014) (describing the evolution of genetic sequencing techniques).
14. Douglas Hanahan & Robert A. Weinberg, The Hallmarks of Cancer, 100 CELL
57, 57 (2000).
15. Aisyah Mohd Noor et al., Big Data: The Challenge for Small Research Groups in
the Era of Cancer Genomics, 113 BRIT. J. CANCER 1405, 1405 (2015).
16. See, e.g., The International Cancer Genome Consortium, International Network of
Cancer Genome Projects, 464 NATURE 993, 993 (2010) (predicting the benefits of cancer
research using large datasets); Peng Jiang & X. Shirley Liu, Big Data Mining Yields Novel
Insights on Cancer, 47 NATURE GENETICS 103, 103 (2015) (reviewing several big data
approaches to cancer research); Joseph R. Nevins, New Breast Cancer Genes—Discovery
at the Intersection of Complex Data Sets, 12 CANCER CELL 497, 497 (2007) (describing the
role of big data in uncovering breast cancer risk genes); Noor et al., supra note 15, at 1405
(discussing big data and cancer research).
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previously known better for its trial-and-error approach to clinical
research than any greater understanding of the disease.17 By contrast,
the object of much current cancer research is not the immediate
development of treatments but the creation of “complex data sets . . .
coupled with powerful analytical methods to extract a level of detail
. . . not achievable with the once powerful methods of molecular
biology.”18 Current cancer research, therefore, centers less on
producing therapeutic innovations—new drugs, medical devices, and
other tangible things used to treat cancer—and more on
information.19
Understanding cancer as information exposes a number of
challenges for encouraging private investment in research, especially
investment structured within public-private partnerships. Traditional
intellectual property protections seem ill-suited to support investment
in projects like the Cancer Moonshot. Patents, for example, do not
protect claims to scientific information—an increasingly powerful
stricture after a series of recent Supreme Court cases concerning
patent eligibility.20 Where patents do cover the fruits of cancer
research, patent law requires such discoveries to be disclosed before
they can be appropriately verified, contributing to a burgeoning
problem of scientific irreproducibility.21 And patents’ short term
17. See MUKHERJEE, supra note 12, at 206 (describing the research strategy of the
National Cancer Institute in the 1970s as “empirical—throwing chemicals at cancer cells in
test tubes to identify cancer killers . . . . The biology of cancer was still poorly understood.
But the notion that even relatively indiscriminate cytotoxic agents discovered largely by
accident would cure cancer had captivated oncology”).
18. Nevins, supra note 16, at 497.
19. See, e.g., Jennifer Abbasi, NCI Launches Cancer Patient Data Repository, 316
JAMA 384, 384 (2016) (announcing the National Cancer Institute’s plans to house a
“genomic data commons”); John Z. Ayanian et al., Understanding Cancer Treatment and
Outcomes: The Cancer Care Outcomes Research and Surveillance Consortium, 22 J.
CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 2992, 2992 (2004) (announcing canCORS, a cancer dataset
comprising “a new model for studying cancer care: a large, distributed, multidisciplinary
team of investigators collecting shared data”); S. Bamford et al., The COSMIC (Catalogue
of Somatic Mutations in Cancer) Database and Website, 91 BRIT. J. CANCER 355, 355
(2004) (announcing COSMIC, a database then containing “a comprehensive view of all
previously reported somatic mutations in cancer”); Joel Saltz et al., caGrid: Design and
Implementation of the Core Architecture of the Cancer Biomedical Informatics Grid, 22
BIOINFORMATICS 1910, 1910 (2006) (“The complexity of cancer is prompting researchers
to find new ways to synthesize information from diverse data sources and to carry out
coordinated research efforts that span multiple institutions.”).
20. Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014); Ass’n for Molecular
Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 566 U.S. 902 (2013); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v.
Prometheus Labs., Inc., 561 U.S. 1040 (2012); Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010).
21. See generally Jacob S. Sherkow, Patent Law’s Reproducibility Paradox, 66 DUKE
L.J. 845, 848 (2017) (examining how “the availability of patents for the products of clinical
research appears to hamper or even actively dissuade reproducibility”).
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length, relative to the lengths and costs of clinical trials, skews
research incentives toward later-stage—and less scientifically
valuable—cancer research.22 Other forms of intellectual property
currently suffer from similar deficiencies. Trade secrets fail to
guard—and therefore, fails to encourage the production of—basic
information about cancer.23 But where they do operate, they raise
significant public health and policy concerns.24 And regulatory
exclusivities—such as FDA warrants for shelters from market
competition—protect only fully developed products, not the
underlying scientific information about how such products work.25
22. See Eric Budish, Benjamin N. Roin & Heidi Williams, Do Firms Underinvest in
Long-Term Research? Evidence from Cancer Clinical Trials, 105 AM. ECON. REV. 2044,
2045–46 (2015) (assessing how patent terms skew the lengths of clinical trials).
23. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights and the Norms of Science in
Biotechnology Research, 97 YALE L.J. 177, 194 (1987) (“Once [a trade secret] becomes
generally known to other scientists through independent discovery, the first discoverer
loses protection.”); J.H. Reichman & Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property Rights in
Data?, 50 VAND. L. REV. 51, 60 (1997) (explaining that reverse-engineered scientific
information fits poorly within trade secret law as it “provide[s] innovators and investors
with no exclusive property rights”); David A. Rice, Public Goods, Private Contract and
Public Policy: Federal Preemption of Software License Prohibitions Against Reverse
Engineering, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 543, 557 (1992) (“Other advances in science and
technology may gain more limited protection, but cannot be wholly withdrawn from the
public domain as a matter of proprietary right. Trade secrets, for example, are not
protected against independent discovery or against being ascertained with the aid of
reverse engineering.”).
24. See John M. Conley, Robert Cook-Deegan & Gabriel Lázaro-Muñoz, Myriad
After Myriad: The Proprietary Data Dilemma, 15 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 597, 600 (2014)
(“Whether clinical data should be protected as trade secrets, despite the fact that access to
this information can have important health consequences for individual patients, is a
profound ethical and legal dilemma.”); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Problem of New Uses, 5
YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 717, 720 (2005) (“[T]rade secrecy greatly
compromises the social value of the information as a resource for improving public health
and for promoting further R&D.”); W. Nicholson Price II, Black-Box Medicine, 28 HARV.
J.L. & TECH. 419, 434 (2015) (“[A] machine-learning algorithm can examine data,
determine a relationship, and state it, but the underlying biological relationship is too
complex to be amenable to scientific understanding or clinical trials.”); John T. Wilbanks
& Eric J. Topol, Stop the Privatization of Health Data, 535 NATURE 345, 346–47 (2016)
(discussing some of the problems with privatizing health data).
25. See W. Nicholson Price II, Big Data, Patents, and the Future of Medicine, 37
CARDOZO L. REV. 1401, 1447–48 (2016) (limiting the “advantage[s] to regulatory
exclusivity comes only if exclusivity is coupled with a disclosure requirement”); W.
Nicholson Price II, Making Do in Making Drugs: Innovation Policy and Pharmaceutical
Manufacturing, 55 B.C. L. REV. 491, 556 (2014) (discussing “significant concerns with
product-based regulatory exclusivity, centered on appropriately valuing the innovation”);
W. Nicholson Price II & Arti K. Rai, Manufacturing Barriers to Biologics Competition and
Innovation, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1023, 1023 (2016) (arguing that regulatory exclusivities, in
some instances, “undermine[ ] efforts to advance fundamental knowledge about how
biologics function and are best produced”); John R. Thomas, The End of “Patent
Medicines”? Thoughts on the Rise of Regulatory Exclusivities, 70 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 39,
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These difficulties suggest a serious misalignment between current
IP structures and the objective of information-seeking public-private
partnerships: efficiently “creat[ing] and disseminat[ing] knowledge,
[including the] optimization of publishing data and results.”26 Without
sufficient private incentives to participate in knowledge creation, such
partnerships will almost certainly fail.27 But with inappropriate private
incentives—incentives that privatize too much knowledge or disclose
too little—public-private partnerships similarly fail to uphold their
bargain to the public.28 The success of public-private partnerships, like
the Cancer Moonshot, therefore rest, at least in part, on aligning
some form of private rights with the greater public good.
For the Cancer Moonshot specifically, this means data-sharing—
or in Former Vice President Biden’s words, “breaking down some of
the research that is trapped inside of silos, . . . shar[ing] information
with drug companies, and drug companies being willing to be more
forthcoming in sharing information.”29 This is easier said than done.
Current data-sharing efforts suffer from licensing thickets, a lack of
interoperability, and strictures from grant-making agencies.30 There
43 (2015) (“FDA-administered regulatory exclusivities are of commensurate scope with
the drugs they approve.”); see also Yaniv Heled, Regulatory Competitive Shelters in the
Area of Personalized Medicine, 21 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 287, 287 n.3 (2015) (describing
FDA-awarded exclusivities as “regulatory competitive shelters” as “competitive
advantages resulting from statutory bars on regulatory action”).
26. Constance E. Bagley & Christina D. Tvarnø, Pharmaceutical Public-Private
Partnerships: Moving from the Bench to the Bedside, 4 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 373, 384
(2014); see also Liza S. Vertinsky, Patents, Partnerships, and the Pre-Competitive
Collaboration Myth in Pharmaceutical Innovation, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1509, 1531–37
(2015) (enumerating what public-private partnerships offer to the public).
27. See Vertinsky, supra note 26, at 1517 (“[Policymakers] need to find ways of
mitigating the negative effects of market incentives on cooperation without removing
market incentives altogether from this process. This requires strategies for confronting and
reducing the tensions between private and public incentives to create and share
knowledge.”).
28. See id. at 1516 (describing policymakers as “[w]ary of the challenges that patents
and other market-based incentives can create for public-private partnerships”).
29. David A. Graham, What Is the Point of Joe Biden’s Cancer ‘Moonshot’?,
ATLANTIC (Feb. 11, 2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/02/bidencancer-moonshot-duke/462288/ [https://perma.cc/CU5F-22BH].
30. See, e.g., Final NIH Genomic Data Sharing Policy, 79 Fed. Reg. 51,345, 51,348
(Aug. 28, 2014) (describing restrictions on disclosing genetic data for health privacy
reasons); Ryan Abbott, The Sentinel Initiative as a Cultural Commons, in GOVERNING
MEDICAL RESEARCH COMMONS 121 (Katherine J. Strandburg et al. eds., Cambridge
University Press 2017) (discussing barriers to data sharing in the pharmaceutical and
biotech contexts); Simon Oxenham, Legal Maze Threatens to Slow Data Science, 536
NATURE 16, 16–17 (2016) (describing the data licensing difficulties of Hetionet, a
metadata set of “drugs, genes and diseases”); Victoria Stodden, Reproducing Statistical
Results, 2 ANN. REV. STAT. & APPLICATION 1, 14 (2015) (“Evolving community standards
and peer review cannot be relied upon to solve all dissemination issues, as some, such as
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likely exists no elegant solution to resolving all of these issues while
maintaining fidelity to the purpose—and success—of public-private
partnerships. But breaking down broader mandates for data-sharing
into discrete components—namely, the production of cancer data, the
disclosure of cancer data, and the use of cancer data to generate new
therapies—may prove more manageable. Compartmentalizing datasharing this way provides policy makers the flexibility to
appropriately tailor intellectual property and information policy
incentives for the Cancer Moonshot, as well as other public-private
partnerships.
Part I of this Article describes cancer’s informational complexity,
including the costs of developing such information and recent efforts
to employ public-private partnerships in uncovering it. Part II then
examines one of the broader difficulties in structuring public-private
partnerships to tackle informational problems like cancer—namely,
the misalignment between intellectual property incentives and data
production. It shows that patents likely fail to cover the most
important advances in the field or, oppositely, encourage only the
disclosure of thin, short-term data. It also discusses the impropriety of
levying trade secrets for public goods and the ineffectiveness of
regulatory exclusivities for basic, robust data about scientific
phenomena. Part III then attempts to align these disparate regimes. It
counsels the recognition of projects like the Cancer Moonshot as
grand data-sharing efforts. And it compartmentalizes their tasks as
the production, disclosure, and use of the information they
generate—each of which can be separately encouraged by relatively
inexpensive alterations to the intellectual property and information
policy regimes. Lastly, Part III uses this analysis to draw greater
conclusions about some of the difficulties facing information-seeking
public-private partnerships.
I. CANCER’S INFORMATION
A. Cancer’s Informational Complexity
Cancer is a complex disease, “complex almost beyond
measure.”31 Indeed, what we call “cancer” is, in actuality, a multitude

licensing for code and data, require coordinated action to ensure that goals such as
interoperability are met.”).
31. Hanahan & Weinberg, supra note 14, at 57.
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of hundreds of separate diseases with no single etiological source.32
The link—perhaps the only link—shared by this collection of diseases
is unchecked cellular growth: the tumor or neoplasm.33 For better or
for worse, “cancer, a shape-shifting disease of colossal diversity [has
been] recast as a single, monolithic entity.”34
Traditional cancer research—if it may be called that—was
therefore mostly superficial. Throughout the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries, physicians principally categorized tumors simply
by which organ they grew on—and little else. In 1848, the
development of various cellular stains and the microtome—a
precision instrument for cutting slices of paraffin-fixed tissue—rapidly
increased our understanding of tissue systems and gave rise to better
descriptions of various tumors.35 But these advances did little to
elucidate cancer’s cause. Even as late as the 1960s, clinicians had little
understanding of what, molecularly, cancer was or how tumors
originated.36
By contrast, understanding cancer today is an effort to
understand its cause: how normal cellular growth and division—a
tightly regulated process with numerous safety checkpoints—can
explode in a voracious malignancy.37 And within cancer’s multitude,
32. See MEL GREAVES, CANCER: THE EVOLUTIONARY LEGACY 3 (2000) (“The
illness we call cancer has extraordinarily diverse features including its causation,
underlying pathology, clinical symptoms, therapeutic response, and outcome or chance of
cure.”); MUKHERJEE, supra note 12, at 155 (“[One patient’s] lymphoma and [another’s]
pancreatic cancer were both, of course ‘cancers,’ malignant proliferations of cells. But the
diseases could not have been further apart in their trajectories and personalities. Even
referring to them by the same name, cancer, felt like some sort of medical anachronism
. . . .”); MUKHERJEE, supra note 12, at 332 (“Cancer is, in truth, a variety of diseases.’”
(quoting Barnett S. Kramer & Richard D. Klausner, Grappling With Cancer—Defeatism
Versus The Reality of Progress, 337 NEW ENG. J. MED 931, 932–33 (1997))).
33. See MUKHERJEE, supra note 12, at 15–16 (“[T]he quintessential disease of
pathological hyperplasia—cancer . . . . [Rudolf] Virchow called it neoplasia—novel,
inexplicable, distorted growth . . . .”).
34. Id. at 173.
35. Erwin H. Ackerknecht, Historical Notes on Cancer, 2 MED. HIST. 114, 116 (1958)
(“Oncology made a tremendous step forward through the flourishing of pathological
anatomy, especially in France, at the beginning of the nineteenth century and the shift
from the mere study of organ changes to that of the tissues composing the organs.”);
Giuseppe Musumeci, Past, Present and Future: Overview on Histology and Histopathology,
1 J. HISTOLOGY & HISTOPATHOLOGY 1, 1 (2014) (discussing the invention of the
microtome).
36. MUKHERJEE, supra note 12, at 155.
37. Michael B. Kastan & Jiri Bartek, Cell-Cycle Checkpoints and Cancer, 432
NATURE 316, 320 (2004) (“As the checkpoint and repair pathways facilitate cellular
responses to DNA damage . . . it is reasonable to speculate that alterations in these
pathways increase the risk of cancer developing.”); see also Hanahan & Weinberg, supra
note 14, at 66 (describing cellular order as “guaranteed by . . . watchmen, manning so-
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there appears to be a virtually limitless variety of causes. Smoking, for
example, has been shown to cause several types of lung cancer.38
Certain mutations in the TP53 gene appear to be correlated to a
particular variety of kidney cancer: clear cell renal cell carcinoma.39
And the human papilloma viruses seem to be a necessary component
to cervical cancer.40 Overall, cancers arise from a wide and disparate
variety of mechanisms including genetics, infections, environment,
behavior, time, and just plain bad luck.41
Even within an individual incidence of cancer—a single tumor,
residing in a single individual—the offending neoplasm can be
remarkably heterogeneous, or even unique among its type.42 Each
tumor may very well contain genetic mutations not seen in other
tumors—or, more complicated yet, mutations in only parts of the
tumor, hidden from an analysis of the whole.43 And because every
cancer patient’s unique genetic and medical makeup contribute to the
development of their cancers, each tumor is, in a very real sense, a
novel composition.44 Further, cancers are not static: they evolve in
called checkpoints, that operate at critical times in the cell’s life”); Leland H. Hartwell &
Michael B. Kastan, Cell Cycle Control and Cancer, 266 SCI. 1821, 1821 (1994) (“The
passage of cells from one stage of the cell cycle to another is tightly regulated by a wealth
of controls . . . .”).
38. 83 WORLD HEALTH ORG. & INT’L AGENCY FOR RES. ON CANCER, IARC
MONOGRAPHS ON THE EVALUATION OF CARCINOGENIC RISKS TO HUMANS: TOBACCO
SMOKE AND INVOLUNTARY SMOKING 33 (2004), http://monographs.iarc.fr/ENG
/Monographs/vol83/mono83.pdf [https://perma.cc/QLX9-NDQM].
39. Mark Bi et al., Genomic Characterization of Sarcomatoid Transformation in Clear
Cell Renal Cell Carcinoma, 113 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. USA 2170, 2170 (2016).
40. Jan. M. M. Walboomers et al., Human Papillomavirus Is a Necessary Cause of
Invasive Cervical Cancer Worldwide, 189 J. PATHOLOGY 12, 12 (1999).
41. See Sharon Begley, Most Cancers Due to ‘Bad Luck’? Not so Fast, Says Study,
STAT (Dec. 16, 2015), https://www.statnews.com/2015/12/16/cancers-bad-luck/
[https://perma.cc/VQQ4-LKPK] (describing competing studies on the role that random
mutations, i.e., “luck,” factor into cancer development). Compare Cristian Tomasetti &
Bert Vogelstein, Variation in Cancer Risk Among Tissues Can Be Explained by the
Number of Stem Cell Divisions, 347 SCI. 78, 78 (2015) (substantiating the role of random
mutations in cancer development) with Song Wu et al., Substantial Contribution of
Extrinsic Risk Factors to Cancer Development, 529 NATURE 43, 43–44 (2016)
(substantiating the role of extrinsic factors in cancer development).
42. Breivik, supra note 6, at A21 (“There are so many different types of cancer, so
many different genes and biochemical mechanisms, and every patient is different.”).
43. See Dan L. Longo, Tumor Heterogeneity and Personalized Medicine, 366 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 956, 956 (2012) (“About two thirds of the mutations that were found in
single biopsies were not uniformly detectable throughout all the sampled regions of the
same patient’s tumor . . . . Thus, a single tumor biopsy, the standard of tumor diagnosis and
the cornerstone of personalized-medicine decisions, cannot be considered representative
of the landscape of genomic abnormalities in a tumor.”).
44. See GREAVES, supra note 32, at 3 (“In a sense, every patient’s cancer is unique
. . . .”); Shuji Ogino, Charles S. Fuchs & Edward Giovannucci, How Many Molecular
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every sense of the word, often being selected for drug resistance as a
function of medical treatment.45 Any attempt to understand any given
cancer at a given time is likely to be merely a snapshot of its growth
and differentiation.46
Perhaps because of this diversity, broader principles of cancer
have proven difficult to identify. In 2000, cancer researchers Douglas
Hanahan and Robert Weinberg attempted to categorize all cancers
according to roughly six cellular characteristics and announced that
conceptual simplicity would begin to emerge from the past quartercentury of data.47 The small number of these organizing principles
gave them hope that “those researching the cancer problem will be
practicing a dramatically different type of science than we have
experienced over the past 25 years.”48 Yet, only a decade later, the
authors, spurred by new developments in the field, felt obligated to
add two additional hallmarks to their original six.49 Other researchers
have since added more.50
Subtypes? Implications of the Unique Tumor Principle in Personalized Medicine, 12
EXPERT REV. MOLECULAR DIAGNOSTICS 621, 622 (“As each individual human being is
unique, each tumor is unique.”).
45. Samuel Aparicio & Carlos Caldas, The Implications of Clonal Genome Evolution
for Cancer Medicine, 368 NEW ENG. J. MED. 842, 842 (2013) (“Darwin’s theory of
evolution was originally developed in the context of speciation. It has proved to be a
fundamental property of biologic systems, including human cancers.”); Pornpimol
Charoentong, et al., Bioinformatics for Cancer Immunology and Immunotherapy, 61
CANCER IMMUNOLOGY IMMUNOTHERAPY 1885, 1897 (2012) (“Cancer progression is an
evolutionary process that results from accumulation of genetic and epigenetic variations in
a single somatic cell.”); Hanahan & Weinberg, supra note 14, at 57 (“[O]bservations of
human cancers and animal models argue that tumor development proceeds via a process
formally analogous to Darwinian evolution, in which a succession of genetic changes, each
conferring one or another type of growth advantage, leads to the progressive conversion of
normal human cells into cancer cells.”).
46. See Aparicio & Caldas, supra note 45, at 846–47 (noting the need of “tumor
monitoring” as tumor mutations are a moving target).
47. See Hanahan & Weinberg, supra note 14, at 57 (“We suggest that the vast catalog
of cancer cell genotypes is a manifestation of six essential alterations in cell physiology
that collectively dictate malignant growth . . . self-sufficiency in growth signals, insensitivity
to growth-inhibitory (antigrowth) signals, evasion of programmed cell death (apoptosis),
limitless replicative potential, sustained angiogenesis, and tissue invasion and metastasis
. . . . We foresee cancer research developing into a logical science, where the complexities
of the disease, described in the laboratory and clinic, will become understandable in terms
of a small number of underlying principles.”).
48. Id.
49. Douglas Hanahan & Robert A. Weinberg, Hallmarks of Cancer: The Next
Generation, 144 CELL 646, 646 (2011) (adding “reprogramming of energy metabolism and
evading immune destruction” to the list of hallmarks).
50. E.g., Federica Cavallo et al., 2011: The Immune Hallmarks of Cancer, 60 CANCER
IMMUNOLOGY IMMUNOTHERAPY 319, 319 (2011) (adding “effective procedures to
activate immune reactivity; characterization of not-disposable oncoantigens; and
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This intractability in assessing and understanding “cancer” sets it
apart from almost all other diseases.51 Physicians, perhaps better
known for describing human illnesses in cold, clinical language, have
long been moved to poetry in describing cancer’s guile: it is “the
emperor of all maladies, the king of terrors,”52 “an obscene and
demonic predator, an invincible grim reaper,”53 a “hidden assassin.”54
Cancer remains, if not unique in its difficulty, supremely peerless:
diverse, complex, mysterious, intractable, and, for each patient,
personal.
B.

Understanding Cancer’s Information

At its core, the modern endeavor to understand cancer’s
complexity is one of information: uncovering data, facts, or statistics
describing the disease’s sufferers or components of tumors.55 This
parallels research into other complex phenomena that seeks to make
sense of “the number and variety of an item’s constituent elements
and of the elaborateness of their interrelational structure.”56 Cancer
research today accordingly focuses on determining and quantifying
counteraction of immune suppression.”); T. Dalmay & D.R. Edwards, MicroRNAs and the
Hallmarks of Cancer, 25 ONCOGENE 6170, 6170–72 (2006) (aberrant microRNA
regulation of tissue architecture); Maozhen Tian, Jason R. Neil & William P. Schiemann,
Transforming Growth Factor-β and the Hallmarks of Cancer, 23 CELLULAR SIGNALLING
951, 959 (2011) (TGF-β sensitivity).
51. See Erika Check Hayden, Cancer Complexity Slows Quest for Cure, 455 NATURE
148, 148 (2008) (discussing the unique difficulties arising from cancer’s complexity); Peter
J. Neumann, Sarah K. Bliss & James D. Chambers, Therapies For Advanced Cancers Pose
a Special Challenge for Health Technology Assessment Organizations in Many Countries,
31 HEALTH AFF. 700, 700 (2012) (“[H]ealth technology assessment organizations are
struggling with cancer’s ‘exceptionalism.’”); Jennifer K. Pilchta et al., What’s New in
Genetic Testing for Cancer Susceptibility?, 30 ONCOLOGY 787, 787 (2016) (assessing the
“complexity of clinical management . . . genetic testing, risk assessment, and large-scale
population screening, [as] present[ing] unique challenges.”); see also Teneille R. Brown,
Denying Death, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 977, 982 (2015) (“In many ways, cancer is different.
Cancer hijacks our bodies’ natural production systems and makes them go haywire.
Cancer cells sinisterly take refuge in hidden corners of our bodies and then cleverly
mutate to evade new drug treatments.”).
52. MUKHERJEE, supra note 12, at xiv.
53. GREAVES, supra note 32, at 3 (describing Susan Sontag’s depiction of cancer in
her book, SUSAN SONTAG, ILLNESS AS METAPHOR, 1978)).
54. Id. at 109 (quoting poem by W.H. Auden, Miss Gee, in ANOTHER TIME 62
(1937)).
55. See PEDRO J. GUTIÉRREZ, IRMA H. RUSSO & JOE RUSSO, THE EVOLUTION OF
THE USE OF MATHEMATICS IN CANCER RESEARCH 158–165 (2012) (demonstrating the
statistical modeling of tumors); Vivien Marx, The Big Challenges of Big Data, 498
NATURE 255, 255 (2013) (describing cancer as a “big data” challenge); Michael R.
Stratton, Peter J. Campbell & P. Andrew Futreal, The Cancer Genome, 458 NATURE 719,
719 (2009) (characterizing cancer genetics as an “explosion of information”).
56. NICHOLAS RESCHER, COMPLEXITY: A PHILOSOPHICAL OVERVIEW 1 (1998).
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these elements, such as: which populations are most susceptible to the
disease;57 environmental factors or human behaviors that contribute
to it;58 how changes in cellular function affect cancer’s progression;59
and which genes play a role in tumors’ genesis.60 To that end, efforts
to understand cancer both focus on information and produce it—
cancer research generates data about components of the disease and
synthesizes existing data to produce new understandings about its
causes.61 Understanding cancer is understanding cancer’s information.
This drive to understand cancer through producing and
synthesizing information is perhaps best illustrated by the
International Agency for Research on Cancer’s (“IARC”)
Monographs on the Evaluation of Carcinogenic Risks to Humans.62
IARC—an arm of the World Health Organization (“WHO”)—
periodically establishes working groups of several dozen to hundreds
of scientists to evaluate published research on the carcinogenic effect
of chemicals, foods, and human behavior.63 Through committee
meetings, it crafts a report that weighs all of the published evidence of
the particular agent studied and then assigns the agent to one of five
risk groups: (1) carcinogenic to humans; (2A) probably carcinogenic
to humans; (2B) possibly carcinogenic to humans; (3) not classifiable
as to its carcinogenicity to humans; and (4) probably not carcinogenic
to humans.64 As an example, IARC recently completed a report of the
57. See, e.g., Jeffery P. Struewing et al., The Risk of Cancer Associated with Specific
Mutations of BRCA1 and BRCA2 Among Ashkenazi Jews, 336 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1401,
1401 (1997).
58. See, e.g., David C. Whiteman & Louise F. Wilson, The Fractions of Cancer
Attributable to Modifiable Factors: A Global Review, 44 CANCER EPIDEMIOLOGY 203, 203
(2016).
59. See, e.g., A. Janssen & R.H. Medema, Mitosis as an Anti-Cancer Target, 30
ONCOGENE 2799, 2799 (2011).
60. See, e.g., Stratton et al., supra note 55, at 719.
61. See, e.g., Marx, supra note 55, at 257 (charting a “data explosion” for genetic
sequencing information); Stratton et al., supra note 55, at 723 (“[T]he arrival of secondgeneration sequencing technologies promises a new era for cancer genomics. These
platforms currently generate billions of bases of DNA sequence per week, yields that are
predicted to increase rapidly over the next couple of years.”); Whiteman & Wilson, supra
note 58 at 203 (demonstrating the data created from a synthesis of global cancer
information).
62. See generally WORLD HEALTH ORG. & INT’L AGENCY FOR RES. ON CANCER,
Preamble to IARC MONOGRAPHS ON THE EVALUATION OF CARCINOGENIC RISKS TO
HUMANS
(2006),
http://monographs.iarc.fr/ENG/Preamble/CurrentPreamble.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UYL5-NR62] (describing the monograph system).
63. Id. at 5–6.
64. Id. at 22–23. For a criticism of IARC’s classification system, see Ed Yong, Beefing
With the World Health Organization’s Cancer Warnings, ATLANTIC (Oct. 26, 2015),
http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2015/10/why-is-the-world-health-organization-sobad-at-communicating-cancer-risk/412468/ [https://perma.cc/X2HA-DX3F].
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role of glyphosate—the pesticide famously found in Monsanto’s
Roundup—in human cancers.65 It analyzed the methodology and
results of roughly two dozen studies—cohort, case-control, and metaanalyses in humans—as well as other experimental studies in mice
and rats.66 It reviewed the possible mechanisms of action for
glyphosate to damage cellular DNA.67 And it concluded that
glyphosate is “probably” carcinogenic to humans, based on limited
evidence of its association with one form of human cancer, more
substantial evidence of its carcinogenicity in animals, and plausible
mechanisms of action for the chemical “operat[ing] through two key
characteristics of known human carcinogens.”68 IARC reports, like
the one on glyphosate, frequently review hundreds of studies and
commonly consist of close to 1,000 pages.69 As of July 6, 2016, IARC
has produced 999 of these reports.70 Significantly, the WHO does not
study any other disease with such depth.71
Information underlies reports like IARC’s—the myriad
biochemical, genetic, and cellular pathways involved in the origins
and progression of tumors. Because cancer is, in effect, “a runaway
cell-cycle engine,”72 researchers often examine which of these
elements are responsible for aberrations in the cell-cycle—whether
they wrongly drive a cell forward in its replication cycle,73 fail to stop
a replicating cell from further replicating,74 or incorrectly signal other

65. 112 WORLD HEALTH ORG. & INT’L AGENCY FOR RES. ON CANCER, IARC
MONOGRAPHS ON THE EVALUATION OF CARCINOGENIC RISKS TO HUMANS: SOME
ORGANOPHOSPHATE INSECTICIDES AND HERBICIDES (2015), http://monographs.iarc.fr
/ENG/Monographs/vol112/mono112.pdf [https://perma.cc/LC9A-FPW6].
66. Id. at 331–61.
67. Id. at 365–86.
68. Id. at 398 (“Glyphosate is probably carcinogenic to humans (Group 2A).”).
69. E.g., WORLD HEALTH ORG. & INT’L AGENCY FOR RES. ON CANCER, supra note
38 (comprising 1,473 pages, including a 24-page, single-spaced bibliography).
70. See Agents Classified by the IARC Monographs, Volumes 1–120, INT’L AGENCY
FOR RES. ON CANCER, LIST OF CLASSIFICATIONS, http://monographs.iarc.fr/ENG
/Classification/ (last modified Oct. 27, 2017) [https://perma.cc/8YD5-GRM7].
71. A recent list of the WHO’s programs includes only a single research agency:
IARC. See Programmes and Projects, WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/entity
/en/ [http://perma.cc/HL8V-ZJRV].
72. See Andrew W. Murray, Creative Blocks: Cell-Cycle Checkpoints and Feedback
Controls, 359 NATURE 599, 599 (1992).
73. E.g., William R. Taylor & George R. Stark, Regulation of the G2/M Transition by
p53, 20 ONCOGENE 1803, 1803 (2001) (describing the role of a protein, p53, in driving
replication in a cancerous cell).
74. E.g., Charles J. Sherr, Cancer Cell Cycles, 274 SCI. 1672, 1672 (1996) (reviewing
genes responsible for the continuous replication of cancer cells).
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cells to begin the replication process.75 To date, researchers have
identified innumerable pathways responsible for cellular replication,
each involving dozens of proteins engaged in countless interactions
with one another.76 Researchers then frequently continue this work
by using the data generated in past studies to identify even more
genes and cellular pathways responsible for “tumorigenesis.”77
This broad view of cancer places the disease within the
framework of “-omics,” a suffix used to identify areas of study
encompassing enormously large informational scales.78 The human
genome, for example, is the collection of roughly all 20,000 known
human genes.79 Genomics is, therefore, the study of the interactions
among them.80 At omics-level scales, science begins to fade from
laboratory benches and moves toward computers. Researchers, facing
data from tens of thousands of elements, with a gargantuan number
of interactions among them, cannot possibly examine them all.
Instead, “techniques developed in fields such as computer science and
statistics [are used] to facilitate understanding . . . [of] the biologic
systems being studied.”81

75. E.g., Francis Rodier et al., Persistent DNA Damage Signalling Triggers
Senescence-Associated Inflammatory Cytokine Secretion, 11 NATURE CELL BIOLOGY 973,
973 (2009) (finding an inflammation signaling response in some types of cancer cells).
76. See H. Billur Engin, Jason F. Kreisberg & Hannah Carter, Structure-Based
Analysis Reveals Cancer Missense Mutations Target Protein Interaction Interfaces, 11 PLOS
ONE e0152929 1, 2 (2016).
77. E.g., id.
78. WILLIAM C.S. CHO, Preface to AN OMICS PERSPECTIVE ON CANCER RESEARCH
v (William C.S. Cho ed., 2010) (“Postgenome science is characterized by omics data
related to genome, transcrip-tome, epigenome, proteome, metabolome and interactome.
In the omics era, it is a revolution in cancer research which fundamentally shifts the
strategy from piece-by-piece to global analysis and from hypothesis-driven to discoverybased research.”).
79. Jyoti Madhusoodanan, Human Gene Set Shrinks Again, SCIENTIST (July 8, 2014)
(citing Iakes Ezkurdia, Multiple Evidence Strands Suggest That There May Be as Few as
19,000 Human Protein-Coding Genes, 23 HUM. MOLECULAR GENETICS 5866, 5866
(2014)),
http://www.the-scientist.com/?articles.view/articleNo/40441/title/Human-GeneSet-Shrinks-Again/ [http://perma.cc/4SD5-RKJF].
80. John Quackenbush, Microarray Analysis and Tumor Classification, 354 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 2463, 2470 (2006) (“Genomics is the study of genomes and the complete
collection of genes that they contain.”); Nick Campbell & Mary Muers, About This Site:
Omics, OMICSGATEWAY (July 2011), http://www.nature.com/omics/about/index.html
[http://perma.cc/E4SC-8BB7] (“Omics is a general term for a broad discipline of science
and engineering for analyzing the interactions of biological information objects in various
‘omes.’”).
81. Quackenbush, supra note 80, at 2470.
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The same is true for data concerning cancer, or
“oncogenomics.”82 Oncogenomics seeks “the integration of complete
genome analyses . . . so that accurate models of the molecular basis of
cancer can be built.”83 And in contrast to traditional clinical
research—case reports from physicians about patients—
oncogenomics requires the expertise of statisticians, data scientists,
and quantitative molecular biologists.84 Studying cancer’s information
is consequently more of a data science than a laboratory science.
As an illustration of this point, take the size and structure of
oncogenomic databases. These frequently consist of vast arrays of
information concerning tumor genetics, some of which house
sampling information from more than 100,000 subjects.85 The
Catalogue of Somatic Mutations in Cancer (“COSMIC”) database,
for example, contains genetic information from over 370,000 tumors
as part of more than 1.5 million individual experiments.86 These
databases have become objects of study themselves, with researchers
compiling resources to analyze, annotate, and visualize their data.87
Indeed, cancer research has become so informationally rich that its
output is now routinely studied by data scientists unrelated to cancer
research.88 Somewhat controversially, a great deal of cancer research
now concerns mining this previously collected data to determine new

82. Robert L. Strausberg et al., Oncogenomics and the Development of New Cancer
Therapies, 429 NATURE 469, 470 (2004) (“Database development and analysis tools
. . . will be equally important for the development and population of a database of the
molecular biology of cancer.”).
83. Id.
84. See R. David Hawkins, Gary C. Hon & Bing Ren, Next-Generation Genomics: An
Integrative Approach, 11 NATURE REV. GENETICS 476, 478 (2010) (discussing the
requirement of data integration in the era of next-generation genomics).
85. See Athanasia Pavlopoulou, Demetrios A. Spandidos & Ioannis Michalopoulos,
Human Cancer Databases (Review), 33 ONCOLOGY REP. 3, 4 (2014) (reviewing sample
sizes of various cancer databases).
86. Simon A. Forbes et al., COSMIC (The Catalogue of Somatic Mutations in Cancer):
A Resource to Investigate Acquired Mutations in Human Cancer, 38 NUCLEIC ACIDS RES.
D652, D652 (2009) (describing a database with 370,000 samples).
87. See, e.g., Michael P. Schroeder, Abel Gonzalez-Perez & Nuria Lopez-Bigas,
Visualizing Multidimensional Cancer Genomics Data, 5 GENOME MED. 9, 10 (describing
one such compilation and visualization project).
88. See, e.g., David Haussler et al., A Million Cancer Genome Warehouse 3–5 (Univ.
Cal. Berkley Dep’t Elec. Eng’g & Comput. Scis., Technical Report No. UCB/EECS-2012211), https://www2.eecs.berkeley.edu/Pubs/TechRpts/2012/EECS-2012-211.pdf [http://perma.cc
/34HM-9WT2]; Mehmet Koyutürk, Using Protein Interaction Networks to Understand
Complex Diseases, 45 COMPUTER 31, 31 (2012); A. Lex et al., StratomeX: Visual Analysis
of Large-Scale Heterogeneous Genomics Data for Cancer Subtype Characterization, 31
COMPUTER GRAPHICS F. 1175, 1175 (2012).
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linkages between genetics and the disease.89 This all highlights the
recent turn in cancer research: that it is now as much an informational
endeavor as it is an empirically clinical one.
C.

The Cost of Developing Cancer Information

Developing information about cancer is both time-intensive and
costly. Sourcing patients, providing treatment, excising tumors,
analyzing samples, and conducting further research on those samples
requires long commitments of time, effort, and expertise.90 A typical
clinical cancer research protocol may take a decade to complete.91 It
also requires a good deal of money. The National Cancer Institute
(“NCI”), responsible for roughly eighty percent of U.S. cancer
research spending,92 received $5.389 billion in appropriations in
2017.93 That equals roughly seventy percent of the total budget of the
National Science Foundation, an agency devoted to funding research
in virtually every non-health-related science, from astronomy to
zoology.94
89. See, e.g., Simon A. Forbes et al., COSMIC: Mining Complete Cancer Genomes in
the Catalogue of Somatic Mutations in Cancer, 39 NUCLEIC ACIDS RES. D945, D945
(2010) (describing data mining techniques for the COSMIC database). An editorial in the
New England Journal of Medicine has fomented a recent controversy over the practice of
data sharing and data mining, calling some researchers “research parasites.” Dan L. Longo
& Jeffrey M. Drazen, Data Sharing, 374 NEW ENG. J. MED. 276, 276 (2016). Other
prominent researchers in the field have criticized the editorial as “deeply troubling,”
“deranged,” and an act of “condescension.” Data Sharing, Data Scientists, and “Parasites,”
GENOMEWEB (Jan. 25, 2016), https://www.genomeweb.com/scan/data-sharing-datascientists-and-parasites [https://perma.cc/2H3B-LJPG (dark archive)].
90. See Aylin Sertkaya et al., Examination of Clinical Trial Costs and Barriers for
Drug Development, ERG 4.3–4.26 (July 25, 2014), https://aspe.hhs.gov/sites/default/files
/pdf/77166/rpt_erg.pdf [http://perma.cc/QXC6-4KN8] (describing some of the barriers to
clinical trials).
91. See, e.g., Jack Cuzick et al., Effect of Anastrozole and Tamoxifen as Adjuvant
Treatment for Early-Stage Breast Cancer: 10-Year Analysis of the ATAC Trial, 11 LANCET
ONCOLOGY 1135, 1135 (2010) (noting breast cancer “median follow-up of 120 months”);
Kristina R. Dahlstrom et al., An Evolution in Demographics, Treatment, and Outcomes of
Oropharyngeal Cancer at a Major Cancer Center, 119 CANCER 81, 81 (2013) (noting the
median survival rate oropharyngeal cancer is 120 months); Wilma D. Heemsbergen et al.,
Long-Term Results of the Dutch Randomized Prostate Cancer Trial: Impact of DoseEscalation on Local, Biochemical, Clinical Failure, and Survival, 110 RADIOTHERAPY &
ONCOLOGY 104, 104 (2014) (noting prostate cancer “median follow-up of 110 months”).
92. Seth Eckhouse, Grant Lewison & Richard Sullivan, Trends in the Global Funding
and Activity of Cancer Research, 2 MOLECULAR ONCOLOGY 20, 20 (2008) (estimating
NCI’s spending to be roughly 83% of cancer research spending in the United States).
93. NCI Budget and Appropriations, NAT’L CANCER INST. (Apr. 19, 2016),
http://www.cancer.gov/about-nci/budget [https://perma.cc/N8WU-DFMM].
94. What We Do, NAT’L SCI. FOUND. (Sept. 3, 2017), https://www.nsf.gov/about
/what.jsp [http://perma.cc/XFF2-MFXU] (describing the goals and purpose of the National
Science Foundation).
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Currently, the cost of cancer research is spread across multiple
domains, none of which are cheap. Academic research laboratories
often pair with their clinical counterparts to genetically sequence
patient tumors—a process that experienced an exponential decrease
in cost since 2007.95 Nonetheless, whole genome sequencing of a
single sample still costs roughly $1,000 on the retail market, a sum
that can quickly become extraordinary when multiplied across several
samples from thousands of patients.96 Research laboratories running
studies on this data, funded by government or private grants, typically
bear these costs.97 As just one example, the NCI awarded a $2.8
million grant for a project focused on the whole genome sequencing
of 1,200 samples from a leukemia variant—a grant that ultimately
resulted in a publication in Nature.98 That grant was one of almost
seventy whole genome sequencing studies funded by the NCI in 2013
alone.99
Besides the cost of sequencing itself, there is also the cost of
housing and securing sequencing information. These data costs can
similarly be substantial. Using one popular genetic data service,
Strand NGS, whole genome sequencing data files from 1,000 samples
can expand to as large as 300 terabytes100—currently the size of 300
typical computer hard drives.101 Storing and securing this data can
95. See DNA Sequencing Costs: Data, NAT’L HUM. GENOME RES. INST. (last updated
Oct.
31,
2017),
https://www.genome.gov/27541954/dna-sequencing-costs-data/
[http://perma.cc/HC94-4YSJ] (charting the decrease in sequencing cost from 2001 to 2015).
96. HiSeq X Ten System, ILLUMINA, https://www.illumina.com/systems/sequencingplatforms/hiseq-x.html [http://perma.cc/J87M-9L3Q] (“The system consists of a set of 10
HiSeq X ultra-high-throughput instruments that deliver over 18,000 human genomes per
year at the price of $1000 per genome.”).
97. See Elaine R. Mardis, The $1,000 Genome, the $100,000 Analysis?, 2 GENOME
MED. 84, 84 (2010) (noting that while the cost of sequencing is often paid for by research
laboratories, the cost-bearer for sequencing analysis is frequently unclear).
98. See Li Ding et al., Clonal Evolution in Relapsed Acute Myeloid Leukaemia
Revealed by Whole-Genome Sequencing, 481 NATURE 506, 510 (2012); Genomics of Acute
Myelogenous Leukemia, NAT’L CANCER INST. (2013), http://fundedresearch.cancer.gov
/nciportfolio/search/details?action=abstract&grantNum=2P01CA101937-10&grantID=8475986
&grtSCDC=FY%202013&absID=8475986&absSCDC=PUB2013 [https://perma.cc/6QFN4JB9].
FUNDED
RES.
PORTFOLIO,
99. See
Advanced
Search,
NCI
http://fundedresearch.cancer.gov/nciportfolio/search/SearchForm?formType=advanced
&action=clear&field=keywords#keywords_field [http://perma.cc/J6H7-C2NR] (searching
for grants in fiscal year 2013 with keywords “whole genome sequencing” or “whole
genome sequence”).
100. Guide to Storage and Computation Requirements, STRANDNGS, http://www.strandngs.com/support/ngs-data-storage-requirements [http://perma.cc/F2AZ-C2U7 ].
101. See Joel Santo Domingo, SSD vs. HDD: What’s the Difference?, PCMAG (Jun. 9,
2017, 4:01 PM), https://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2404258,00.asp [http://perma.cc
/7MTG-K2UN].
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then easily cost thousands of dollars per month.102 A recent report
from STAT pegged the cost of storing information from the Cancer
Genome Atlas, for example, to be $2 million per year.103
More traditionally, FDA-mandated clinical trials for new cancer
therapeutics remain one of the richer, yet more expensive, sources of
data of cancer information.104 In a typical cancer clinical trial, a
therapeutic developer divides a subject population into several
treatment “arms” to determine whether a new treatment will have a
beneficial effect, often relative to a current, standard treatment.105 In
doing so, the therapeutic developer often generates reams of data
concerning the subjects’ genetics, physiology, and behavior, including
valuable information concerning patients’ (and their tumors’)
genetics, biochemistry, and cellular makeup.106 This information, in
turn, then often requires years’ worth of follow-up to determine
whether the therapy (or its control) had any effect on the disease.107
From start to finish, a typical cancer clinical trial costs roughly
$40 million and takes between six-and-a-half to eight-and-a-half
years.108
Clinical trials have several drawbacks, not the least of which is
their length: they are often not run long enough to generate some of
the most robust and important data to researchers.109 Longitudinal
data—measurements of fixed variables over prolonged periods of

102. See Pricing: Genomics, GOOGLE CLOUD PLATFORM, (last updated Dec. 13, 2017)
https://cloud.google.com/genomics/pricing [http://perma.cc/FW6F-CDVG] (listing the
annual cost of storage of a single, average human genome to be $25.00).
103. Sharon Begley, Cancer Research Moves to the Cloud to Improve Patient Care,
STAT (Feb. 17, 2016), https://www.statnews.com/2016/02/17/cancer-research-cloudcomputing/ [http://perma.cc/9HBM-5RSU].
104. See Kathy L. Hudson, Michael S. Lauer & Francis S. Collins, Toward a New Era
of Trust and Transparency in Clinical Trials, 316 JAMA 1353, 1353 (2016) (describing
clinical trials as responsible for the “generation of robust evidence about treatments or
preventive interventions in routine clinical care”).
105. See Richard Simon, The Use of Genomics in Clinical Trial Design, 14 CLINICAL
CANCER RES. 5984, 5984 (2008) (describing variations of cancer clinical trials).
106. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 9,350,802 (filed June 22, 2012) (describing a method of
transferring data generated from clinical trials).
107. See, e.g., Jack Cuzick et al., supra note 91, at 1135; Kristina R. Dahlstrom et al.,
supra note 91, at 81, 90; Wilma D. Heemsbergen et al., supra note 91, at 104.
108. Sertkaya et al., supra note 90, at 1, 3.
109. See Budish, Roin & Williams, supra note 22, at 2074 (“[C]onsistent with the idea
that the patent system should offer zero incentive to develop drug compounds that take
longer than 20 years to develop, very few trials in our data have a reported length of 20
years or longer.”).
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time—frequently serve as the gold standard in clinical research.110 In
the cancer context, longitudinal data typically focuses on several
standard measurements of treatment patients—survival period,
remission, tumor genetics, and so on—taken over the course of
several years, to accurately assess whether the patients have, in fact,
survived their cancers.111 Because of the long time periods involved,
longitudinal studies are often publicly funded.112 For instance, the
NCI currently shepherds the well-known National Surgical Adjuvant
Breast and Bowel Project (“NSABP”), a series of decades’ long
longitudinal studies on cancer treatments.113 One NSABP project,
NSABP-04, consisted of a thorough, twenty-five year longitudinal
study concerning breast cancer patients’ survival expectancies after
massive surgical interventions, like radical mastectomies114 (it
concluded that radical surgery provided no additional benefit,
overturning decades of oncological wisdom).115 By as late as 2011, the
NSABP cost between $15 and $30 million per year.116
And even after all of a project’s clinical research has been
performed, there remains the possibility—and cost—of secondary
research, or research reexamining the same data, under different
hypotheses, statistical tools, and global analyses.117 The costs of

110. See Scott L. Zeger & Kung-Yee Liang, Longitudinal Data Analysis for Discrete
and Continuous Outcomes, 42 BIOMETRICS 121, 122 (1986) (introducing “general
estimating equations” for clinical statistics).
111. See GEERT VERBEKE & GEERT MOLENBERGHS, LINEAR MIXED MODELS FOR
LONGITUDINAL DATA 15 (2009) (describing a longitudinal cancer study tracking
“duration of response, time to progression, [and] survival,” among other variables); id. at
415–16 (discussing the measuring of interdam variability as capturing tumor genetics).
112. See Budish et al., supra note 22, at 2074 (“Of the approximately 120 clinical trials
longer than 20 years that have non-missing data on sponsorship, essentially 100 percent
are publicly funded.”); Wilbanks & Topol, supra note 24, at 347 (“Pharmaceutical firms
have long sequestered limited types of hard-to-obtain data, for instance on how specific
chemicals affect certain blood measurements in clinical trials. But they generally lack
longitudinal health data about individuals outside the studies that they run, and often
cannot connect a participant in one trial to the same participant in another.”).
113. National Surgical Adjuvant Breast and Bowel Project: Over 50 Years of Clinical
Trial History, NSABP, http://www.nsabp.pitt.edu [http://perma.cc/S45T-GS6U].
114. Bernard Fisher et al., Twenty-Five-Year Follow-Up of a Randomized Trial
Comparing Radical Mastectomy, Total Mastectomy, and Total Mastectomy Followed by
Irradiation, 347 NEW ENG. J. MED. 567, 567 (2002); see also MUKHERJEE, supra note 12,
at 200–01 (describing NSABP-04).
115. See Fisher et. al., supra note 114, at 567; MUKHERJEE, supra note 12, at 200–01.
116. 2011 Fact Book, NAT’L CANCER INST. (2011), https://www.cancer.gov/about-nci
/budget/fact-book/archive/2011-fact-book.pdf [https://perma.cc/WG7B-MJP7] (budget
information about the center ended in 2012).
117. Angela K. Green et al., The Project Data Sphere Initiative: Accelerating Cancer
Research by Sharing Data, 20 ONCOLOGIST 464, 465 (2015) (“[A]dvancements in
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secondary research are essentially the data costs of the original
research repeated with the additional costs of computer equipment,
data
scientists,
statisticians,
and
information
technology
118
professionals.
Furthermore, there are costs in ensuring the
confidentiality of any information obtained from the original
dataset119 and potentially licensing fees for private datasets.120 In 2013,
the Director of Kansas State University’s Johnson Cancer Research
Center, Rob Denell, praised a series of private donations to make up
some of these costs.121 To paraphrase Professor Denell: cancer
research ain’t cheap.122
D. Public-Private Partnerships and the Cancer Moonshot
Given the cost and uncertainty involved in developing cancer
information, cancer research has historically been funded through
grants, both private and public. In the nineteenth century, cancer
research suffered from a lack of “government support—local, state, or
national—for biological scientists.”123 As a result, the private largesse
of the Gilded Age funded research hospitals studying the disease,
including the United States’ first such specialized facility, the New
York Cancer Hospital, in 1890.124 Today, private funding comprises a
large part of the global cancer research budget—roughly $1 billion in
the United States alone.125 A substantial portion of that goes to
research by pharmaceutical development companies in an effort to
usher their products to the marketplace.126 But, in a historical parallel,
today’s New Gilded Age similarly funds cancer research through

statistical methods for secondary database analysis offer many tools for reanalyzing data
arising from disparate trials, such as propensity score matching.”).
118. See Alexander K. Smith et al., Conducting High-Value Secondary Dataset
Analysis: An Introductory Guide and Resources, 26 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 920, 923–26
(2011) (describing some of the costs associated with secondary analyses).
119. See id. at 923 (“Some datasets . . . require multiple layers of permission and
security, and in some cases data must be analyzed in a central data processing center. If
the project requires linking new data to an existing database, this linkage will add to the
time needed to complete the project and probably require enhanced data security.”).
120. See infra notes 381–86 and accompanying text.
121. Marcia Locke, Private Donations Let Cancer Research Center Award $466,600 for
Research, Training, K-STATE NEWS (May 9, 2013), http://www.k-state.edu/media
/newsreleases/may13/canceryear5913.html [http://perma.cc/XM2M-HRZ9].
122. Id. (“‘Saving lives through cancer research isn’t cheap,’ said Rob Denell, director
of the university’s Johnson Cancer Research Center and distinguished professor of
biology.”).
123. JAMES T. PATTERSON, THE DREAD DISEASE 22 (1987).
124. See id.
125. Eckhouse et al., supra note 92, at 25.
126. See id. at 21–22.
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large, singular grants.127 Like the Astors of last century, Sean Parker,
the internet billionaire, recently announced a $250 million grant effort
devoted to cancer research.128
On the public side of the ledger, cancer research through grant
funding largely began in 1938 with the establishment of—and
$400,000 of appropriations funding awarded to—the National Cancer
Institute.129 The NCI’s work and budget slowly but steadily increased
in the intervening decades until 1971, when President Nixon declared
a “War on Cancer”—increasing the Institute’s budget by $100
million.130 As of this writing, the NCI’s budget constitutes $5.389
billion,131 sixteen percent of the NIH’s total budget,132 with funding
relatively split between intramural and extramural research.133 It is
fair to say that current academic research on cancer is largely a
product of the NCI.134
The success of these funding efforts, however, has been mixed.
Research efforts—alongside breakthrough advances in genomics and
information technology—have produced more information about
cancer than previously dreamed of.135 But the parallel development of
127. See Ron Winslow, Sean Parker Turns to Cancer Research, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 17,
2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/sean-parker-turns-to-cancer-research-1460521518
[https://perma.cc/C8FN-UQ75 (staff-uploaded archive)] (describing the cancer
philanthropy of Sean Parker, Michael Bloomberg, and Sidney Kimmel).
128. Id.
129. NAT’L INSTS. HEALTH, HISTORY OF CONGRESSIONAL APPROPRIATIONS, 1938–
1949, https://officeofbudget.od.nih.gov/pdfs/FY08/FY08%20COMPLETED/appic3806%20%20transposed%2038%20-%2049.pdf [https://perma.cc/TWL4-EWZM].
130. See NAT’L CANCER INST., 1972 FACT BOOK 22 (1972), http://www.cancer.gov
/about-nci/budget/fact-book/archive/1971-fact-book.pdf [https://perma.cc/DQ5T-XGVF];
National Cancer Act of 1971, NAT’L CANCER INST., https://dtp.cancer.gov/timeline/flash
/milestones/M4_Nixon.htm [https://perma.cc/3S23-W4NZ].
131. NCI Budget and Appropriations, NAT’L CANCER INST. (last updated Nov. 28,
2017), http://www.cancer.gov/about-nci/budget [https://perma.cc/S4FZ-5QQB].
132. HHS FY2016 Budget in Brief, HHS.GOV, http://www.hhs.gov/about/budget
/budget-in-brief/nih/index.html [https://perma.cc/XM3M-2RKL].
133. NCI Budget Fact Book, NAT’L CANCER INST., http://www.cancer.gov/about-nci
/budget/fact-book [https://perma.cc/HU42-R2JY]. NIH defines “intramural research” as
research “done by scientists employed by the Federal government,” while extramural
research “is done across the United States and in some foreign countries by investigators
who have been awarded grants through the NIH grant program.” Frequently Asked
Questions About NHGRI Research, NAT’L INSTS. HEALTH, https://www.genome.gov
/12011002/about-nhgri-research-fact-sheet/ [https://perma.cc/Y2DB-CJ44].
134. See G. Steven McMillan, Francis Narin & David L. Deeds, An Analysis of the
Critical Role of Public Science in Innovation: The Case of Biotechnology, 29 RES. POL’Y 1,
6 (2000) (calculating the National Cancer Institute to be the largest paper-producing
research organization in the United States, apart from Harvard University, and the single
greatest source of funding acknowledgements in published materials).
135. See Robert L. Grossman et al., Toward a Shared Vision for Cancer Genomic Data,
375 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1109, 1111 (2016) (“The recent explosion of cancer genome
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public and private funding mechanisms shows a lack of coordination
between the two systems, and even within them.136 Cancer
information seems to be increasingly siloed in public and private
granaries, and even then, compartmentalized and divided by
discipline.137 Nixon’s War on Cancer was perhaps the first attempt to
break down these barriers, by establishing the National Cancer
Advisory Board (“NCAB”), “a presidentially appointed committee of
18 members, to assist NCI in developing its programs.”138 But,
historically, the NCAB has included university research professors at
the expense of industry representatives.139 Today, the board consists
entirely of academics and clinicians.140 Within the NCI, true
coordination between the public and private sectors remains
pervasively weak.141 And Nixon’s War on Cancer, like other wars
fought by him, has been widely viewed as a failure.142
analysis has left in its wake a trail of data ambiguity that must be addressed and
rectified.”).
136. See NAT’L CANCER INST., THE FUTURE OF CANCER RESEARCH:
ACCELERATING SCIENTIFIC INNOVATION (PRESIDENT’S CANCER PANEL ANNUAL
REPORT 2010-2011) ii (2012) https://deainfo.nci.nih.gov/advisory/pcp/annualreports/pcp1011rpt/FullReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/2KN7-VXAB]. (“In 2012, more than 40 years after
passage of the [1971 National Cancer] Act, neither the scope of the [National Cancer
Program] nor its leadership, coordination, or participants have ever been clearly defined.
As a result, the NCP lacks a national vision and priorities, and the cancer research effort
continues to be fragmented and largely uncoordinated. The application and dissemination
of research advances remains uneven at best.”).
137. See Alaina G. Levine, Blurring the Lines Between Academic and Industrial Cancer
Research, SCIENCE (Mar. 29, 2013), https://www.sciencemag.org/careers/features/2013/03
/blurring-lines-between-academic-and-industrial-cancer-research [https://perma.cc/23JGJ7HG] (“‘Depending on the type of cancer research, [scientists] can become quite siloed in
academia,’ says [Jennifer] Malin . . . . Companies rely on collaboration across disciplines
such as cancer biology, oncology, cellular biology, chemistry, and biotechnology.” (first
alteration in original)).
138. National Cancer Act of 1971, NAT’L CANCER INST., http://www.cancer.gov/aboutnci/legislative/history/national-cancer-act-1971 [https://perma.cc/E8VS-DQH9].
139. This conclusion is based on a review of the meeting minutes of the National
Cancer Advisory Board from 1980 until today. See National Cancer Advisory Board
CANCER
INST.,
http://deainfo.nci.nih.gov/advisory/ncab
Meetings,
NAT’L
/ncabmeetings.htm [https://perma.cc/KDX5-5X3D]; NCAB Archive Meeting Information,
CANCER
INST.,
http://deainfo.nci.nih.gov/advisory/ncab/archive/index.htm
NAT’L
[https://perma.cc/DF7V-C9VG].
140. See NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, NATIONAL CANCER INSTITUTE,
NATIONAL CANCER ADVISORY BOARD (May 2017), http://deainfo.nci.nih.gov/advisory
/ncab/ncabpublicroster.pdf [https://perma.cc/MG7E-NVUC].
141. See PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., PRIORITIES FOR
PERSONALIZED MEDICINE 2 (Sept. 2008), https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=234678
[https://perma.cc/H9ME-QJD5]. (“Historically, development [of genomics-based
molecular diagnostics] has been the purview of industry rather than of governmentsupported academic science, which has instead focused on discovery research. . . . [I]n
order to move genomic discoveries to practical application, public investment in the
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Recently, however, public and private funders have been united
in calls to solve these coordination problems through true publicprivate partnerships.143 Indeed, “[n]early all major recent policy
cancer research funding and policy initiatives have emphasised the
public–private partnership route.”144 Broadly defined, public-private
partnerships are joint efforts between private industry and public
agencies to achieve public goals.145 They are, in many ways, an explicit
recognition that certain problems are so large and unwieldy that
neither sector has the appropriate incentives—owing to short-term
political and shareholder appeasement—to work on the task alone.146
Public-private partnerships may be publicly funded by an agency, as a
lure for the expertise and efficiency of the private sector.147 Or they
may seek private funding in exchange for profitable participation in
public (and publicity generating) work.148 They also differ from other
forms of public engagement with private entities, such as grants,
prizes, or tax credits, in that they seek not just expertise but also
organizational input and elbow grease from private participants.149

translational research necessary to validate genomic/clinical correlations must be
increased and also coordinated with industry investment.”).
142. See Alison Abbott, On the Offensive, 416 NATURE 470, 470 (2002) (“[S]ince
President Richard Nixon launched his ‘war on cancer’ in 1971, a minority of experts has
[sic] even begun to suggest that cancer has become science’s Vietnam.”).
143. See PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., supra note 141, at 2;
Bagley & Tvarnø, supra note 26, at 376 (discussing Bristol-Myers Squibb’s formation of
the International Immuno-Oncology Network).
144. Eckhouse et al., supra note 92, at 31.
145. Gian Luca Burci, Public/Private Partnerships in the Public Health Sector, 6 INT’L
ORGS. L. REV. 359, 361 (2009) (defining a public-private partnership as a “long-term
collaborative arrangement among a group of diverse stakeholders, some of which of a
public nature (e.g., government agencies and intergovernmental organizations) and others
of a private nature (e.g., non-governmental organizations, private commercial companies,
research institutes, professional associations, etc.) to jointly pursue a discreet public health
goal”); Vertinsky, supra note 26, at 1515 n.23 (similarly defining public-private
partnerships). In contrast to this Article, other commentators have included public
universities on the public side of this ledger. See, e.g., Bagley & Tvarnø, supra note 26, at
376 n.13 (“[W]e define ‘public nature’ to include public universities and research institutes,
and those private universities and research institutes that receive government funding for
medical research.”).
146. See Bagley & Tvarnø, supra note 26, at 376–77 (“Partnerships of this sort . . . are
designed to address the market’s failure to incentivize private firms to develop and market
drugs that would not be profitable without government or NGO funding.”); id at 379
(describing shareholder pressure on the current pharmaceutical development system).
147. See Vertinsky, supra note 26, at 1533 (describing public-private partnerships as
sharing expertise).
148. See id. at 1532–33 (describing private incentives for public-private partnerships).
149. See Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 11, at 315–26 (describing prizes, patents,
grants, and R&D tax incentives as one-way incentives for the production of goods).
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Apart from cancer, these form part of a larger story of similar, recent
partnerships in the health innovation space.150
To be sure, public-private partnerships, as an organizational
structure, are not new. Public-private partnerships have been
deployed in attempts to solve large-scale infrastructure problems
since at least the early nineteenth century.151 Where neither the public
fisc nor the private sector can afford to fund the establishment of a
project for the common good, public-private partnerships strive to
marry public governance with market efficiencies.152 Ideally, at least.
Public-private partnerships, like all forms of economic organization,
suffer from their own problems, such as culture mismatches: “a lack
of trust between the two groups, with resistance on both sides to share
fully with the other, leading to informational asymmetry.”153 Publicprivate partnerships often, despite their name, suffer from a lack of
public accountability, with decisions between government and private
actors cloistered in the shadows of appropriation decisions.154 And
perhaps most alarmingly, public-private partnerships often fail to
fulfill the very public values under which they are established: public
access to their products, market competition among private
participants, and community representation.155 For these reasons,
Martha Minow has partially criticized the trend toward privatizing
public governance as loosing upon the world “dangers of divisiveness
and [a] loss of common institutions.”156 Nonetheless, as with cancer
research, public-private partnerships have recently been proposed as
150. See, e.g., Kevin Outterson et al., Accelerating Global Innovation to Address
Antibacterial Resistance: Introducing CARB-X, 15 NATURE REV. DRUG DISCOVERY 589,
589 (2016) (announcing CARB-X, a public-private partnership to combat antibiotic
resistance). See generally Vertinsky, supra note 26 (discussing the Alzheimer’s Disease
Neuroimaging Initiative, the Accelerating Medicines Partnership, and Arch2POCM).
151. Minow, supra note 8, at 1237.
152. See CHARLES L. GLENN, THE AMBIGUOUS EMBRACE: GOVERNMENT AND
FAITH-BASED SCHOOLS AND SOCIAL AGENDAS 25 (2000) (“New forms of competition
are likely to result from such a devolution of responsibility from government to mediating
structures, and this could produce some efficiencies.”).
153. Jay P. Kesan & Carol Hayes, Thinking Through Active Defense in Cyberspace, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE WORKSHOP ON DETERRING CYBERATTACKS: INFORMING
STRATEGIES AND DEVELOPING OPTIONS FOR U.S. POLICY 338 (2010).
154. See Minow, supra note 8, at 1259–63 (discussing accountability issues with public
private partnerships).
155. See id. at 1246.
156. See id. at 1246. Yeats has vividly imagined the collapse of systems and society.
William Butler Yeats, The Second Coming, in THE COLLECTED POEMS OF W. B. YEATS
187 (Richard J. Finneran ed. 1996) (“Turning and turning in the widening gyre / The
falcon cannot hear the falconer; / Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold; / Mere anarchy
is loosed upon the world, / The blood-dimmed tide is loosed, and everywhere / The
ceremony of innocence is drowned . . . .”).
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solutions to particularly heavy public policy problems including
education,157 health care,158 and cybersecurity,159 to name a few. In an
age of dwindling public research dollars, affixing “-private” to public
research programs at least provides hope that other actors will make
up for research and development shortfalls.
As currently structured, the Cancer Moonshot is just such a
public-private partnership.160 The recently passed 21st Century Cures
Act authorized $1.8 billion in funding, primarily to engage and
encourage pharmaceutical developers to turn their own resources
toward studying cancer’s complexity, disclosing that information to
the public, and bringing potential treatments to trial.161
Organizationally, the Moonshot will be overseen by the Cancer
Moonshot Task Force, an entity broadly focused on seven major
problems with cancer research today: clinical trial enrollment,
immunology and prevention, risk assessment, pediatric cancers,
precision medicine, tumor evolutionary, and—importantly for this
Article—data sharing.162 Unlike the NCAB, however, the Task Force
has commissioned—and will likely commission in the future—
implementation reports from both the public and private sectors. One
such working group, the Enhanced Data Sharing Working Group,
lists members from three different federal agencies, as well as
Amazon, Google, Microsoft, and a variety of academic research
institutions.163 Using these working groups, the Cancer Moonshot will
ideally select several discrete projects for joint completion between
private industry and the NCI.164 Furthermore, the Task Force will
explicitly discuss—beyond the scientific hurdles they face—creative
ways to fund their goals, and bring them—profitably—into the private
sector.165

157. Minow, supra note 8, at 1231–32 (describing several facets of public-private
partnerships in education).
158. John V. Jacobi, The Ends of Health Insurance, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 311, 402
(1997) (describing a trend toward public-private partnerships in health care).
159. Kesan & Hayes, supra note 153, at 337–38 (describing the move toward
cybersecurity Information Sharing and Analysis Centers).
160. See FACT SHEET, supra note 8.
161. See id.; 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, § 1001(b)(4)(c), 130 Stat.
1033, 1040–41 (2016).
162. See Memorandum, supra note 5.
163. See CANCER MOONSHOT BLUE RIBBON PANEL REPORT 2016, 62 (2016)
https://www.cancer.gov/research/key-initiatives/moonshot-cancer-initiative/blue-ribbon-panel
/blue-ribbon-panel-report-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y9AX-CGVD].
164. See Memorandum, supra note 5.
165. See id. (charging the Task Force with, among other things, contemplating
“targeted incentives [such as] private sector efforts from industry and philanthropy”).
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The Moonshot goes beyond the mere funding of new research: it
also seeks to use the imprimatur of non-research focused federal
agencies as a lure for private participation in the project. The U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”), for example, recently
announced a program, “Patents 4 Patients,” that seeks to fast-track
patent applications directed to cancer immunotherapies—a research
area of particular interest to the Moonshot.166 The program, originally
slated to expire in June 2017, has since been extended—by the same
statute creating the Moonshot, the 21st Century Cures Act.167 The
Moonshot also employs the FDA, in coordination with the NIH to
review research into the connection between cancer and stem cells,
providing—in theory—a coordinated approach to moving basic
research from the laboratory to the clinic.168
More broadly, Cancer Moonshot researchers and industry
participants realize that their efforts are unlikely to produce a silver
bullet: a single pill or vaccine set to cure cancer.169 Rather, they
recognize that the primary effort of the Moonshot, for all of the
Working Groups involved, is to produce, share, and utilize robust
information about cancer. In a speech at Duke University, former
Vice President Biden noted that the purpose of the Moonshot was to
“seek greater collaboration, greater sharing of information . . . [,]
breaking down some of the research that is trapped inside of silos,
and share information with drug companies, and drug companies
being willing to be more forthcoming in sharing information.”170 The
heads of both the NCI and NIH similarly published a letter in the
New England Journal of Medicine, noting that a “goal of the initiative
will be to overcome barriers that often prevent collaboration and
information sharing among the various groups working to defeat
cancer and that limit access to state-of-the-art research.”171 And Greg
Simon, a former executive at Pfizer and the current executive director
of the Moonshot, wrote an opinion piece for Medium promising that
the Moonshot would “use the power of data to generate real solutions

166. Patents for Patients, USPTO, https://www.uspto.gov/patent/initiatives/patentapplication-initiatives/patents-4-patients [https://perma.cc/64L2-JC9J].
167. Extension of the Cancer Immunotherapy Pilot Program, 82 Fed. Reg. 28,645,
28,645–46 (June 23, 2017).
168. 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, § 1001(b)(4)(D), 130 Stat. 1041
(2016).
169. See Simon, supra note 7 (“For one thing, there’s the matter of ‘cancer’ not being a
single disease, but hundreds of diseases, with ‘cures’ taking many forms.”).
170. Graham, supra note 29, at 2.
171. Douglas R. Lowy & Francis S. Collins, Aiming High—Changing the Trajectory for
Cancer, 374 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1901, 1902–03 (2016).
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for treating cancer.”172 Whether industry agrees remains to be seen.173
The key to making the Cancer Moonshot a success, where other
efforts have failed, therefore likely lies in structuring the appropriate
incentives to produce that data.
II. CANCER’S IP
Understanding that the product of public-private partnerships
like the Cancer Moonshot is data—for example, protein information
for 58,000 patients,174 the genomic sequences of 600,000 people,175 or
molecular screens of 1.5 million historical cancer cases176—presents
numerous challenges for intellectual property and information policy.
Who, if anyone, owns the underlying datasets? Should the
information derived from such research be propertized, and if so, by
whom? And, concerning public-private partnerships, will private
enterprises be sufficiently encouraged to participate, and on what
terms?
In particular, efforts to uncover cancer’s information present a
classic case of Kenneth J. Arrow’s information paradox.177 Although
costly and difficult to create, once known information about cancer’s
mechanisms and modes of treatment can be used freely by anyone.

172. Simon, supra note 7 (emphasis added).
173. See David Winwood, The ‘Cancer Moonshot’ May Succeed—If We Don’t Weaken
Patent Protections, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Aug. 18, 2016, 6:55 PM), http://www.ibtimes.com
/cancer-moonshot-may-succeed-if-we-dont-weaken-patent-protections-opinion-2403922
[https://perma.cc/9QN5-RVKK] (preemptively criticizing the Moonshot for weakening
patent protection for cancer therapies).
174. Press Release, The White House Office of the Vice President, FACT SHEET: At
the Victoria Comprehensive Cancer Ctr., Vice President Biden Announces New
Memoranda of Understanding Between the U.S. and Australia, New Funding as Part of
Cancer Moonshot (July 16, 2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office
/2016/07/16/fact-sheet-victoria-comprehensive-cancer-center-vice-president-biden [https://perma.cc
/QH9F-7H2K].
175. Mark Warren, The Cure for Cancer Is Data—Mountains of Data, WIRED (Oct. 19,
2016, 6:55 AM), http://www.wired.com/2016/10/eric-schadt-biodata-genomics-medicalresearch/ [https://perma.cc/6BMB-Y2EK].
176. Syapse, Non-Profit Health Systems Form Cancer Data-Sharing Consortium,
GENOMEWEB (June 2, 2016), https://www.genomeweb.com/cancer/syapse-non-profithealth-systems-form-cancer-data-sharing-consortium [https://perma.cc/Q7L3-Q6L7 (staffuploaded archive)].
177. Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for
Inventive Activity, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC
AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609, 615 (Universities-National Bureau Committee for Economic
Research, Committee on Economic Growth of the Social Science Research Council ed.,
1962) (explaining that because information must be shared in order to advertise it to
potential purchasers, the seller must either risk transferring his information without
compensation or avoid sharing with anyone).
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Without some right to the information itself, researchers may be
discouraged from developing information about cancer in the first
instance.178 The traditional solution to Arrow’s paradox has been
intellectual property: government sanctioned property rights to
information—namely, the right to exclude others from using that
information in the marketplace.179 This has been no less true in cancer
research, where biopharmaceutical developers have typically relied
on three forms of intellectual property: patents, trade secrets, and
regulatory exclusivities.180 Used together, these forms of intellectual
property give rise to a system of exclusive rights in information about
cancer, from the discovery of cancer’s information to its use in
commercially available treatments.181 But each form of intellectual
property has significant shortcomings in the cancer context—legal,
temporal, and practical deficiencies that make them less than ideal to
develop and use information about cancer. This Section describes
these intellectual property regimes and examines their deficiencies.
A. Patents
1. Patentable Subject Matter
In many respects, patents are a societal quid pro quo: inventors
of new technological advances publicly disclose their creations in
exchange for time-limited exclusionary rights to their inventions.182 At
the same time, not all advances are thought to be “worth to the public
178. See id. at 615; see also Michael J. Burstein, Exchanging Information Without
Intellectual Property, 91 TEX. L. REV. 227, 232–33 (2012) (examining the paradox, and its
shortcomings, with respect to biotechnology); Arti K. Rai, Regulating Scientific Research:
Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of Science, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 77, 126 (1999)
(describing the paradox in the context of gene sequences); Ted Sichelman,
Commercializing Information With Intellectual Property, 92 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 35,
42–44 (2013) (further examining Burstein’s work in the biotechnology context).
179. Dan L. Burk & Brett H. McDonnell, The Goldilocks Hypothesis: Balancing
Intellectual Property Rights at the Boundary of the Firm, 2007 ILL. L. REV. 575, 585 (“By
publicly disclosing technical information, while protecting it by exclusivity, patents
circumvent the Arrow paradox.”); Robert Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and
Bargaining Breakdown: The Case of Blocking Patents, 62 TENN. L. REV. 75, 81 n.15 (1994)
(“Indeed, patents in general protect the licensor’s property so that she can confidently
offer it for sale. In other words, patents solve Arrow’s Paradox.”).
180. See Arti K. Rai & Jacob S. Sherkow, The Changing Life Science Patent
Landscape, 34 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 292, 292–93 (2016) (discussing the historical
use of these protections); Jacob S. Sherkow, Protecting Products Versus Platforms, 34
NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 462, 462–63 (2016) (discussing these protections for
biotechnology companies, generally).
181. See infra Part II.A–C.
182. See Sherkow, supra note 21, at 865 n.128 and accompanying text (reviewing the
history of this terminology).
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the embarrassment of an exclusive patent.”183 Some things, “like the
heat of the sun, electricity, or the qualities of metals, are part of the
storehouse of knowledge[,] . . . free to all men and reserved
exclusively to none.”184 To that end, patent law has long prohibited
the patenting of “pure” information: mathematical equations,
scientific principles, laws of nature, and the like.185 These discoveries
are ineligible for patent protection; they lack, in patent law parlance,
patentable subject matter.186
But separating what constitutes mere information as opposed to
a practical application of it has proved to be one of the most
difficult—if not the most difficult—questions in patent law.187 Since
2010, the Supreme Court has issued a quartet of opinions attempting
to delineate just that difference: Bilski v. Kappos;188 Mayo
Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc.;189 Association
for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc.;190 and Alice Corp.
Pty. v. CLS Bank International.191 In Bilski, the Court affirmed the
Patent Office’s rejection of a patent application claiming a method of
commodities hedging as an unpatentable “concept . . . reduced to a

183. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson, (Aug. 13, 1813) in 13 THE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 326, 335 (Albert Ellery Bergh & Monticello eds.,
1904).
184. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948).
185. See, e.g., Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 70–71
(2012) (law of nature); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 65 (1972) (mathematical
formula); Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 130 (scientific principle). See generally Jacob S.
Sherkow, The Natural Complexity of Patent Eligibility, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1137, 1144–55
(2014) (describing the contours of what, doctrinally, constitutes patent subject matter).
186. Sherkow, supra note 185, at 1139 (describing “patentable subject matter [as] a
century-and-a-half old legal doctrine that limits the types of inventions that can be
patented”). The doctrine is nominally codified in § 101 of the patent statute: “any new and
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new useful
improvement thereof.” 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). But in reality, it is ignored in favor of a
long-established common gloss. Sherkow, supra note 185, at 1144–45 (discussing 35 U.S.C.
§ 101).
187. Sherkow, supra note 185, at 1140 (discussing the difficulties in applying the
doctrine).
188. 561 U.S. 593 (2010).
189. 566 U.S. 66 (2012).
190. 569 U.S. 576 (2013).
191. 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014). In addition, Justice Breyer’s 2006 dissent in Laboratory
Corp. of America Holdings v. Metabolite Laboratories, Inc.—a per curiam dismissal of a
writ of certiorari as improvidently granted—further explicated the contours of patent
eligibility. 548 U.S. 124, 125–32 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting). The Supreme Court’s
activity in this area looks diminished, however, after its recent denial of certiorari in
another patentable subject matter case. Sequenom, Inc. v. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc., 136 S.
Ct. 2511 (2016).
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mathematical formula.”192 In Mayo, the Court rejected patents
directed to a system of measuring the toxicity of certain drugs used to
treat Crohn’s disease as merely the application of “well-understood,
routine, conventional activity previously engaged in by researchers in
the field.”193 In Myriad, the Court invalidated patents covering
versions of several human genes as nothing but a “product of
nature.”194 And in Alice, the Court synthesized these cases as
essentially encompassing a two-part test: “[f]irst . . . determine
whether the claims at issue are directed to . . . patent-ineligible
concepts . . . . [And second,] ask whether the additional [claim]
elements ‘transform the nature of the claim’ into a patent-eligible
application.”195
Unfortunately, these opinions provide little concrete guidance on
differentiating
unpatentable
abstractions
from
patentable
196
embodiments. What is a patent ineligible concept? For that matter,
what is a “concept”? What is a “natural” product?197 What are
“additional” claim elements? What does “transform” mean? How
much transformation is required to make a discovery simply eligible
for patent protection? Courts have struggled mightily to apply these
principles to the real world.198 Academic and practitioner commentary
on these cases has been withering,199 and the PTO’s guidance on these
cases has been less than illuminating.200
192. Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611.
193. Mayo, 566 U.S. at 73.
194. Myriad, 569 U.S. at 576.
195. Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72).
196. See John M. Golden, Patentable Subject Matter and Institutional Choice, 89 TEX. L.
REV. 1041, 1075–91 (2011) (discussing the problems with the Court’s “abstract idea”
jurisprudence); Timothy R. Holbrook & Mark D. Janis, Patent-Eligible Processes: An
Audience Perspective, 17 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 349, 352, 354–58 (2015) (raising
similar questions).
197. See generally Sherkow, supra note 185, at 1144, 1155–66 (attempting to answer this
question).
198. See Golden, supra note 196, at 1081 (“Given the lack of an applicable plain
meaning for the term ‘abstract idea,’ a legal realist might hazard that characterization of
patent claims as involving ‘abstract ideas’ really is just formal cover for a court’s
conclusion that those claims are excessively ‘abstract’ in the sense that they are too broad
to be socially justified by whatever innovative contribution has been made.”); Sherkow,
supra note 185, at 1153 (noting that the Supreme Court’s “invocations of natural ‘laws,’
‘phenomenon,’ and ‘products’ . . . provides no framework, no formula, and no list of
factors to assess their construction”).
199. See, e.g., Bernard Chao, Moderating Mayo, 107 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 423,
424–425 (2012) (surveying the reaction to Mayo); Robert R. Sachs, Punishing Prometheus:
The Supreme Court’s Blunders in Mayo v. Prometheus, PATENTLY-O (Mar. 26, 2012, 8:10
AM),
https://patentlyo.com/patent/2012/03/punishing-prometheus-the-supreme-courtsblunders-in-mayo-v-prometheus.html [http://perma.cc/3LHW-QVJ3] (“Like so many
pseudo-sciences in which every phenomenon can be rationalized and in which there is no
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These difficulties pose particular problems for patents in the
cancer space. Cancer research is a difficult, expensive, and long term
enterprise, a substantial product of which is simply information about
the natural world.201 Where the promise of patents serve as
motivation for practical research, ambiguity concerning whether
patents in the area are even eligible for protection creates substantial
risk for researchers and drug developers alike.202 After Myriad, for
example, it is unclear whether biopharmaceuticals derived from
natural products—a significant component of many cancer
therapies—can be patented.203 At an industry conference following
test that can show the theory to be incorrect, under Prometheus seemingly anything can be
‘explained’ as being unpatentable subject matter.”).
200. See Memorandum from Robert W. Bahr, Deputy Comm’r for Patent Examination
Policy, U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, to Patent Examining Corps 6–7 (May 4, 2016),
http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ieg-may-2016-memo.pdf [https://perma.cc
/8ESN-5EH4] (briefly discussing Alice and Mayo as examples, but failing to address their
analytical process); Kevin E. Noonan, The Recent PTO Guidance on Subject Matter
Eligibility: Lessons, PATENT DOCS (May 25, 2016), http://www.patentdocs.org/2016/05/therecent-pto-guidance-on-subject-matter-eligibility-lessons.html [https://perma.cc/83B2-CS67]
(“It is unclear why [the PTO’s] analysis should not arrive at patent eligibility for using a
conventional method with a novel biomarker to produce a novel result . . . . The Office
also seems to have conflated (or, more kindly, synthesized) the ‘routine, well-understood
and conventional’ standard from Mayo into the Myriad product of nature analysis; while it
may be likely that the Supreme Court will one day perform that synthesis, prudence
suggests that we let the Court do it any [sic] not have the Office try to help.”).
201. See Abbasi, supra note 19, at 384 (“The GDC’s mission is to provide ‘the cancer
research community with a unified data repository that enables data sharing across cancer
genomic studies . . . .’”); Ayanian et al., supra note 19, at 2992 (introducing a “new model
for studying cancer care,” the collection of “much more detailed data from patients,
physicians, and medical records to support more comprehensive analyses of the reasons
for variations in treatment and outcomes”); Bamford, et al., supra note 19, at 335
(containing an information source of data “extracted from information on 66,634 samples
. . . .”); Saltz et al., supra note 19, at 1910 (“The complexity of cancer is prompting
researchers to find new ways to synthesize information from diverse data sources and to
carry out coordinated research efforts that span multiple institutions.”).
202. See Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Patentable Subject Matter and Non-Patent
Innovation Incentives, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1115, 1116 (2015) (noting that some
researchers may “find the patent incentive to be dulled by the persistent uncertainty that
has plagued patentable-subject-matter doctrine in recent years”).
203. Dan L. Burk, The Curious Incident of the Supreme Court in Myriad Genetics, 90
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 505, 510 (2014) (“For thirty years prior to the Myriad decision, the
Patent Office treated purified macromolecules the way they treated other purified
chemicals, as the non-natural product of human ingenuity . . . . Overturning three decades
of consistent administrative practice would be fairly disruptive.”); Donald Zuhn, USPTO
Issues Guidance for Analyzing Subject Matter Eligibility of Claims Reciting Laws of
Nature/Natural Principles, Natural Phenomena or Natural Products, PATENT DOCS (Mar.
4, 2014), http://www.patentdocs.org/2014/03/uspto-issues-guidance-for-analyzing-subjectmatter-eligibility-of-claims-reciting-laws-of-naturenatu.html [https://perma.cc/2EB7-FMVV]
(discussing the difficulties in assessing “natural” products under the PTO’s § 101 guidance
in light of Mayo and Myriad).
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the Supreme Court decisions, Sherry Knowles, former Chief Patent
Counsel at GlaxoSmithKline, noted that four out of six of front-line
treatments for breast cancer contained Adriamycin (doxorubicin), an
analog to a chemical produced in bacteria.204 Accordingly, the
patentability of these treatments—and the appetite of their
developers to usher similar therapies through clinical trials—is
unclear.205
Similarly, diagnostics for assessing the nature of a patient’s
cancer, and the best treatments for it, are likely to fall afoul of patent
eligibility after Mayo and Alice. Rebecca S. Eisenberg summarized
this development as “increasingly clear that most important advances
in [diagnostics] lie outside the boundaries of patent-eligible subject
matter.”206 More specifically, Bernard Chao recently dissected several
patent applications for cancer diagnostics that were rejected at the
Patent Office for lacking patentable subject matter.207 These included
methods for screening certain proteins associated with lethal cancers,
selecting chemotherapy agents based on patients’ genetic profiles, and
assessing and enhancing an anti-cancer immune response using a sea
sponge extract.208 Robert R. Sachs, too, has tabulated data on over
100 patent applications concerning cancer immunotherapies—cancer
treatments utilizing the body’s own immune system—abandoned in
the wake of the Supreme Court decisions.209

204. Donald Zuhn, Sherry Knowles Addresses Real World Impact of Myriad-Mayo
Guidance at BIO Symposium, PATENT DOCS (Oct. 15, 2014, 11:34 PM),
http://www.patentdocs.org/2014/10/sherry-knowles-addresses-real-world-impact-of-myriadmayo-guidance-at-bio-symposium.html [https://perma.cc/AAT3-P9PY].
205. See id.
206. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Diagnostics Need Not Apply, 21 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L.
256, 256 (2015).
207. Bernard Chao & Lane Womack, USPTO Is Rejecting Potentially Life-Saving
Inventions, LAW360 (Dec. 18, 2014), http://www.law360.com.nyls.idm.oclc.org/articles
/604808/print?section=health [https://perma.cc/AJ6K-TZPF (staff-uploaded-archive)].
208. Id.
209. Robert R. Sachs, Will the USPTO’s “Patents 4 Patients” Program Even Make it off
the “Cancer Moonshot” Launch Pad?, BILSKI BLOG (June 30, 2016),
http://www.bilskiblog.com/blog/2016/06/will-the-usptos-patents-4-patients-program-evenmake-it-off-the-launching-pad-1.html [https://perma.cc/2C7Y-T3W3]. In connection with
the Cancer Moonshot, and partly in response to these criticisms, the PTO has adopted a
pilot program, the Cancer Immunotherapy Pilot Program, which fast-tracks certain cancer
immunotherapy patent applications. See, e.g., Cancer Immunotherapy Pilot Program, 81
Fed. Reg. 42,328, 42,328–32 (June 29, 2016). But it is unclear how such a program can
salvage patent applications that would nonetheless continue to fall outside the scope of
patentable subject matter. See John T. Aquino, Attorneys Debate Risk of Cancer
“Moonshot” Patent Claims Facing Rejection, BLOOMBERG LIFE SCI. L. & INDUSTRY REP.
(Aug. 30, 2016), https://www.bna.com/attorneys-debate-risk-n73014447075/ [https://perma.cc
/K8EB-MC2X] (discussing similar concerns raised by patent attorneys).
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The Court’s decision in Alice particularly obscures the patent
eligibility of innovations derived from basic cancer research, even
those that have specific, concrete clinical utility. Take, for example,
Esoterix Genetic Laboratories LLC v. Qiagen Inc.,210 a case
concerning the patent eligibility of a method for determining whether,
through genetic sequencing, certain lung cancers will respond to a
particular treatment.211 In 2003 and 2004, the FDA approved two
drugs to treat non-small cell lung cancer, Iressa (gefitinib) and
Tarceva (erlotinib), both of which became the gold-standard therapy
for the disease.212 A significant number of patients, however,
developed resistance to the drugs after only short courses of
treatment.213 Determining which patients would develop resistance—
and how to prevent it—remained an important but unsolved problem
following the drugs’ approval.214 In 2004, researchers at Massachusetts
General Hospital and Harvard Medical School determined that
certain mutations in a single gene, EGFR, were primarily responsible
for promoting resistance in patients treated with Iressa or Tarceva.215
They also discovered that blocking mutant versions of EGFR may
prolong patient survival.216 The researchers, in turn, obtained a patent
on a method to diagnose Iressa and Tarceva resistance: obtain a
biopsy sample of a patient and perform genetic sequencing on the
sample to determine whether it harbored one of three specific
mutations.217
Viewed through Alice’s looking glass, the patent could be
construed both ways. On one side, the patent claimed a particular

210. 133 F. Supp. 3d 349 (D. Mass. 2015).
211. Id. at 356–59.
212. Letter from Robert Temple, Dir., Office of Drug Evaluation I, Ctr. for Drug
Evaluation & Research, Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., to Ronald Falcone, Regulatory
Affairs Dir. AstraZeneca Pharm. (May 5, 2003), http://www.accessdata.fda.gov
/drugsatfda_docs/nda/2003/21-399_IRESSA_Approv.pdf [https://perma.cc/WZR2-8TMH]
(determination of application approval); Letter from Robert Temple, Dir., Office of Drug
Evaluation I, Ctr. for Drug Evaluation & Research, Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., to
Christine Boisclair, Senior Dir., Glob. Regulatory Affairs, OSI Pharm. (Nov. 18, 2004),
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/appletter/2004/21743ltr.pdf [https://perma.cc
/92FV-CHP6] (determination of application approval).
213. William Pao et al., KRAS Mutations and Primary Resistance of Lung
Adenocarcinomas to Gefitinib or Erlotinib, 2 PLOS MED. 57, 58, 61 (2005).
214. Id.
215. Thomas J. Lynch et al., Activating Mutations in the Epidermal Growth Factor
Receptor Underlying Responsiveness of Non–Small-Cell Lung Cancer to Gefitinib, 350
NEW ENG. J. MED. 2129, 2129–30 (2004).
216. Raffaella Sordella et al., Gefitinib-Sensitizing EGFR Mutations in Lung Cancer
Activate Anti-Apoptotic Pathways, 305 SCI. 1163, 1163 (2004).
217. U.S. Patent No. 7,294,468 (filed Dec. 5, 2005).
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diagnostic method for assessing drug resistance using a tangible
process—the genetic sequencing of patient tumors for specific
mutations—to produce a clinically actionable result. This appears to
be an innovation beyond a mere “concept,” as articulated in Alice—
and, in any event, transforms the information contained in the claim
into a practical application of it.218 But on the other side, the
innovation could also be seen as being simply directed to the concept
of genetically sequencing tumors to determine drug resistance. The
specific sequences, drugs, and tumors recited in the claims do not,
necessarily, turn that basic concept into a practical application. In
Esoterix, the district court happened to adopt the latter view,
concluding that the claims were “directed to a law of nature . . . the
correlation between a naturally-occurring mutation in a cancer cell,
and the likelihood that a particular type of known pharmaceutical
compound will be effective in treating that type of cancer.”219 And
under Alice’s step two, “there was nothing ‘transformative’ . . . that
amounts to a novel application of the natural law, or that otherwise
warrants patent protection.”220 Legal analysis like this suggests that
the now ambiguous nature of patentable eligibility makes protecting
cancer diagnostics—and the information undergirding them—all the
more uncertain.
2. The Statutory Bars
In an effort to goad inventors to the Patent Office—and to
protect the public from unscrupulous late-comers—patent law
requires inventors to timely file for patents on their inventions prior
to or soon after disclosing them to the public.221 Because several
sections of the patent statute codify this requirement, these strictures
are known as the “statutory bars.”222 While the 2011 Leahy-Smith
America Invents Act dramatically changed the textual structure of
the statutory bars, their content has remained largely the same for
over a century: the patent office will not award patents to inventors
who have caused their inventions to be “patented, described in a

218. See Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2351, 2630 (2014)
(discussing the lack of invention beyond its mere concept).
219. Esoterix Genetic Labs., LLC v. Qiagen, Inc., 133 F. Supp. 3d 349, 358 (D. Mass.
2015).
220. Id. at 359.
221. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012) (barring patents if the underlying invention had
been previously disclosed); Timothy R. Holbrook, Possession in Patent Law, 59 SMU L.
REV. 123, 152 (2006) (discussing the statutory bars).
222. See Holbrook, supra note 221, at 152.
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printed publication, or in public use, on sale, or otherwise available to
the public” for more than a year prior to filing.223
Capturing the statutory bars’ prohibition of early public use
within the hands of real-world research has proven slippery. An
invention is not publicly used, for purposes of the statute, if it is used
“by the inventor himself, or of any other person under his direction,
by way of experiment, and in order to bring the invention to
perfection . . . .”224 But determining whether a third-party has truly
taken an inventor’s “direction” or whether the inventor’s efforts were
genuinely for the purposes of “bringing an invention to perfection”
are elusive inquiries.225 This is all the more difficult in today’s research
environments, where collaboration is the norm and where technology
transfer and non-disclosure agreements among sophisticated parties
often obfuscate who, if anyone, acts under the direction of a mythical,
sole inventor.226
In the cancer context, and in the drug-development context
generally, the contours of public use comes to a head in clinical trials.
Prior to the sale of a new drug in interstate commerce, the FDA
requires its manufacturer to demonstrate the drug’s safety and
provide “substantial evidence that the drug will have the effect it
purports,” typically through clinical trials.227 The trials themselves,
traditionally conducted in three phases of increasing size, are
expensive, arduous, multiyear affairs: premarket cancer clinical trials
cost, on average, $39.8 million from start to finish and run between
six-and-a-half to eight-and-a-half years.228 And even after approval,
the FDA often requires its manufacturer to engage in “postmarket
surveillance” of its product, to ensure its safe and efficacious
deployment in the real world.229
223. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) (2012). Compare 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2) (2012) (awarding a
patent to the first inventor to file, for patents filed after March 16, 2013), with 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(g)(2) (2006) (awarding a patent to the first inventor to invent).
224. City of Elizabeth v. Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 126, 134 (1877).
225. See Mark A. Lemley, Does “Public Use” Mean the Same Thing It Did Last Year?,
93 TEX. L. REV. 1119, 1131–32 (2015) (discussing the paradox of “submarine patenting”);
Ari Ezra Waldman, Trust: A Disclosure Model for Patent Law, 92 IND. L.J. 557, 559, 563–
64, 566 (2017) (discussing various difficulties with public use’s “control” element).
226. See Eisenberg, supra note 23, at 226–29 (discussing the difficulties conjoining
scientific collaboration and statutory bars’ disclosure requirement); cf. Stuart J.H. Graham
& Ted Sichelman, Why Do Start-Ups Patent?, 23 BERK. TECH. L.J. 1063, 1082 (2008)
(discussing the difficulty in detecting breaches of non-disclosure agreements).
227. 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (2012).
228. Sertkaya et al., supra note 90, at 3-3.
229. See Lars Noah, Administrative Arm-Twisting in the Shadow of Congressional
Delegations of Authority, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 873, 879–82 (describing several instances of
the FDA’s postmarket surveillance system).
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The main product of all of this work is information. Specifically,
data on the drug’s toxicity to humans and at what dosages; data on
how the human body receives and metabolizes the drug; data on
whether the drug poses dangers to any special patient populations;
data on whether the new drug will interact with any other medications
patients are likely take; and importantly, data—volumes and volumes
of data—on how clinical treatment groups fared in their diseases’
prognoses relative to any control groups.230 Eisenberg has called this
production of information the “structural role” of the FDA: the
development of credible information about the effects of drugs.”231
In this sense, experimental clinical trials can be conceived as just
that: experiments. Like hypothesis testing, whether a new drug, in
fact, works in any scientifically rigorous sense is largely unknown until
after clinical trials—the experiments—have been performed.232 One
could therefore be forgiven for thinking that clinical trials necessarily
fall under the public-use exception for “experiment[s] in order to
bring the invention to perfection.”233 But this is not always so. In
several cases, courts have invalidated patents covering new drugs
because the drugs were deployed in clinical trials for more than a year
prior to their patent applications.234 In Pronova Biopharma Norge AS
v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc.,235 for example, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit invalidated Pronova’s patent covering

230. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.50(d) (2011) (enumerating the technical data required for a
New Drug Application).
231. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, 13 MICH.
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 345, 347 (2007).
232. See generally S.J. Cutler et al., The Role of Hypothesis Testing in Clinical Trials, 19
J. CHRONIC DISEASE 857 (1965) (establishing this experimentalist view of clinical trials).
233. City of Elizabeth v. Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 126, 134 (1877).
234. See, e.g., Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 855 F.3d 1356, 1375
(Fed. Cir. 2017) (concluding that future sale agreement of finished pharmaceutical product
then in clinical trials constituted an “on sale bar” to patentability); Dey, L.P. v. Sunovion
Pharm., Inc., 715 F.3d 1351, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (reversing the district court and
concluding that a triable issue of fact remained on whether Sunovion’s studies were, in
fact, confidential); Pronova Biopharma Norge AS v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 549 F. App’x
934, 942–43 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (reversing the district court and holding the patents invalid);
In re Natures Remedies, Ltd., 315 F. App’x 300, 305 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (affirming the patent
office rejection of a patent application due to statutory bars raised from the invention
being listed in clinical trials); C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1374–75 (Fed.
Cir. 1998) (affirming the invalidation of patents covering biopsy needles due to the
statutory bar triggered by clinical trials). But see Eli Lilly & Co. v. Zenith Goldline
Pharm., Inc., 471 F.3d 1369, 1380–81 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (concluding that the experimental
nature of Eli Lilly’s testing did not raise a statutory bar); SmithKline Beecham Corp. v.
Apotex Corp., 403 F.3d 1331, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (affirming the district court rejection of
Apotex’s statutory bars defense while invalidating the patents on other grounds).
235. 549 F. App’x 934 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
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Lovaza (omega-3-acid ethyl esters) because its predecessor provided
samples of the drug to a clinical hospital for analytical testing with
“no agreement restricting use of batches to clinical trials or
experiments.”236 Such preclinical work was an invalidating public use,
according to the court: where “a compound is provided without
restriction to one highly skilled in the art, that compound’s
formulation is disclosed in detail, and the formulation is subject to
confirmatory testing, no other activity is needed to render that use an
invalidating one.”237
To be clear, there are numerous cases to the contrary. The
Federal Circuit’s decision in SmithKline Beecham v. Apotex Corp.238
offered some clarity to the intersection of these two areas of law, and
has provided substantial guidance in the area.239 But the consequence
of decisions like SmithKline is unpredictability for pharmaceutical
developers.240 Recounting the development of Eli Lilly & Co.’s
Straterra (atomoxetine), Christopher M. Holman discussed the
difficult choices the company faced in filing its patents in light of
uncertainty about the drug’s performance and the public use bar.241 In
assessing whether to conduct more tests to perfect its claims or to file
early on thinner and less scientifically rigorous data, Lilly “had no
way of knowing whether the clinical trials would later be construed as
236. Id. at 942.
237. Id. at 943. With this said, it is unclear whether inventions derived from the data of
clinical testing are, themselves, subject to patent law’s statutory bars beginning with the
clinical trials themselves. That question likely turns on resolving the tension between the
data’s confidential nature and patent law’s inherency doctrine, an issue beyond the scope
of this discussion. See generally Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Inherency, 47 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 371 (2005) (discussing inherency).
238. 365 F.3d 1306, 1316–17 (Fed. Cir. 2004), vacated en banc, 403 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir.
2004).
239. Id. at 1316–17 (rejecting its prior invalidating public use decision and reaffirming
that the experiment use exception to the statutory bars only applies where the inventor is
testing claimed aspects of the invention); see also Eli Lilly & Co. v. Zenith Goldline
Pharms., Inc., 471 F.3d 1369, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (concluding that the patents were not
invalid because the patent holder “restricted access to the facility and provided full-time
security. . . closely monitored and confined the movements of the volunteers . . . [did] not
use the [patented] drugs to treat schizophrenic patients, but merely to test the safety and
efficacy of the drug [sic]”); Janssen Pharmaceutica, N.V. v. Eon Labs Mfg., Inc., 134 F.
App’x 425, 431 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (concluding patent was not invalid, because “the [clinical]
trials were closely monitored by [the patent holder]; there was a strict protocol that was to
be followed[;] . . . participating physicians were not able to dispense [the patented]
capsules to anyone they wished[;] . . . any unused drug had to be returned to [the patent
holder;] . . . [the patent holder] received no money for these trials[;] and there were only
twenty-eight people involved in the study”).
240. See Christopher M. Holman, Unpredictability in Patent Law and Its Effect on
Pharmaceutical Innovation, 76 MO. L. REV. 645, 657–61 (2011).
241. Id.
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public use invalidating their patent.”242 It ultimately chose the latter—
and then ironically lost its patent in future challenges for failing to
include enough experimental data.243
Like Lilly’s case with Straterra, the standard practice in the
pharmaceutical industry is to file for patents as early as possible,
specifically to avoid the statutory bars.244 Ideally, however, this
practice seems undesirable in the cancer context. Early, preclinical
experimental data in the cancer context is notoriously unreliable.245
And in several notable instances, patent claims covering certain
cancer drugs or diagnostics have been, literally, scientifically
disproven in later clinical trials.246 Early patents covering Avastin
(bevacizumab), for example, claim its use in treating breast cancer,
either alone, or in combination with other therapies.247 But without
the benefit of robust clinical trials, these patents relied on genetic
linkage studies or preclinical mouse models.248 When actual clinical
trials on Avastin and breast cancer were completed in 2008, the
results were either statistically insignificant—or, for one trial, actually
demonstrated a decrease in patient survival.249
Avastin demonstrates that the statutory bars encourage
expansive patents on methods of and drugs for cancer treatment that
may not necessarily work. More broadly, this rush to patent
essentially irreproducible science bears “numerous social costs
affecting drug research, scientific integrity, and patient safety.”250 But
beyond these costs, the specter of clinical trials raising patent law’s
statutory bars dissuades cancer researchers from perfecting their
innovations—or even testing to see whether they work—before
patenting. Indeed, a patent system that works in this manner is
antagonistic, not complementary, to the regulatory system: if the
purpose of requiring clinical trials is “the development of credible
information about the effects of drugs,”251 the need for early patenting

242. Id. at 659.
243. Id. at 661.
244. Sherkow, supra note 21, at 883 (discussing this phenomenon).
245. See C. Glenn Begley & Lee M. Ellis, Raise Standards for Preclinical Cancer
Research, 483 NATURE 531, 532 (2012) (describing some of the difficulties with preclinical
cancer research).
246. Sherkow, supra note 21, at 886–89 (discussing Avastin).
247. Id. at 896.
248. Id. at 883–84.
249. Id. at 896–97.
250. Id. at 899.
251. Eisenberg, supra note 231, at 347.
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in areas like cancer actively dissuades it.252 A patent system that
mandates cheap and easy patenting in the early stages of research
fails to encourage the development of that most important aspect of
cancer research: information.
3. Patent Expiration
Cancer is a disease of time. It often takes years to kill its
victims.253 In other instances, it lurks until old age.254 And knowing
whether one has, in fact, survived often takes years of waiting.255
Cancer research, too, has a fundamental problem of time: how long
should researchers wait until they have determined that something
does, or does not, cause cancer? How long of a window should be
used to assess whether a treatment has worked? Simply measuring
the survival rates of cancer sufferers under a particular treatment
poses particularly difficult questions—scientific questions concerning
statistics and methodology.256 For example, diagnosing cancer earlier
may lead to the erroneous conclusion that a given treatment prolongs
survival.257 Similarly, simply measuring “overall mortality,” may
incorporate age related biases: “[a] nation with a larger fraction of
older citizens will seem more cancer-ridden than a nation with
younger citizens, even if actual cancer mortality has not changed.”258
With appropriate statistical adjustments to measuring mortality rates,
a robust analysis of treatments takes years, and sometimes, decades
worth of data.
But patents don’t last forever. Since 1995, they only last from
when they were issued until twenty years after the date they were
filed.259 And because patents on biopharmaceuticals are often filed at
252. See Budish et al., supra note 22, at 2045–46 (discussing the role of the patent term
on research incentives).
253. See SEER Stat Fact Sheets: Cancer of Any Site, NAT’L CANCER INST.,
http://seer.cancer.gov/statfacts/html/all.html [http://perma.cc/AV6L-AKJK] (noting that
66.9% of cancer patients survive at least five years after diagnosis).
254. MUKHERJEE, supra note 12, at 44 (“Cancer is an age-related disease—sometimes
exponentially so.”).
255. Id. at 148 (“[Childhood leukemia patients] remained in remission not just for
weeks or months, but for years. They came back, year after year, and sat nervously in
waiting rooms at trial centers all around the nation.”).
256. See id. at 229–30 (describing some of these difficulties).
257. Id. at 230.
258. Id.
259. Uraguary Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, Sec. 532, § 154(a)(2), 108
Stat. 4809, 4984 (1994) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2012)) (“Subject to
the payment of fees under this title, such grant shall be for a term beginning on the date on
which the patent issues and ending 20 years from the date on which the application for the
patent was filed in the United States . . . .”).
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their genesis—not after thorough clinical trials have been
conducted—patents often begin to expire during the drug discovery–
approval process, before the treatment’s manufacturer can sell its
product in the marketplace.260 Since it takes, on average, ten to fifteen
years for a biopharmaceutical developer to discover and move a new
treatment through regulatory approval,261 there is the possibility that
little of a patent’s twenty-year lifespan will be left by the time the
drug reaches patients.262 In 1984, Congress recognized this difficulty in
the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act (more
popularly known as the Hatch-Waxman Act), which granted some
term extensions to patents covering drugs that are the subject of
clinical trials.263 Nonetheless, the Hatch-Waxman Act limits these
extensions to a total of fourteen years of patent life—on average,
three years shorter than their nonregulated counterparts.264
This system of early patent filing, combined with limited term
extensions, encourages research and development companies to
reorient their clinical trials around expediting their drugs’ approval
times.265 This has only been exacerbated by patent law’s recent move
to a “first to file” regime, further encouraging researchers—or, more
appropriately, the attorneys in researchers’ intellectual property
departments—to file for patents as soon as they become apprised of
even nascent discoveries.266 This presents some particular problems in
the cancer context given the long times needed to otherwise measure
260. See Eisenberg, supra note 231, at 351–52.
261. REBECCA A. ENGLISH, YEONWOO LEBOVITZ & ROBERT B. GIFFIN,
TRANSFORMING CLINICAL RESEARCH IN THE UNITED STATES: CHALLENGES AND
OPPORTUNITIES: WORKSHOP SUMMARY 12 (2010).
262. See Eisenberg, supra note 231, at 352 (noting that the average effective life of a
patent covering an invention subject to clinical trials is 11.7 years).
263. Pub. L. No. 94-417, sec. 201, § 156, 98 Stat. 1585, 1598–4602 (1984) (codified as
amended at 35 U.S.C. § 156 (2012)); see also Eisenberg, supra note 231, at 352.
264. Eisenberg, supra note 231, at 352 (parsing 35 U.S.C. §§ 156(c), (g)(1)(B), (g)(6)
(2012)).
265. Ian Ayres & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, A Market Test for Bayh-Dole Patents, 102
CORNELL L. REV. 271, 278 (2017) (“[T]he need for a lengthy exclusivity period skews
medical research toward diseases for which clinical trials can be conducted more
quickly.”); Budish, Roin & Williams, supra note 22, at 2044 (discussing that firms attempt
to maximize patent terms in “cancer research, where clinical trials—and hence, project
durations—are shorter for late-stage cancer treatments relative to early-stage treatments
or cancer prevention”); Vertinsky, supra note 26, at 1523 (“Strong patent rights at early
stages of the discovery and development process reinforce the model of placing early and
secret bets on potential drug candidates that are pushed through a proprietary
development process.”).
266. Timothy R. Holbrook, Patent Disclosures and Time, 69 VAND. L. REV. 1459, 1466
(2016) (discussing this race to patent following the 2011 Leahy Smith America Invents
Act).
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mortality rates. For cancer clinical trials, therefore, biopharmaceutical
developers often rely not on mortality endpoints but on so-called
surrogate endpoints, or physiological proxies that are “reasonably
likely to predict clinical benefit.”267 These include a reduction in
tumor size, the amount of time it takes for a cancer to progress to a
later “stage,” the amount of time until the average patient
discontinues treatment, or the continuing presence or absence of
cancer-related biomarkers.268
Unfortunately, however, measuring many of these surrogate
endpoints within the context of rapidly expiring patents is only
practically feasible in late-stage cancers.269 As a result, pharmaceutical
developers tend to focus their efforts on clinical trials that can be
deployed among longer—and more hopeless—sufferers of the
disease.270 This has the pernicious consequence of encouraging
“private firms [to] invest more in late-stage cancer drugs—and too
little in early-stage cancer and cancer prevention drugs—because latestage cancer drugs can be brought to market comparatively
quickly.”271 A 2015 study in the American Economic Review
calculated the effect of these incentives on short-termism in cancer
research: a roughly 8.7% decrease in R&D funding for every ten
percent increase in five-year survival rates.272 Furthermore, from 1973
to 2011, there appeared to be no privately-funded clinical trials with
investigations of longer than twenty years—that is, beyond the patent
term.273 Research-and-development patterns accordingly skew toward
later-stage cancer drugs and speedier clinical trials.274 And the

267. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: CLINICAL TRIAL
ENDPOINTS FOR THE APPROVAL OF CANCER DRUGS AND BIOLOGICS 2 (May 2007),
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs//Guidances/ucm071590.pdf [https://perma.cc/3UDPDZPX]; see also Budish et al., supra note 22, at 2081 (discussing the incentive distortions
of surrogate endpoints).
268. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 267, at 6–11.
269. See Thomas R. Fleming, Surrogate Endpoints and FDA’s Accelerated Approval
Process, 24 HEALTH AFFAIRS 67, 68 (2005) (discussing difficulties in using surrogate
endpoints for earlier stage diseases); Victor G. De Gruttola et al., Considerations in the
Evaluation of Surrogate Endpoints in Clinical Trials: Summary of a National Institutes of
Health Workshop, 22 CONTROLLED CLINICAL TRIALS 485, 487 (2001) (discussing
advanced stage diseases as “situations where trials using clinical endpoints are not feasible
or cannot be carried out efficiently”); Ross L. Prentice, Surrogate Endpoints in Clinical
Trials: Definition and Operational Criteria, 8 STAT. MED. 431, 434–36 (1989) (describing
this effect on “advanced” breast cancer).
270. Budish et al., supra note 22, at 2045.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 2068.
273. Id. at 2074.
274. Id.
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magnitude of the effect is enormous: for “US cancer patients
diagnosed in 2003 [for example the] longer commercialization lags
required for non-hematologic cancers generated around 890,000 lost
life-years.”275
Viewed from a greater altitude, this focus on later-stage cancer
with shorter clinical trials fails to generate some of the most
important information about cancer—specifically, long-term data on
how to slow, stop, or prevent early stage cancer from progressing into
later stages of the disease. With the dramatic differences in survival
rates between early and late stage cancer, information about early
cancers is likely to have a greater clinical benefit to larger numbers of
people.276 And given cancer’s predilection to mutate and evolve over
time, and through different courses of treatment, information
concerning halting early stage cancers is likely to produce more
information about cancer, generally.277 Patents’ time constraints also
discourage longer-term research into preventing cancer—likely the
most effective strategy in “curing” the world of the disease.278 Instead,
the rapidly expiring patent grant has encouraged development about
only surrogate endpoints, which may not be clinically valid.279 While

275. Id. at 2081. That is, that the clinical detriment of studying late stage—and more
likely untreatable cancers—as opposed to early stage ones, could have improved aggregate
clinical outcomes by 890,000 life years. Id.
276. See J.J. Ott, A. Ullrich & A.B. Miller, The Importance of Early Symptom
Recognition in the Context of Early Detection and Cancer Survival, 45 EURO. J. CANCER
2743, 2743 (2009) (reviewing the medical literature for the benefit of early cancer
detection).
277. See, e.g., Ding et al., supra note 98, at 506 (deriving clinical information from
tumor evolution in leukemia); Siân Jones et al., Comparative Lesion Sequencing Provides
Insights Into Tumor Evolution, 105 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. USA 4283, 4286 (2008)
(“Mutations thereby act as a clock, providing information similar to that obtained through
the use of sequence divergence to assess the relatedness of organisms or cells during
evolution or development.”); Fumiaki Sato, Shigehira Saji & Masakazu Toi, Genomic
Tumor Evolution of Breast Cancer, 23 BREAST CANCER 4, 6 (2016) (noting that a “series
of genomic aberrations would occur in the early stage of mammary carcinogensis”).
278. Benjamin N. Roin, The Case for Tailoring Patent Awards Based on Time-toMarket, 61 UCLA L. REV. 672, 752 (2014) (“Indeed, there are certain types of drugs that
firms will rarely develop because the twenty-year patent term is too short given the
amount of time it takes to complete their R&D—including early-stage and preventative
treatments for cancer and Alzheimer’s disease.”).
279. See TOMASZ BURZYKOWSKI, GEERT MOLENBERGHS & MARC BUYSE, THE
EVALUATION OF SURROGATE ENDPOINTS 2–3 (2005) (“More than ever is there a strong
drive to search for and evaluate potential surrogate markers and surrogate endpoints for
randomized clinical trials.”); Fleming, supra note 269, at 68; Thomas R. Fleming & John
H. Powers, Biomarkers and Surrogate Endpoints in Clinical Trials, 31 STAT. MED. 2973,
2982 (2012) (“Using biomarkers as surrogate endpoints often is motivated by interests to
reduce the size and duration of definitive clinical trials . . . . However, a rigorous evidence
based justification should be provided in any setting where use of biomarkers as surrogate

96 N.C. L. REV. 297 (2018)

2018]

CANCER’S IP

341

validating these endpoints or providing better ones through public
research is likely to produce large social returns, the time-limited
nature of patents is not likely to encourage private investment in their
validation.280
B.

Trade Secrets

As the name suggests, trade secrets comprise confidential
information important in business or trade.281 Once solely creatures of
state law, trade secrets as instruments of intellectual property recently
became federal causes of action with the 2016 enactment of the
Defend Trade Secrets Act.282 Nonetheless, the substantive differences
between the bulk of state trade secret laws and their federal
counterpart are relatively few.283 Today, broadly generalized, trade
secret law protects “financial, business, scientific, technical, economic,
or engineering information” that “derives independent economic
value . . . from not being generally known to . . . the public,”284 and for
which the owner has taken “reasonable measures to keep such
information secret.”285 The public is free to attempt to identify trade
secrets through public means—by, for example, reverse engineering a
proprietary product—but owners of trade secrets are protected
endpoints is proposed because the scientific evaluation of benefit and risk needs to be not
only timely but also valid and reliable.”); FDA Facts: Biomarkers and Surrogate
Endpoints, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (July 22, 2016), http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA
/Innovation/ucm512503.htm [http://perma.cc/6PBT-BGFE] (“Biomarkers and surrogate
endpoints alone do not give us the total picture of benefit and risk of a therapy. . . .
Despite such caveats, as science and technology advance, it is hoped that the increased use
of biomarkers and surrogate endpoints will facilitate the more efficient development of
safe and effective medical products.”).
280. See Roin, supra note 278, at 752.
281. See 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3) (2012) (defining a trade secret as “all forms and types of
financial, business, scientific, technical, economic, or engineering information . . . [that]
derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known
to, and not being readily ascertainable through proper means by, the public”).
282. See Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-153, 130 Stat. 376; Dennis
Crouch, Implementing and Interpreting the Defend Trade Secrets Act, PATENTLY-O (Apr.
27, 2016), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2016/04/implementing-interpreting-secrets.html
[http://perma.cc/QM2Z-632C] (describing the Defend Trade Secrets Act’s
implementation).
283. John Carson & Cameron Cushman, DTSA Versus UTSA: A Comparison of Major
Provisions, LAW360 (June 8, 2016), http://www.law360.com/articles/803049/dtsa-versusutsa-a-comparison-of-major-provisions [https://perma.cc/CR5N-7M2F] (“The DTSA
[(Defend Trade Secrets Act)] is modeled in many respects after the UTSA [(Uniform
Trade Secrets Act)]. Accordingly, the substantive provisions governing federal actions
under the DTSA bear many similarities with those of state laws modeled after the
UTSA.”).
284. 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3)(B).
285. Id. at § 1839(3)(A).
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against confidants disclosing them to others.286 And unlike patents,
trade secrets essentially last forever—that is, as long as they remain
secret.287
Trade secrets serve as enormously powerful incentives in the
development of cancer information. Biopharmaceutical developers
often protect entire “libraries” of synthetic molecules as trade secrets,
along with preliminary data about the compounds’ molecular
targets.288 These libraries “vastly increase[] the scope of potentially
useful information available to scientists,”289 including uncovering
several fundamental properties of cancer, such as information about
certain cellular pathways common in many cancers290 and genetic
mutations in others.291 Companies developing large, complex
biopharmaceuticals as cancer treatments will also frequently guard
their manufacturing methods as trade secrets.292 Viewed as
protocols—like kitchen recipes—trade secret protection in this area
has encouraged the development of information about best practices
in a variety of manufacturing processes.293 In the clinical trial space,

286. See Eisenberg, supra note 23, at 194 (“Once [a trade secret] becomes generally
known to other scientists through independent discovery, the first discoverer loses
protection.”); Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 23, at 60 (explaining that reverseengineered scientific information fits poorly within trade secret law as it “provide[s]
innovators and investors with no exclusive property rights”); David A. Rice, Public
Goods, Private Contract and Public Policy: Federal Preemption of Software License
Prohibitions Against Reverse Engineering, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 543, 557 (1992) (“Other
advances in science and technology may gain more limited protection, but cannot be
wholly withdrawn from the public domain as a matter of proprietary right. Trade secrets,
for example, are not protected against independent discovery or against being ascertained
with the aid of reverse engineering.”).
287. Christopher D. Stone, What to Do About Biodiversity: Property Rights, Public
Goods, and the Earth’s Biological Riches, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 577, 605 n.76 (1995)
(“Distinct from patents, trade secrets protection potentially lasts forever.”).
288. Arti K. Rai et al., Pathways Across the Valley of Death: Novel Intellectual Property
Strategies for Accelerated Drug Discovery, 8 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 1, 4, 7
(2008).
289. Id. at 7.
290. See, e.g., A. Lavecchia, C. Di Giovanni & E. Novellino, STAT-3 Inhibitors: State
of the Art and New Horizons for Cancer Treatment, 18 CURRENT MED. CHEMISTRY 2359,
2359 (2011) (reviewing libraries’ use in discovering role of STAT3 in cancer).
291. See Denise A. Chan & Amato J. Giaccia, Harnessing Synthetic Lethal Interactions
in Anticancer Drug Discovery, 10 NATURE REV. DRUG DISCOVERY 351, 352–54
(describing screening for genetic lethality in cancer, generally).
292. See Price & Rai, supra note 25, at 1028 (“[T]rade secrecy [is] pervasive in the field
of biologics manufacturing.”).
293. See Peter Lee, Transcending the Tacit Dimension: Patents, Relationships, and
Organizational Integration in Technology Transfer, 100 CAL. L. REV. 1503, 1531–33 (2012)
(discussing two case studies of the importance of tacit knowledge); Price & Rai, supra note
25, at 1031 (highlighting the importance of tacit information about biologics
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potential marketers of cancer treatments also universally treat the
raw data from their trials as confidential.294 This practice bears several
public health and policy concerns, discussed below,295 but it does
encourage sponsors of clinical trials to be expansive—that is,
information seeking—about their trials’ design and conduct.296 Lastly,
the FDA’s requirements to engage in post-market surveillance for
many cancer therapies may generate additional safety and efficacy
data often protected as trade secrets.297 While biopharmaceutical
marketers involved in such surveillance have strong incentives not to
reveal too much information to the FDA298—lest their drugs be
removed from the marketplace—confidentiality imposed on such data
invites, at least, a greater measure of candor in its reporting.299
At the same time, trade secrets poorly protect other forms of
information—potentially
valuable
and
expensive-to-uncover
information—about cancer. Basic information about a cancer
treatment’s intended—and unintended—molecular mechanisms is
virtually impossible to keep as a trade secret once the treatment is
disclosed.300 As a result, biopharmaceutical developers have little
incentive to engage in further mechanistic research of any treatments
once the treatments have been approved by the FDA.301 Further, for a
manufacturing); cf. HAROLD MCGEE, ON FOOD AND COOKING (2004) (systematically
reviewing the best practices of various methods of cooking).
294. Jorge L. Contreras & Liza Vertinsky, Pre-Competition, 95 N.C. L. REV. 67, 120
n.279 (2016) (“[T]he vast majority of clinical trials data remains private.”); see also Erika
Lietzan, A New Framework for Assessing Clinical Data Transparency Initiatives, 18
MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 33, 37 (2014) (discussing the biopharmaceutical industry’s
expectation that clinical data information be kept confidential); W. Nicholson Price II &
Timo Minssen, Will Clinical Trial Data Disclosure Reduce Incentives to Develop New Uses
of Drugs?, 33 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 685, 685 (2015) (discussing market disincentives
to disclosing clinical trial data).
295. Infra notes 305–17 and accompanying text.
296. See Richard Simon, New Challenges for 21st Century Clinical Trials, 4 CLINICAL
TRIALS 167, 168 (2007).
297. See Trudo Lemmens & Shannon Gibson, Decreasing the Data Deficit: Improving
Post-Market Surveillance in Pharmaceutical Regulation, 59 MCGILL L.J. 943, 961–63
(2014) (describing this, in the U.S. and Canada, in the context of adverse event reporting).
298. See Price & Minssen, supra note 294, at 685 (“[C]linical trial disclosure severely
limits the patentability of new uses in both the United States and the European Union.”).
299. See id. at 685 (noting the “increased exposure to litigation owing to trolling of
[raw clinical trial] data by class-action tort lawyers”); Sherkow, supra note 21, at 886–89
(noting the Prempro litigation).
300. Eisenburg, supra note 23, at 194 (describing this in the biotechnology context);
Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 23, at 60 (discussing this in the context of scientific
information, generally).
301. Benjamin P. Falit, Curbing Industry Sponsors’ Incentive to Design Post-Approval
Trials That Are Suboptimal for Informing Prescribers but More Likely Than Optimal
Designs to Yield Favorable Results, 37 SETON HALL L. REV. 969, 998 (2007) (“When
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variety of reasons—including intellectual property reasons—negative
information about a treatment’s safety and effectiveness gets
purposely underdeveloped.302 In particular, developers often
intentionally overlook nuances about dosing information for specific
patient subgroups—a potentially critical facet of cancer
information.303 And even after approval, marketers of cancer
treatments may nonetheless voluntarily disclose important, previously
confidential information about their products to medical practitioners
and clinicians to inform (and sell) them on the relative superiority of
their treatments.304
But apart from trade secrets’ effectiveness, or lack thereof, in
promoting the development of information about cancer, they pose
several worrisome public health problems. Keeping secret too much
information about cancer threatens physicians’ ability to fully
understand the treatments they provide to their patients.305 As an
example, Myriad Genetics, a breast cancer-gene testing company, has
developed a proprietary database of its customers’ DNA sequences,
including a repository of “variants of unknown significance”
(“VUSs”)—individual mutations in certain genes with no known
clinical importance.306 This large storehouse of information, were it
conducting voluntary, non-label-seeking post-approval studies, pharmaceutical companies
may have an incentive to use a control that is cheap and provides the best chance of
obtaining favorable results, even though a different comparator would be more medically
informative.”); see also Eisenberg, supra note 23, at 194 (discussing the incentive to
withhold public disclosure of information to prevent reverse engineering that may
terminate the right to a trade secret claim).
302. See Sean B. Seymore, The Null Patent, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2041, 2051–54
(2012) (discussing reasons why negative information arising from scientific research is
underreported); Nicola Jones, Half of US Clinical Trials Go Unpublished, NATURE (Dec.
3, 2013), http://www.nature.com/news/half-of-us-clinical-trials-go-unpublished-1.14286#/b1
[https://perma.cc/T4MF-Y45W] (“For those trials that were also published in journals,
complete reporting of negative side effects of the drugs—rather than just mentioning
common events, for example—occurred 73% of the time in the trials database but only
45% of the time in the publications.”).
303. See Sherkow, supra note 21, at 892–95 (discussing Plavix’s trials’ as overlooking an
important gene variant in patients).
304. See Ryan Abbott & Ian Ayres, Evidence and Extrapolation: Mechanisms for
Regulating Off-Label Uses of Drugs and Devices, 64 DUKE L.J. 377, 391–92 (2014)
(discussing pharmaceutical marketers’ promotion of off-label uses supported by clinical
trials to physicians).
305. See Conley et al., supra note 24, at 600; Eisenberg, supra note 24, at 720.
306. Conley et al., supra note 24, at 599–600; Jacob S. Sherkow & Christopher Thomas
Scott, Commentary, CASE STUDY: Myriad Stands Alone, 32 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY
620, 620 (2014). While Myriad has kept its database secret since 2004, some of its strategy
stems from the 2013 loss of many of its important gene-sequence patents in Ass’n for
Molecular Pathology vs. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013). See id. at 620. While
such a result may seem to normatively promote the patenting of genetic information, data-
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public, could be easily mined by clinicians to preliminarily assess the
prognoses of patients’ with VUSs.307 But its protection as a trade
secret means that clinicians treating VUS-harboring patients must
labor largely in the dark, and at their patients’ risk.308 Similarly, the
protection of raw clinical trial data as trade secrets often means a lack
of information about rare but significant side effects.309 Allowing
clinicians access to this data, especially those treating patients with
rare or complex cancers for which data is especially hard to come by,
would undoubtedly help their service.310
Apart from these public health concerns, trade secrets in the
cancer context may also be undesirable for public policy reasons.
First, because trade secrets are, by their nature, secret, coordinating
research among biopharmaceutical developers is unfeasible.311 As a
result, encouraging the discovery of cancer information through trade
secrets runs the risk of producing irreproducible or duplicative
research.312 Second, because much cancer research is federally funded,
trade secrets may be a less-than-appropriate intellectual property
incentive for taxpayers: without a transfer of information to the
public, private subsidies of trade secrets operate as pure wealth

generating inventions have long allowed their owners to claim patent protection on their
devices while secreting away the information their machines create. Brenda Simon & Ted
Sichelman, Data-Generating Patents, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 377, 377 (2017).
307. See Conley et al., supra note 24, at 613.
308. Id. Typically, access to secret databases can be solved through licensing combined
with non-disclosure agreements. But Myriad, at least currently, has refused to license its
database to others, even on confidential terms. See id. at 615 (explaining that Myriad has
asymmetrical access to information, such that Myriad may access public databases, but
outsiders may not access Myriad’s database).
309. See Jones, supra note 302 (noting that “[s]erious adverse events were mentioned
in 99% of trials on the database but in only 71% corresponding articles”).
310. See Conley et al., supra note 24, at 618.
311. See Spencer Phillips Hey & Aaron S. Kesselheim, Countering Imprecision in
Precision Medicine, 353 SCI. 448, 448–49 (2016) (discussing research coordination issues
when IP, like trade secrets, are unknown or diffused across industry); Rai et al., supra note
288, at 34 (“For the most part, only limited inter-firm R&D coordination or exchange of
information would occur—largely confined to contexts where complementary assets had
to be deployed in order to maximize research potential.”).
312. See Price, supra note 24, at 447–48 (“Secrecy slows cumulative innovation and
promotes duplicative investment—though of course it also encourages ex ante
investment.”); Rai et al., supra note 288, at 21 (arguing that proprietary molecular
databases encourage duplicative research); Vertinsky, supra note 26, at 1558 (“Sharing of
information about which drug candidates are being studied and tested, along with
knowledge derived from clinical trial failures, can be a critical part of reducing duplicative
discovery efforts and avoiding later stage drug candidate failures.”). For a discussion of
this argument in relation to Edmund Ktich’s prospect theory of patents, see Benjamin N.
Roin, Unpatentable Drugs and the Standards of Patentability, 87 TEX. L. REV. 503, 509
n.14 (2009).
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transfers.313 Third, given cancer’s enormous burden on public
resources, the public may have a viable claim that it simply has a right
to know basic information about cancer’s molecular machinery,
whether uncovered through private research or otherwise.314 And
fourth, trade secrets covering negative results from clinical trials may
be important to the development of new information about cancer.315
Allowing companies to confidentially retain this data may hamper
future research efforts.316 The availability of trade secrets, for
example, may crimp efforts to create a data commons for cancer
research, one of the tools widely believed to be integral to larger
efforts—like the Cancer Moonshot—to stymie the disease.317
C.

Regulatory Exclusivities

Treatments for cancer approved by the FDA often bear another
form of intellectual property: regulatory or data exclusivities.318
Regulatory exclusivities protect the data generated by therapeutic
developers during clinical trials: generic or biosimilar manufacturers
may not rely on developers’ clinical trial data in their regulatory
submissions for a set period of time after the original therapies’

313. See Sheldon Krimsky, The Profit of Scientific Discovery and Its Normative
Implications, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 15, 36–37 (1999) (“It may be difficult for some to
understand how turning federal research funds into discoveries that are privately
controlled, how classifying scientific results of therapeutic significance as trade secrets, and
how a publicly funded research enterprise in which conflicts of interest are endemic can
serve the public interest.”).
314. See R. Adorno, The Right Not to Know: An Autonomy Based Approach, 30 J.
MED. ETHICS 435, 437 (2004) (“Public health interests may in particular circumstances
justify limitations on the right to ignore one’s genetic make up as they may justify
limitations to confidentiality, for instance, in the case of infectious diseases.”); Lemmens &
Gibson, supra note 297, at 973 (“[T]he driving force behind an invigorated debate over
data access has been the issue of wasteful spending of public funding.”); Fiona Murray &
Siobhán O’Mahony, Exploring the Foundations of Cumulative Innovation: Implications for
Organization Science, 18 ORG. SCI. 1006, 1011 (2007) (describing this as the principle
animating the public release of data from the Human Genome Project).
315. See Falit, supra note 301, at 998 (discussing the use of suboptimal comparators in
post-approval medical studies to increase the chance of obtaining favorable test results);
Seymore, supra note 302, at 2051–54 (discussing reasons why negative information arising
from scientific research is underreported).
316. See Seymore, supra note 302, at 2050–56.
317. See Abbasi, supra note 19, at 384; Grossman et al., supra note 135, at 1111; Lowy
& Collins, supra note 171, at 1902–03.
318. See generally Robin Feldman, Regulatory Property: The New IP, 40 COLUM. J.L.
& ARTS 53 (2017) (describing regulatory exclusivities as forms of property); Anna B.
Laakmann, A Property Theory of Medical Innovation, 56 JURIMETRICS 117, 199 (2016)
(describing these exclusivities as forms of property). But see Heled, supra note 25, at 287
(describing the same as a regulatory entitlement, rather than property).
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approval.319 Due to the cost of running separate, confirmatory clinical
trials, this unavailability of the pioneer’s data typically bars generic
entrants until the exclusivity period ends.320 Anna B. Laakmann terms
this form of exclusivity “regulatory property”: a property right that
“governs information generated to satisfy a regulatory standard and
appropriate to include in a submission to a regulatory agency.”321
The length of these data exclusivities varies depending on several
factors, including a treatment’s molecular identity, its disease
indication and prevalence in the population, and whether its
developer conducted pediatric testing during clinical trials.322 A “new
chemical entity,” for example—that is, a drug that “contains no active
[chemical] moiety that has been approved by FDA in any other
application”323—receives five years of data exclusivity from generic
competition.324 For diseases occurring in less than 200,000 people in
the United States325—“orphan indications”—the FDA awards seven
years of exclusivity.326 And conducting clinical trials in pediatric
populations rewards applicants with an additional six months of
exclusivity on top of the exclusivities already granted.327 Data
exclusivities for larger molecule biologics parallel and lengthen these
time periods.328
These exclusivities serve as important incentives—and policy
levers—for drug development.329 But they do a poor job encouraging
the development of basic information about complex diseases, like
cancer.330 Data exclusivities, in all their iterations, cover only
319. Laakmann, supra note 318, at 120–21.
320. See generally Heled, supra note 25 (discussing regulatory shelters in medicine and
their legal implications).
321. Laakmann, supra note 318, at 119.
322. Thomas, supra note 25, at 42 n.40 (enumerating the various exclusivities and their
legal bases).
323. 21 C.F.R. § 314.108(a) (2017).
324. Id. § 314.108(b)(2).
325. Id. § 316.29(c).
326. Id. § 316.31.
327. 21 U.S.C. § 355a(b)–(c) (2012).
328. See Thomas, supra note 25, at 42 n.40 (describing the exclusivity regimes for
biologics).
329. Erika Lietzan, The Myths of Data Exclusivity, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 91, 94
(2016) (“The well-accepted narrative of data exclusivity is that it is provided by the
government as an incentive to perform the research necessary to obtain the marketing
authorization in question.”).
330. See Laakmann, supra note 318, at 129 (describing this tension); Lietzan, supra
note 329, at 118 n.107 (“Second, a new drug is never fully understood when approved, nor
has it been proven safe and effective in any absolute sense.”); Kristina M. Lybecker, When
Patents Aren’t Enough: Why Biologics Necessitate Data Exclusivity Protection, 40 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 1427, 1438 (2014) (noting that, as opposed to patents, “data protection
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approved therapeutics used for treatment—the molecules
themselves—and new indications to use them.331 They do not,
however, encourage the development of information about new
molecular targets, cellular signaling pathways, or tumor stage
progression.332 Importantly, they are similarly agnostic about the
content of the clinical trials used for approval, including dosing
information, differential effects on certain subpopulations, or
comparative results with current standard therapies.333 Eisenberg, in
considering similar problems for patents in this regard, notes that
these informational goods
do not necessarily correspond to product markets. Many
inventions feed into drug development, including research
platform technologies like genomic information and databases,
newly identified (or characterized) drug targets, genetically
engineered animal models, and new laboratory techniques,
instruments, and reagents. These “upstream” inventions . . .
help to explain disease pathways and mechanisms and to
identify potential targets for therapeutic interventions . . . .334
Unsettlingly, data exclusivities for orphan drugs have, at times,
encouraged regulatory gamesmanship at the expense of further
developing cancer information.335 Knowing that physicians will often
prescribe orphan drugs for broader and more grossly profitable
disease indications, therapeutics developers have tailored their
clinical trials around smaller, more manageable orphan indications to
incentivizes the costly and time-consuming development work, which is required to
establish safety and efficacy and to secure regulatory approval of a new product”);
Maxwell R. Morgan, Regulation of Innovation Under Follow-on Biologics Legislation:
FDA Exclusivity As an Efficient Incentive Mechanism, 11 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV.
93, 105 (2010) (“FDA exclusivity, by contrast, better tailors incentives for firms to bear
these downstream development, regulatory approval, and commercialization costs for any
socially valuable new drug, regardless of whether it meets the standards of patentability.”).
At the same time, such exclusivities do serve to promote trade secrets regarding the
manufacturing of these compounds—its own problem in the field. Price & Rai, supra note
25, at 1028 (discussing trade secrets covering manufacturing methods of biologics).
331. Lybecker, supra note 330, at 1438 (discussing the distinction in legal protections
for “small molecule” generics and biosimilars).
332. Cf. Morgan, supra note 330, at 107.
333. The FDA’s clinical trial requirements mandate only that a new drug be
demonstrated to be “safe and effective” relative to its clinical benefit. See 21 C.F.R.
§ 314.2 (2017). Assuming that requirement is met, the regulations do not further specify
that the drug operate within specific dosage ranges, populations, or adjuvant therapies.
334. See Eisenberg, supra note 231, at 355–56.
335. See generally Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust Law and Regulatory
Gaming, 87 TEX. L. REV. 685, 687 (2009) (defining “regulatory gaming” as “private
behavior that harnesses procompetitive or neutral regulations and uses them for
exclusionary purposes”).
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maximize their exclusivity periods.336 In 2004, Amgen’s Sensipar
(cinacalcet), for example, was approved for two indications:
secondary hyperparathyroidism in patients on dialysis with chronic
kidney disease and hypercalcemia of parathyroid carcinoma, the
latter being an orphan condition so rare it is diagnosed on average in
only twenty-eight patients each year.337 Following approval, however,
physicians began to use the drug off label—that is, for diagnoses other
than the drug label’s listed indication—for a variety of conditions.338
Indeed, off-label uses were so extreme as to constitute 98.8% of
prescriptions for a two-year period following approval.339
While it is true that oncology practice tends to be responsible for
a large portion of off-label uses, this enormous ratio of off- to on-label
use (494:1) strongly suggests a disconnect between Sensipar’s actual,
real-world use and the information developed during its clinical trials.
Rather, it appears—as is often the practice—that Sensipar’s orphan
indication (parathyroid carcinoma) was used as a vehicle for
approval, knowing that off-label prescriptions in only tangentially
related diseases would account for the bulk of the drug’s profits.340
To be clear, such behavior has virtues as well as vices. Seeking
approval for succeeding and broader indications may put a
developer’s product on the market sooner, to the great benefit of
patients who may then obtain it off label if needed. And providing
treatment to sufferers of rare diseases that, absent the orphan drug
program, would remain untreated should be praised, as Amgen
indeed deserves for its investigations in parathyroid carcinoma. But
where clinical resources are limited, and where broader clinical trials
serve to produce more therapeutically useful information to more

336. See André Côté & Bernard Keating, What Is Wrong with Orphan Drug Policies?,
15 VALUE IN HEALTH 1185, 1187 (2012) (listing “blockbuster” orphan drugs); John W.
Peabody, Allen Ruby & Peter Cannon, The Economics of Orphan Drug Policy in the US:
Can the Legislation Be Improved?, 8 PHARMACOECONOMICS 374, 374 (1995) (noting the
problem with the same).
337. Elizabeth Shane, Parathyroid Carcinoma, 86 J. CLINICAL ENDOCRINOLOGY &
METABOLISM 485, 485 (2001); Letter from Robert Meyer, Dir. Office of Drug Evaluation
II, to Pamela Danaher, Manager of Regulatory Affairs, Amgen Inc. (March 8,
2004), https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/nda/2004/21-688.pdf_Sensipar_Approv
.pdf [https://perma.cc/8S2S-FHPB]; see Christina H. Wei & Avital Harari, Parathyroid
Carcinoma: Update and Guidelines for Management, 13 CURRENT TREATMENT OPTIONS
IN ONCOLOGY 11, 11 (2012) (discussing the incidences of hypercalcemia of parathyroid
carcinoma as being extraordinarily rare).
338. See Aaron S. Kesselheim et al., The Prevalence and Cost of Unapproved Uses of
Top-Selling Orphan Drugs, 7 PLOS ONE e31894, 2–3 (2012).
339. Id. at 3.
340. See id. at 6.
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patients, the orphan drug exclusivity regime may encourage
gamesmanship over substance.
At the same time, data exclusivities fail to capture more
benevolent investigations of cancer therapies, notably combination
therapies.341 Many cancer therapies—and chemotherapies in
particular—are combinations of several drugs, either taken in specific
sequences or under very controlled dosages in rapid succession.342
Developing the information required to identify these combinations
from a virtually limitless array of permutations is arduous and
expensive.343 Yet, none of the data exclusivities definitively answer
how the FDA will consider combination therapy for data exclusivity
purposes.344 As a result, there are relatively few commercial
investigations into combination therapies of older drugs—even
though the information produced by such trials would be enormously
valuable.345 To its credit, the FDA has recently issued new guidance
suggesting a limited data exclusivity regime for therapeutic
combinations that contain a new chemical entity.346 But these do little
to promote the production of information concerning combinations of
old drugs.347
Data exclusivities also fail to cover several cutting-edge
technologies in cancer treatment, notably personalized cancer
immunotherapy. In personalized immunotherapy, clinicians
reengineer a patient’s white blood cells to elicit the patient’s own

341. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., NEW CHEMICAL ENTITY EXCLUSIVITY
DETERMINATIONS FOR CERTAIN FIXED-COMBINATION DRUG PRODUCTS GUIDANCE
INDUSTRY
1
(Oct.
2014),
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/drugs
FOR
/guidancecomplianceregulatoryinformation/guidances/ucm386685.pdf
[https://perma.cc
/7P73-4QGJ] (“Historically, FDA has interpreted these provisions such that a fixedcombination was ineligible for 5-year NCE exclusivity if it contained a previously
approved active moiety, even if the product also contained a new active moiety (i.e., an
active moiety that the Agency had not previously approved).”).
342. MUKHERJEE, supra note 12, at 455 (describing advances in combination therapy).
343. Id. at 126.
344. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 341, at 1.
345. See Johannes Koch, Pairing New Cancer Drugs With Older Ones Bolsters Roche
Profit, BLOOMBERG (July 21, 2016), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-07-21
/roche-first-half-profit-rises-7-as-cancer-drugs-get-combined [http://perma.cc/MK87-P9C3]
(describing some of the difficulties in this approach); Peter Loftus, Combination Drug
Therapies for Cancer Show Promise at Higher Potential Cost, WALL ST. J. (June 5, 2016)
https://www.wsj.com/articles/combination-drug-therapies-for-cancer-show-promise-at-higherpotential-cost-1465141936 [https://perma.cc/62DM-ZAYK (staff-uploaded archive)]
(discussing recent developments of cancer combination therapies using older drugs).
346. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 341, at 2.
347. Id. at 1.
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immune system to fight against cancerous cells.348 This usually takes
one of two forms: either priming the white blood cells to the patient’s
specific cancer or genetically modifying the white blood cells to
recognize the cancer.349 Afterwards, the modified white blood cells
are reinjected into the patient.350 By their nature, these therapies are
unique to each patient and each cancer—a therapeutic platform that
presents a host of serious regulatory challenges.351 At the same time,
clinical trials for these therapies provide wells of general information
about cancer and its often-complex relationship with the immune
system.352 A regulatory property system grounded in encouraging the
production of generalizable information like this should, ideally,
encourage these sorts of trials. Nonetheless, in the absence of a
certain data exclusivity regime, it is wholly unclear what will
encourage the development of information concerning these
personalized immunotherapies.
Perhaps as a function of history—for simpler diseases with
simpler treatments—data exclusivities ultimately promote products
rather than information.353 Where complex diseases, like cancer, are
concerned, this perversely encourages the development of “me too”
therapies—therapies modeled on existing ones, already approved by
the FDA, or, more subtly, treatments that target the same cellular
pathways of approved products. In one particularly astonishing
example, three of the current top-ten selling biologic products are all
348. See Meghana Keshavan, Experimental Cancer Therapy Holds Great Promise—But
at Great Cost, STAT (Aug. 23, 2016), https://www.statnews.com/2016/08/23/cancer-car-tside-effects/ [https://perma.cc/UM3Z-28AL] (describing CAR-T therapy).
349. Id.
350. Id. (“The therapy itself consists of an infusion: The Frankensteinian T cells are fed
back into the patient’s bloodstream, where they proliferate and work furiously to kill
tumor cells.”).
351. Chizuru Ogi & Atsushi Aruga, Clinical Evaluation of Therapeutic Cancer
Vaccines, 9 HUM. VACCINES & IMMUNOTHERAPIES 1049, 1049 (2013) (explaining that as
of 2013, Provenge, was the only therapeutic cancer vaccine to have earned approval by the
FDA).
352. See Jennifer Couzin-Frankel, Cancer Immunotherapy, 342 SCI. 1432, 1432–33
(2013) (describing individual immunotherapies as marking a shift where “the anecdotes
coalesce into data . . . a sense of paradigms shifting”).
353. See generally Laakmann, supra note 318 (noting that public health regulation
pushes developers to move discoveries downstream along innovation pathways);
Lybecker, supra note 330 (describing the different incentives created by patents and data
exclusivity with respect to the development of biologic medicines); Morgan, supra note
330 (arguing that the adoption of a market-exclusivity rather than data-exclusivity regime
would promote efficient disclosure of information); Price & Rai, supra note 25 (observing
that under the current regulatory regime for biologic medicine manufacturing there are
high barriers to both entry into the market and to the disclosure of basic knowledge about
biologics functions and optimal products).
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monoclonal antibodies directed to a specific protein, tumor necrosis
factor alpha.354 To be clear, new products—that is, new drugs and
biologics—are truly important in any broader fight against cancer.
But as tools, these products are only as a useful as the depth of
information about when, and in what circumstances, to deploy them.
In her conception of data exclusivities as regulatory property,
Laakmann idealizes data exclusivities as belonging to a “process
through which administrative oversight gives rise to the production of
new information resources.”355 As currently structured, however, this
oversight fails to encourage the most robust and useful information in
the fight against cancer.
III. INFORMATION AND IP FOR CANCER RESEARCH
The Cancer Moonshot may fail for numerous scientific,
administrative, or even political reasons.356 But just getting the
Moonshot off the ground—or, for that matter, other complex, publicprivate partnerships—will require tailoring the current intellectual
property regime to fit the informational production desired from such
a project. Giving private industry enough incentives to participate—
but on terms that comport with a long-term, publicly funded project
with serious public health implications—remains key. This is, of
course, easier said than done. Balancing IP incentives with public
health and policy concerns persists as one of the more intractable
problems in innovation policy.357
354. The current biologics landscape strongly demonstrates this point: of the top ten
selling biologics in 2014, three are monoclonal antibodies directed against one protein,
tumor necrosis factor alpha. Peter Ubel, The Best-Selling Biologic Drugs, FORBES (Oct.
16,
2014),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/peterubel/2014/10/16/the-best-selling-biologicdrugs/ [https://perma.cc/TRT9-WQE5] (listing anti-TNF biologics, Humira, Enbrel, and
Remicade, among the top ten).
355. Laakmann, supra note 318, at 119.
356. Sharon Begley, DNA Pioneer James Watson: The Cancer Moonshot Is ‘Crap’ But
There Is Still Hope, STAT (July 20, 2016), https://www.statnews.com/2016/07/20/jameswatson-cancer/ [https://perma.cc/HE86-FHY2] (“The depressing thing about the ‘cancer
moonshot’ is that it’s the same old people getting together, forming committees, and the
same old ideas, and it’s all crap.”); Breivik, supra note 6, at A21 (“Confronted with these
forces, there is little incentive for our democratically elected leaders to question the goal
of the ultimate cure. Yet, they should be aware of the rhetorical spin that drives the cancer
enterprise and how it obstructs a clear understanding of the issue.”); Bruce Zetter & Lara
Maggs, What the Cancer ‘Moonshot’ Needs to Fix, POLITICO (Apr. 20, 2016),
http://www.politico.com/agenda/story/2016/04/biden-cancer-moonshot-needs-to-fix-000109
[https://perma.cc/WP6L-KGHC] (tasking the NCI with proportional imbalances in
research funding for specific types of cancers).
357. Peter Lee, Toward a Distributive Commons in Patent Law, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 917,
920 (“The debate is one of the most intractable in intellectual property law, and it is no
exaggeration to say that lives hang in the balance. In the realm of health technologies,
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Recognizing that the product of the Cancer Moonshot is
informational may ease these difficulties. Cancer information derived
from the Moonshot can be considered as a public good: a resource
that is both nonrivalrous, in that one’s use does not deplete the
resource for others, and nonexcludable, in that it “cannot be privately
provided or traded in markets.”358 A vast literature documents that
the development of public goods are most rewarding where there are
limited encumbrances to both public access and commercial use.359 A
public forest, for example, may best serve a public nonetheless
interested in environmental preservation even where some clear-cut
logging is allowed.360 This applies in even greater force to
informational public goods, the commercial development of which
does not diminish the public’s access to the good procured.361
Today, establishing informational public goods often revolves
around “data sharing”: the collection of, and access to, standardized
sets of information pliable to statistical or empirical analysis.362 This
has most notably included the Human Genome Project (“HGP”), the
effort to provide a “template” sequence of all of the DNA contained
within a human cell.363 Although the HGP functioned as a publicprivate partnership, its researchers nonetheless adhered to the
“Bermuda Principles,” a “require[ment] that all DNA sequences
generated by the HGP be released to the public a mere twenty-four
hours after generation.”364 And while portions of the human genome
were originally patented, since the project’s completion in 2003, nonprofit, academic, and commercial researchers have freely plumbed its

advancing innovation through strict exclusive rights often appears to conflict with the ideal
of promoting distributive justice.”).
358. Romer, supra note 9, at S74; see also Contreras, supra note 10, at 99.
359. See Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Knowledge Goods and Nation
States, 101 MINN. L. REV. 167, 192–99 (2016) (documenting this literature of knowledge as
a public good); Romer, supra note 9, at S76 (listing prior discussions in the economic
literature of this concept); see also Contreras, supra note 10, at 100 (describing these
rewards for the Human Genome Project).
360. See Kenneth J. Arrow & Anthony C. Fisher, Environmental Preservation,
Uncertainty, and Irreversibility, 88 Q.J. ECON. 312, 314 (1974) (modeling commercial
development of environmentally preserved areas by taking into account the irreversibility
of some commercial development).
361. See Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 359, at 170–171 (discussing the nonrivalrous
nature of information).
362. See Stodden, supra note 30, at 2 (discussing data sharing and statistical
replication).
363. Contreras, supra note 10, at 101.
364. Id. at 101.
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depths, contributing to an additional $65 billion in economic output.365
Conceiving the Cancer Moonshot as less like the space race and more
like the HGP suggests that its success will depend on encouraging
data sharing in the shadow of intellectual property.
The remainder of this Section provides some concrete
suggestions for achieving data sharing for the Cancer Moonshot and
later provides some general thoughts about how data-sharing can
illuminate some of the academic literature on similar public-private
partnerships and IP. First, this Section focuses on historical and
current data-sharing efforts in cancer research, and some of the
intellectual property issues they raise. Second, this Section explores
ways to encourage data sharing for the Moonshot—specifically, ways
to encourage the production of desirable information, its disclosure in
a data sharing agreement, and its ultimate use by participants. Finally,
this Section ties these findings to the academic literature on IP,
information, and public-private partnerships for large-scale research
projects.
A. Data and Data-Sharing Efforts in Cancer Research
Data sharing in cancer research is not new; physicians have been
trading information about their patients’ successes and failures of
treatment since the disease was identified in antiquity.366 On a
broader scale, however, the National Cancer Institute’s Clinical Trials
Cooperative Group Program, established in 1955, was likely the first
major effort to share information about experimental therapies in
cancer across institutions.367 The Cooperative Group Program’s main
effort lay in running large-scale, multi-institutional clinical trials,
mainly to assess the effectiveness of new anti-cancer compounds.368
But the Program also established a cross-disciplinary network of
cancer researchers in the hopes of bringing a diversity of scientific
experience to bear on fighting cancer.369 Since 2014, the Program has
been rechristened the National Clinical Trials Network (“NCTN”)
and focuses more on providing support, oversight, and funding to
365. Id. at 100 (citing BATELLE TECH. P’SHIP PRACTICE, THE IMPACT OF GENOMICS
U.S. ECONOMY (2013), http://www.unitedformedicalresearch.com/wp-content
/uploads/2013/06/The-Impact-of-Genomics-on-the-US-Economy.pdf [https://perma.cc/WA8PFKJ3]).
366. MUKHERJEE, supra note 12, at 39–40 (discussing the Edwin Smith Papyrus, an
ancient Egyptian manuscript that contains the first recorded observations about cancer).
367. SHARYL J. NASS, HAROLD L. MOSES & JOHN MENDELSOHN, A NATIONAL
CANCER CLINICAL TRIALS SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 43 (2010).
368. Id. at 43–44.
369. Id. at 44.
ON THE
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clinical trials run by academic cancer centers and community
hospitals.370 Importantly, all of the NCTN’s current programs contain
a Statistics and Data Management component.371
As the complexity of cancer research has evolved, so too have
the types of data subject to collection. Data concerning cancer’s
underlying molecular biology—genetic mutations found in tumors,
cellular signaling pathways that contribute to the disease, and
molecular markers of tumors—comprise a leviathan source of data
for cancer research. Several platforms house this data: CGHub,
COSMIC, and cBioPortal are but a few of the larger cancer “omics”
databases.372 The FDA, meanwhile, houses an enormous quantity of
raw, clinical trial data, much of which has recently been organized
into the Janus Clinical Trials Repository, “a data repository and
nonclinical study for subject-level clinical trial data submitted to the
FDA as part of regulatory submissions.”373 And the NCI, through its
Surveillance, Epidemiology, and End Results Program (“SEER”),
manages a variety of databases concerning cancer patients’
treatments and longitudinal outcomes.374 A recent review of cancer
databases groups them in roughly six categories: (1) data concerning
DNA mutations in tumors; (2) data concerning whether certain genes
have been copied multiple times in tumors; (3) data on gene
expression, i.e., whether a gene is turned “on” or “off” within a tumor
databases; (4) epigenetic databases, i.e., databases concerning the
chemical profile of tumors’ DNA beyond just their sequence; (5)
integrative databases, or databases combining the information of
several databases and providing a platform for analysis; and (6) a
catch-all “other” category, including data on the proteins involved in
cancer progression.375
Realizing the true benefits of cancer databases, however,
requires access to them by researchers and clinicians; through data

370. An Overview of NCI’s National Clinical Trials Network, NAT’L CANCER INST.
(May 29, 2015), https://www.cancer.gov/research/areas/clinical-trials/nctn [https://perma.cc
/PVB6-WJQS].
371. Id.
372. See Yadong Yang et al., Databases and Web Tools for Cancer Genomics Study, 13
GENOMICS, PROTEOMICS & BIOINFORMATICS 46, 46–47, 49 (2015).
373. Janus, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (March 17, 2017), http://www.fda.gov
/ForIndustry/DataStandards/StudyDataStandards/ucm155327.htm [https://perma.cc/S62AJ83J].
374. Surveillance, Epidemiology, and End Results Program, NAT’L CANCER INST.,
http://seer.cancer.gov [https://perma.cc/QGN7-FWZ4].
375. Charoentong et al., supra note 45, at 1886–87.
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sharing, not merely a gross aggregation of data.376 In a 2003 policy
statement concerning data sharing and funding, the NIH concluded
“that data sharing is essential for expedited translation of research
results into knowledge, products, and procedures to improve human
health.”377 This is especially true for datasets in cancer research, which
require “increase[d] sample sizes and available statistical power, as
well as . . . [a] diversity of samples, which allows more robust
subgroup analyses.”378 Data sharing is so important—for cancer
research and beyond—that the NIH now requires it for all federally
funded studies of $500,000 per year or more.379 The scientific journals,
Nature, Science, and Cell—considered the three most prestigious life
science journals—all require some form of data sharing for any
articles they publish.380
Despite this, there are numerous difficulties with data sharing in
the cancer context.381 One of those difficulties is, essentially, a legal
one: each database requires different terms of use and is protected by
a variety of different intellectual property regimes. The Cancer Care
Outcomes Research & Surveillance Consortium (“CanCORS”), for
example—a dataset of roughly 10,000 patients diagnosed with lung or
colorectal cancer—is strictly proprietary.382 Researchers looking for
376. See id. at 1886 (“Thus, a cancer researcher can address today a specific question
and not only by generating proprietary high-throughput data but also by accessing and
mining available datasets.”); id. at 1899 (“The current bottleneck in whole-exome
sequencing projects is not the sequencing of the DNA itself but lies in the structured way
of data management and the sophisticated computational analysis of the experimental
data.”).
377. NAT’L INSTS. HEALTH, FINAL NIH STATEMENT ON SHARING RESEARCH DATA
(2003), http://grants.nih.gov/grants/guide/notice-files/not-od-03-032.html [https://perma.cc
/TH6V-Y5SQ].
378. Tatiana Perrino et al., Advancing Science Through Collaborative Data Sharing and
Synthesis, 8 PERSP. PSYCHOL. SCI. 433, 433 (2013).
379. NAT’L INSTS. HEALTH, supra note 377.
380. Availability of Data, Material and Methods, NATURE, http://www.nature.com
/authors/policies/availability.html
[https://perma.cc/T6VQ-LULA
(dark
archive)];
Information for Authors, CELL, http://www.cell.com/cell/authors [https://perma.cc/YK2HVS2P]; Science: Editorial Policies, SCIENCE, http://www.sciencemag.org/authors/scienceeditorial-policies [https://perma.cc/HVG3-E5YG].
381. See Margaret A. Stone et al., Sharing Patient Data: Competing Demands of
Privacy, Trust and Research in Primary Care, 55 BRIT. J. GEN. PRACTICE 783, 783–84, 787
(2005) (discussing concerns of patient confidentiality, researcher conflict of interest, and
clinical diminishment).
382. CANCER CARE OUTCOMES RESEARCH AND SURVEILLANCE: CANCORS
PROJECT OVERVIEW 1, (2014), https://www.cancors.org/public/servlets/open/home
/home.cmd?itab=0 [perma.cc/N7XX-J7AK]; See Forms to Request Data Access or to
Propose a Manuscript, CANCORS, https://www.cancors.org/public/servlets/open/home
/home.cmd?itab=4 [perma.cc/3EFH-ABSV]; NCIP/cagrid-core, GITHUB, https://github.com
/NCIP/cagrid-core [perma.cc/Y7KX-EGMV].
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access to CanCORS data must partner with a CanCORS member and
are subject to a Data Use Agreement: a contract limiting the type,
manner, and content of data sharing with other institutions.383 By
contrast, caGrid—a clinical trial data sharing platform—runs on
completely free and open source licenses, namely the Berkeley
Software Distribution 3-clause license (“BSD-3”).384 The BSD-3
license places no restrictions on access or use of the underlying data,
or its use in the creation of new intellectual property derived from
it.385 COSMIC—a database of mutations present in over 370,000
tumors—strikes somewhat of a middle ground, requiring paid-up,
agreed-upon licenses for all researchers, but charging large fees for
only commercial companies and large academic institutions.386 This
variety in cancer databases and licensing regimes almost parallels the
complexity in the disease itself.
Cancer investigators looking to conduct research across
platforms—or looking to deposit their data in multiple fora—are
therefore required to navigate the twists and turns of these licensing
regimes. Performing cross-platform cancer research may
consequently run aground on conflicting licensing terms.387 In extreme
cases, owners of proprietary datasets may refuse access to their
underlying data if it is combined with other, open-source datasets.388
For commercial developers, attempting to link data across multiple,
proprietary, fee-based datasets may significantly increase the cost of
research, a problem akin to “stacking” multiple IP royalties to use a
single product.389 And, ultimately, conflicting licensing terms across
383. See Forms to Request Data Access or to Propose a Manuscript, supra note 382.
384. NCIP/cagrid-core, supra note 382; see also Margaret Rouse, BSD (Berkeley
Software Distribution), TECHTARGET, http://searchdatacenter.techtarget.com/definition
/BSD-Berkeley-Software-Distribution [perma.cc/MLV5-RMVB] (describing the Berkeley
Software Distribution system).
385. See The BSD 3-Clause License, OPEN SOURCE INITIATIVE, https://opensource.org
/licenses/BSD-3-Clause [perma.cc/92XQ-EV25].
386. Simon A. Forbes et al., COSMIC: Exploring the World’s Knowledge of Somatic
Mutations in Human Cancer, 43 NUCLEIC ACIDS RES. 805, 805 (2014) (“Our latest release
(v70; Aug 2014) describes 2,002,811 coding point mutations in over one million tumor
samples and across most human genes.”); Licensing - Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ),
COSMIC, http://cancer.sanger.ac.uk/cosmic/license/faq [perma.cc/RP3N-PRCD].
387. See Jennifer C. Molloy, The Open Knowledge Foundation: Open Data Means
Better Science, 9 PLOS BIOLOGY 1, 4 (2011) (“Drawing together diverse datasets for reuse
in this manner becomes complicated where their terms of use are restrictive or not
interoperable, making openness a valuable attribute.”).
388. See, e.g., Oxenham, supra note 30, at 16 (describing this phenomenon in the
context of the development of Hetionet).
389. Cf. Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shaprio, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX.
L. REV. 1991, 1993 (2007) (“Royalty stacking refers to situations in which a single product
potentially infringes on many patents, and thus may bear multiple royalty burdens.”).
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datasets are likely to hinder, if not wholly prevent, the
redistribution—or further protection—of newly created crossplatform datasets to other researchers.390
These difficulties are especially problematic in encouraging
research into longitudinal data analysis: statistical linkages of tumor
mutations, cancer treatment, and clinical outcomes.391 A recent report
from Nature highlighted these difficulties in the development of
Hetionet, a “free online resource that melds data from 28 public
sources on links between drugs, genes and diseases.”392 The principal
investigator responsible for the project was required to negotiate
separate licenses for each original data source—but was refused in
one case, and failed to come to terms in three others.393 This resulted
in a platform of unclear legality.394 This “confusion has the power to
slow down science . . . because researchers will be discouraged from
combining data sets into more useful resources,” and runs the risk of
“good data . . . going to waste because their creators could not clarify
whether [one] could republish them.”395
To its credit, the Cancer Moonshot has attempted to overcome
some of these difficulties. To focus its efforts, the Moonshot project
initially divided itself into seven “Working Groups” of interest,
including the Enhanced Data Sharing Working Group, which seeks to
bring down technological and structural barriers to data sharing.396 A
portion of that effort seeks to expand the NCI’s Genomic Data
Commons (“GDC”), a “unified data repository that enables data
sharing across cancer genomic studies in support of precision

390. See Oxenham, supra note 30, at 16–17 (“The European Union assigns specific
database rights, independent of copyright, that aim to protect the investment made in
compiling a database. Legally speaking, these rights prevent researchers . . . from
republishing data sets created by scientists in EU states without their consent . . . . [E]ven
in jurisdictions such as the United States, where no separate rights exist to govern
databases, there is still room for confusion. Although facts don’t qualify for copyright, the
way they are compiled arguably might—if the act of making that compilation requires
sufficiently creative expression.”); Stodden, supra note 30, at 14 (“Evolving community
standards and peer review cannot be relied upon to solve all dissemination issues, as some,
such as licensing for code and data, require coordinated action to ensure that goals such as
interoperability are met.”).
391. See Stodden, supra note 30, at 3–4 (describing this in several case studies of cancer
genetics data); Strausberg et al., supra note 82, at 470–72 (discussing the need for such
tools to assess clinical utility).
392. Oxenham, supra note 30, at 16.
393. Id.
394. Id. at 16–17.
395. Id. at 17.
396. CANCER MOONSHOT BLUE RIBBON PANEL REPORT 2016, supra note 163, at 3.
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medicine.”397 On a smaller scale, the Cancer Moonshot has supported
several ad hoc cancer data sharing initiatives. The Applied
Proteogenomics Organizational Learning and Outcomes consortium
(“APOLLO”), for example, combines data from 8,000 lung cancer
patients under the care of the Departments of Defense and Veterans
Affairs.398 APOLLO data focuses on gene expression within tumors,
i.e., which genes are turned “on” and “off” as a neoplasm is subjected
to treatment.399 Recently, APOLLO has become an international
consortium with the inclusion of four Australian institutions, and that
country’s own data-sharing efforts, the Australian Proteome of
Human Cancer.400 Relatedly, the Human Cell Atlas (“HCA”)—
“comprehensive reference maps of all human cells . . . as a basis for
both understanding human health and diagnosing, monitoring, and
treating disease”401—have made determined gains to coordinate data
sharing on both institutional and technological levels.402 In June 2017,
the U.C. Santa Cruz Genomics Institute, one of the pioneer
institutions in the Human Genome Project, announced its
participation in the HCA—specifically to build the project’s data
coordination platform.403 U.C. Santa Cruz researchers note that the
HCA is “not only a fascinating and important biology project, it’s also
a very large computational and engineering project that is leading the
way in terms of how to organize big data.”404

397. The Next Generation Cancer Knowledge Network, NAT’L CANCER INST.
https://gdc.cancer.gov [perma.cc/N9C5-WB5P].
398. Adam Bonislawski, APOLLO Initiative Aims to Make Proteogenomics Routine
Part of Cancer Treatment at VA, DoD, GENOMEWEB (July 26, 2016),
https://www.genomeweb.com/proteomics-protein-research/apollo-initiative-aims-makeproteogenomics-routine-part-cancer-treatment [perma.cc/64MZ-UDJU].
399. APOLLO – Proteogenomically Zeroing in on Cancer, HUPO (July 11, 2016),
https://www.hupo.org/2016/07/news/apollo-proteogenomically-zeroing-in-on-cancer/ [perma.cc
/L545-T3R7] (“Applied Proteogenomics Organizational Learning and Outcomes — will
look at both a patient’s genes (genomic analysis) and the expression of these genes in the
form of proteins (proteomic analysis) to create the nation’s first system in which cancer
patients are routinely screened for genomic abnormalities and proteomic information to
match their tumor types to targeted therapies.”).
400. Press Release, The White House Office of the Vice President, supra note 174.
401. Human Cell Atlas, HUM. CELL ATLAS, https://www.humancellatlas.org [perma.cc
/M6HV-DF4H].
402. Data Coordination, HUM. CELL ATLAS, https://www.humancellatlas.org/datasharing [perma.cc/YL6J-HG57].
403. UC Santa Cruz Genomics Institute Joins Human Cell Atlas Initiative,
GENOMEWEB (June 1, 2017), https://www.genomeweb.com/informatics/uc-santa-cruzgenomics-institute-joins-human-cell-atlas-initiative?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium
=email&utm_campaign=GWDN%20Mon%20PM%202017-06-19&utm_term=GW%20Daily
%20News%20Bulletin [perma.cc/6JBK-4ZAF].
404. Id.

96 N.C. L. REV. 297 (2018)

360

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 96

But, thus far, the Moonshot effort has not tackled the IP and
licensing issues at the core of these data-sharing agreements. Access
to the GDC is under tight controls and subject to a complicated
licensing policy tied to NIH grants.405 The policy requires, among
other things, “that basic sequence and certain related data made
available through NIH-designated data repositories and all
conclusions derived from them will be freely available.”406 At the
same time, “[i]t discourages patenting of ‘upstream’ discoveries . . .
while it encourages the patenting of ‘downstream’ discoveries,”
without defining, precisely, what those terms mean.407 Furthermore,
the NIH Data Access Committee controls access to GDC’s data,
tranching it “through a tiered model involving unrestricted- and
controlled-data access mechanisms.”408 Were that not enough, the
policy seems only to apply to NIH-funded research, making unclear
what policies, if any, apply to private researchers.409 Resolving these
issues will remain at the core of successfully implementing any of the
Moonshot’s data-sharing efforts.
B.

Encouraging Data Sharing and IP for Cancer

For the Cancer Moonshot to be successful, it needs to implement
a workable data-sharing plan in the shadow of intellectual property
protections. Participants in the Moonshot will likely need to commit
to generating and sharing data concerning cancer research, treatment,
and outcomes—but are unlikely to participate without some form of
incentive guaranteeing their investment in research.410 The solution

405. See NIH Genomic Data Sharing Policy, NIH Notice No. NOT-OD-14-124, NAT’L
INSTS. HEALTH (Aug. 27, 2014), http://grants.nih.gov/grants/guide/notice-files/NOT-OD14-124.html [perma.cc/M2LS-827K] (structuring restrictions on genomic data sharing).
406. Id.
407. Id.
408. Id.
409. See id.
410. See Lietzan, supra note 329, at 94 (“The well-accepted narrative of data exclusivity
is that it is provided by the government as an incentive to perform the research necessary
to obtain the marketing authorization in question.”); Price & Minssen, supra note 294, at
685 (raising this issue in the context of sharing clinical trial data); Vertinsky, supra note 26,
at 1517 (“[Policymakers] need to find ways of mitigating the negative effects of market
incentives on cooperation without removing market incentives altogether from this
process. This requires strategies for confronting and reducing the tensions between private
and public incentives to create and share knowledge.”); see also Memorandum, supra note
5 (discussing incentives for the Moonshot).
It is important to note that this regime may appear to parallel—but is ultimately
orthogonal—to similar regimes used to encourage the production of chemical toxicity
data. Like programs such as the Moonshot, data on industrial chemicals’ toxicity in
humans is underproduced and underused, despite its value. Mary L. Lyndon, Information
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likely lies in tailoring intellectual property protections to encourage
the level, type, and terms of data sharing the Moonshot ultimately
requires.
Like many things, developing a working model of private
ordering against legal backdrops consists of breaking its essential
questions into elements.411 Here, the essential questions concerning
the success of the Cancer Moonshot can be thought of as comprising
three parts: producing valuable cancer information; disclosing that
information through data-sharing programs; and using that data to
develop cancer treatments or further information.
1. Production
Tailoring IP policies to encourage the production of cancer
information ultimately depends on the type of information sought to
be produced and the organization likely to produce it. For starters,
basic information about cancer—the genes, proteins, and cellular
features found prominently in tumors—has been typically uncovered
by academic researchers funded by federal grants.412 In this way, at
least for academic researchers in the cancer space, the NIH/NCI
grant-funding system strongly functions as a research incentive for the
immediate production of basic cancer information. Academic
scientists study the basic molecular trappings of cancer, publish that
information in scientific journals, and apply for more grants.413 This
occurs even though many NIH grants restrict researchers’ ability to
protect, through the traditional means of intellectual property, their

Economics and Chemical Toxicity: Designing Laws to Produce and Use Data, 87 MICH. L.
REV. 1795, 1796 (1989). Several laws have, consequently, been enacted to encourage
chemical manufacturers to disclose the toxicity of their products to regulators and the
public. Id. at 1832–33. At the same time, the cost of such studies—like the cost of clinical
trials in the cancer context—have dissuaded manufacturers from doing just that. See id. at
1810–13. The difference here, however—and an important one, at that—is that the toxicity
information sought to be produced is ultimately harmful to the manufacturer in that it is
designed to be used for restrictive regulation or as the basis for private tort lawsuits. Id. at
1817–25. The solutions proposed to remedy these problems—right-to-know laws,
environmental tort liability, agency enforcement—are therefore inapposite to similar
information production regimes used in the Moonshot. See id. at 1854–60.
411. Cf. Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the
Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 959 (1979) (analyzing private ordering in
divorce by recognizing that “[l]egal doctrine separates the potential consequences of
divorce into four distributional questions”).
412. See Eckhouse et al., supra note 92, at 24 (showing the breakdown of cancer
research funding).
413. See Brian A. Woodcock, “The Scientific Method” as Myth and Ideal, 10 SCI. &
EDUC. 2069, 2070 (2014) (“Scientists apply for grants, supervise employees, prepare
budgets, and much more.”).
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basic discoveries.414 Tailoring IP laws to further encourage the
academic development of basic cancer information may therefore
have little practical effect.
This hinges, of course, on the availability of NIH funding for
certain areas of research. Where NIH funding is scant—for, say,
scientific, ethical, or political reasons—private research may fill in
that gap. And there, the availability of some form of intellectual
property to protect basic discoveries may encourage research in that
area.415 Prior to the developments in Mayo, Myriad, and Alice, some
of this basic research was disclosed by pharmaceutical developers in
patent applications, both to preserve potentially lucrative claims in
future, continuing applications, but also as a defensive strategy.416
After the Supreme Court’s recent patent-ineligibility turn, however,
more of this information is likely to be the subject of trade secrets.417
Dan L. Burk has recently noted the information-draining quality of
this shift: “if the unpatentable invention is kept as a trade secret, it
may beget further trade secrets.”418
This turn towards secrecy poses particular problems for publicprivate partnerships. The information derived from them can be
thought of as part of the “public infrastructure”—publicly-available
resources created or subsidized by the public sector.419 Subsidizing the

414. See NIH Genomic Data Sharing Policy, supra note 405.
415. One area in which this has been prominent is stem cell research. Since the 1990s,
public funding of stem cell research has been difficult and thin. As a consequence,
prominent researchers in the area have turned to patents and licensing fees to fund further
research. See John M. Golden, WARF’s Stem Cell Patents and Tensions between Public
and Private Sector Approaches to Research, 38 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 314, 314–15 (2010)
(describing stem cell patents held by the Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation); Jacob
S. Sherkow & Christopher Thomas Scott, Stem Cell Patents After the America Invents Act,
16 CELL STEM CELL 461, 461–63 (2015) (discussing the history of stem cell patents).
416. See Contreras & Vertinsky, supra note 294, at 85–89 (discussing defensive
patenting from a genomics consortium); Mark A. Lemley & Kimberly A. Moore, Ending
Abuse of Patent Continuations, 84 B.U. L. REV. 63, 69 (2004) (“Continuations are a major
part of patent practice. They are especially important in certain industries, particularly
pharmaceuticals and biotechnology.”).
417. See Derek E. Bambauer, Secrecy is Dead - Long Live Trade Secrets, 93 DENV. L.
REV. 833, 833 (2016) (“[I]nnovators will shift to using trade secret law to safeguard
advances, rather than filing for patent protection or using contractual and technological
self-help to keep inventions confidential . . . [because] obtaining a patent has become more
difficult and less certain with recent doctrinal developments.”).
418. Dan L. Burk, Patents as Data Aggregators in Personalized Medicine, 21 B.U. J.
SCI. & TECH. L. 233, 245 (2015).
419. Brett M. Frischmann, Infrastructure Commons, 2005 MICH. ST. L. REV. 121, 126–
29 (defining public infrastructure); David S. Levine, Secrecy and Unaccountability: Trade
Secrets in Our Public Infrastructure, 59 FLA. L. REV. 135, 140–45 (2007) (describing
information as public infrastructure).
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creation of these resources and then locking them behind trade
secrecy’s private gates moves such information from public
infrastructure to private property, with little recourse for appeal.420 In
short, it would be a twenty-first century version of enclosure: “a plain
enough case of class robbery.”421
Besides basic scientific information about cancer, encouraging
the production of clinical information about the disease would also be
significantly useful. Typically, that information is produced by
therapeutics developers in connection with bringing a particular
therapeutic treatment to market.422 For a variety of reasons,
developers have little incentive in producing more clinical
information than minimally required for regulatory approval.423 But
because IP protections largely influence the green-lighting and
structuring of clinical trials, tailoring those protections may spur the
development of more clinical trials.424 Significant changes to patent
systems solely to encourage therapeutics’ developers to test more of
their products may be too blunt of an instrument for both political
and policy reasons.425
One smaller, and potentially easier, fix would be a statutory
clarification that the use of a drug during clinical trials does not raise

420. See Thomas O. McGarity & Sidney A. Shapiro, The Trade Secret Status of Health
and Safety Testing Information: Reforming Agency Disclosure Policies, 93 HARV. L. REV.
837, 857–59 (1980) (discussing agencies’ duty to assess when to move “proprietary
information” to public disclosure).
421. Donald N. McCloskey, The Economics of Enclosure: A Market Analysis, in
EUROPEANS PEASANTS AND THEIR MARKETS: ESSAYS IN AGRARIAN ECONOMIC
HISTORY 123 (William N. Parker & Eric L. Jones eds., 1975). “Enclosure” refers to the
process, enacted between the fifteenth to nineteenth centuries in England, of aggregating
smaller, communal village farms into a single, larger space, owned privately by a single
landowner. Id. Because enclosure operated as a “redistribution of wealth from the poor to
the rich,” historians and economists alike have likened it to “a plain enough case of class
robbery.” Id. at 142.
422. See Contreras & Vertinsky, supra note 294, at 120; see also Lietzan, supra note
294, at 37; Price & Minssen, supra note 294, at 685.
423. See Falit, supra note 301, at 988–89.
424. See Leitzan, supra note 294, at 94–95; Prince & Minssen, supra note 294, at 685–
66; Vertinsky, supra note 26, at 1517–18; Memorandum, supra note 5.
425. Roin, supra note 278, at 751–53 (articulating a patent system based on time to
market—and its difficulties); Roin, supra note 312, at 508–10 (proposing the narrowing of
the nonobviousness requirement for drugs and its difficulties). Despite the persuasiveness
of these proposals, they may violate major intellectual property treaties, including TRIPS,
the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights. See General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade – Multilateral Trade Negotiations (the Uruguay Round):
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade in
Counterfeit Goods art. 27.1, Dec. 15, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 81 (requiring patents to be available
for inventions that include “an inventive step”).
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one of patent law’s statutory bars.426 Doing so may encourage
therapeutics developers to at least pull more promising compounds
off the shelf for early stage clinical work, without the threat of
penalizing them—and barring the patentability of derivative
compounds—if their experiments fail. Encouragingly, Congress has
taken a similar tack before with respect to infringement in the clinical
trial context. Section 271(e) of the patent statute excepts from patent
infringement “uses [of a patented invention] reasonably related to the
development and submission of information under a Federal law
which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs or veterinary
biological products.”427 This provision, in turn, has been interpreted
broadly by the courts—despite a buffet of exceptions428—and is now a
core plot of the landscape for therapeutics’ developers IP strategy.429
Lastly, standardizing the IP licensing regime for cancer databases
could also promote the development of new cancer information.
Licensing interoperability—rather than infringement liability—often
precludes meta-analyses of large datasets.430 And researchers
undertaking such analyses do so for a variety of reasons and with a
variety of applications in mind.431 Perfectly harmonizing
interoperability to meet these diverse concerns will likely remain
impossible.432 But centering on a default licensing scheme—much like
FRAND (fair, reasonable, and non-disciminatory) licensing in a
standard setting organization—that both protects the original data
and recognizes its diverse for-profit and non-profit uses may be a
workable solution. At the same time, creating a uniquely-tailored
licensing regime just for cancer data will almost certainly prove
problematic, if for no other reason than the difficulties in predicting
426. See supra Section II.A.2 (discussing the statutory bars).
427. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2012).
428. These exceptions include new animal drugs, veterinary biological products, and
patents on processes used to submit routine manufacturing information to the FDA. See
id.; Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 659 F.3d 1057, 1072 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
429. See Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Elan Pharm., Inc., 786 F.3d 892, 893–94
(Fed. Cir. 2015) (concluding that Elan did not infringe Classen’s patents by engaging in
clinical research on its own drug, Skelaxin (metaxalone)). Because, prior to Classen, it was
unclear whether § 271(e) would apply to brand manufacturers—and not just generics—its
full effect is only beginning to be seen.
430. See Simon Oxenham, Legal Maze Threatens to Slow Data Science, 536 NATURE
16, 16–17 (2016); Victoria Stodden, Reproducing Statistical Results, 2 ANN. REV. STAT. &
APPLICATION 1, 14 (2015).
431. See Oxenham, supra note 30, at 17.
432. See Molloy, supra note 387, at 4 (discussing the unrequited virtues of
interoperability); Stodden, supra note 30, at 14 (discussing interoperability difficulties
including “a conflict between openness for the replication of computational results and
traditional methods of privacy protection via data sequestration”).
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how such data will be used in the future.433 To these ends, off-theshelf licenses like the GNU Lesser General Public License (“GNU
LGPL”) may prove effective. The GNU LGPL specifically
contemplates the use of earlier datasets for the purpose of combining
them into a larger work.434 It also operates automatically; researchers
wishing to use GNU LGPL protected datasets would not need to
secure permission from individual owners for their use.435 Whether
GNU LGLP or another licensing scheme is best positioned as a
default for cancer datasets will almost certainly require more careful
investigation. But centering on a common standard for licensing
would promote the analysis of our current repository of cancer
information and encourage its further development.
2. Disclosure
While producing cancer information is an important goal of the
Cancer Moonshot, its ultimate disclosure remains paramount. Indeed,
the Moonshot’s participants’ concerns about the siloing of cancer
information centers around what is, essentially, a disclosure problem:
finding ways of encouraging the producers of cancer information to
share it.436 Tailoring intellectual property incentives around disclosure
may ultimately promote the activity.
First, the disclosure of previously secret information is one of the
core functions of the patent system. Perhaps ironically, it may
therefore appear that encouraging the patenting of cancer
information would consequently encourage its disclosure.437 But the
reality, of course, is more nuanced than that. A number of scholars
have recently pointedly out—both doctrinally and empirically—that
patents’ disclosure function as a source of technical information is
relatively minimal.438 Furthermore, what does tend to be disclosed is
often wrapped not in technically useful language or the argot of legal
certainty, but a peculiar pidgin of “patentese” useful, sadly, only to
433. Judith Swan et al., Cancer Surveillance in the U.S.: Can We Have a National
System?, 83 CANCER 1282, 1282–83 (1998) (“Although significant steps have been taken
to move toward the use of a uniform data set, differences in data collection, analysis, and
reporting place an extra burden on registries that report to more than one surveillance
program. In addition, the inconsistencies of data sets present obstacles to their compilation
for collaborative use.”).
434. GNU Lesser General Public License (Version 3), GNU OPERATING SYSTEM
(June 29, 2007), https://www.gnu.org/licenses/lgpl-3.0.en.html [https://perma.cc/A6D7A52V] (containing provisions for combined works in section 4 of the license).
435. Id. (requiring some sharing of code).
436. See supra Section III.A.
437. See Sherkow, supra note 21, at 847–48 (discussing this disclosure paradigm).
438. Id. at 867–68.
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other patent attorneys.439 Efforts to fix this disclosure regime in
patents would, obviously, prove meaningful. But they have been
attempted many times, and in many different contexts, without much
success.440 The problems in aligning patent drafting to scientific
discovery are products of law, history, and philosophy, more than
scientific ones.441 In other words, “it may simply be impossible to
cleanly map words to things.”442
Second, trade secrets are, by their nature, anti-disclosure
regimes. Indeed, for trade secrets to remain protectable, their owners
must engage in efforts to keep them secret.443 Encouraging the
protection of cancer information through trade secrets would simply
run counter to the purpose of the Cancer Moonshot, and would
contribute to an increasing compartmentalization of information.444
To mitigate against this, any information created as part of the
Cancer Moonshot should be legally excepted from its protection as a
trade secret or confidential business information. This has several
advantages, not the least of which is that information derived from
the Moonshot that is eventually submitted to the FDA would be
subject to disclosure through the Freedom of Information Act.445
Furthermore, disclosure as a condition of participation circumvents
the problem of “regulatory blocking”: obtaining, and then delaying or
failing to use, regulatory exclusivities for anticompetitive purposes.446
After all, a regime that mandates information disclosure provides no
benefit to those who are slack to use their own—or their
competitors’—information. To be sure, forced disclosure like this
would only eliminate trade secrets de jure as opposed to de facto:
439. Sean B. Seymore, The Teaching Function of Patents, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
621, 633–34 (2010) (“A crucial step in [the claiming drafting] process is transforming the
inventor’s plain English into patentese, the specialized language that patents are written
in.”).
440. See Sherkow, supra note 21, at 905 (discussing the lack of prior success in aligning
science to patents’ disclosure function).
441. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent
Claim Construction, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1743, 1745–47 (2009).
442. Id. at 1745.
443. 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3)(A) (2012) (requiring a trade secret owner to have “taken
reasonable measures to keep such information secret”).
444. See supra notes 23–24 and accompanying text.
445. Cf. Pub. Citizen Health Research Grp. v. FDA, 704 F.2d 1280, 1290–91 (D.C. Cir.
1983) (determining that confidential business information submitted to the FDA from
clinical trials is not subject to FOIA requests).
446. Cf. C. Scott Hemphill & Mark A. Lemley, Earning Exclusivity: Generic Drug
Incentives and the Hatch-Waxman Act, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 947, 949–50 (2011) (promoting
a “use it or lose it” approach to generic exclusivity earned through the Hatch-Waxman
Act pharmaceutical patent litigation).
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even without legal protection, nothing will prevent participants in the
Cancer Moonshot from keeping information to themselves. But
removing legal protections from information developed under the
auspices of a federally-funded information-sharing program would
provide appropriate and legal avenues for the disclosure of such
information for future projects.
Lastly, mandating disclosure brings with it the ancillary, but
important, benefits of standardizing data structure. That is, the FDA
could require data disclosed by Moonshot participants to be
submitted in certain formats, be coded in particular ways, or contain
specific structured data elements.447 This is significantly important for
follow-on research programs like Hetionet. Data standardization
facilitates future research through interoperability, allows for
“reliable comparisons” across studies, and eases data management,
among other benefits.448 Agreeing on uniform data standards has
been a task typically left to industry but has experienced severe
balkanization in the clinical context.449 Putting this role in the hands
of the FDA, or at least with some FDA oversight, has had much more
success.450
Mandating disclosure in a way palatable to industry, however,
remains a challenge. With patents ineffective and trade secrets
unwanted, regulatory exclusivities—tied to the disclosure of
information—may prove fruitful. Private participation in the
Moonshot could be structured around bonus regulatory exclusivities
for future therapies in return for the disclosure of certain types of
information. These could be structured along a continuum of the
data’s value: a smaller number of years for the disclosure of datasets
identifying new molecular targets or chemical screen products, and a
longer regulatory exclusivity period for the disclosure of robust
longitudinal data from human trials. This is not entirely
unprecedented. Currently, the FDA grants an additional six-month

447. ENGLISH ET AL., supra note 261, at 34–35 (discussing the FDA’s role in data
standardization). See generally Roy B. Jones, Dianne Reeves & Charles S. Martinez,
Overview of Electronic Data Sharing: Why, How, and Impact, 14 CURRENT ONCOLOGY
REP. 486 (2012) (discussing these terms in the oncology data context).
448. See Christopher P. Cannon et al., American College of Cardiology Key Data
Elements and Definitions for Measuring the Clinical Management and Outcomes of
Patients with Acute Coronary Syndromes: A Report of the American College of Cardiology
Task Force on Clinical Data Standards (Acute Coronary Syndromes Writing Committee),
38 J. AM. COLL. CARDIOLOGY 2114, 2116 (2001) (listing these and other benefits).
449. See ENGLISH ET AL., supra note 261, at 34–35.
450. See id. at 35 (discussing some “big data” successes, like the cancer Biomedical
Informatics Grid (“caBIG”)).
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exclusivity period for therapeutic developers’ completion of pediatric
clinical trials.451 This operates whether the pediatric trials were,
themselves, a success: developers that engaged in, and failed,
pediatric trials for their drugs are still entitled to the six-month
exclusivity benefit.452 This six-month exclusivity award—worth, in
some cases, hundreds of millions of dollars—therefore functions as an
informational disclosure incentive. A company that conducts
pediatric clinical trials receives an exclusivity bonus on its product for
essentially disclosing that information to the agency.453
One could easily envision such a system for the Cancer
Moonshot, where disclosure of discrete datasets—raw data from
clinical trials, for instance, or information concerning chemical
screens against tumors—entitle their owners to a regulatory
exclusivity period bonus applied to a future therapeutic product
approved by the FDA. Industry has signaled approval for such
bounties as promising more certainty than other forms of intellectual
property that may only poorly protect the information disclosed.454
And the exclusivity bonus for conducting pediatric trials, for example,
has been, in many ways, a success.455 If the program is successful,
taxpayers will likely pay for these bonuses in the form of higher
prices, at least in the short term.456 But society can hope for the long451. 21 U.S.C. § 355a(b)–(c) (2012). This exclusivity is often thought of as an extension
of the patent term because pediatric exclusivities are listed alongside patents in the FDA’s
Orange Book; however, it’s a six-month exclusivity bonus applied in addition to all other
exclusivities—patents or other regulatory exclusivities. Frequently Asked Questions on
Patents and Exclusivity, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/Drugs
/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/ucm079031.htm [https://perma.cc/893G-LURK] (“When
pediatric exclusivity is obtained, a 6-month period of exclusivity is added to all existing
patents and exclusivity on all applications held by the sponsor for that active moiety.”).
452. See 21 U.S.C. § 355a(b)(1) (requiring only that the “studies are completed using
appropriate formulations for each age group for which the study is requested within any
such timeframe, and the reports thereof are submitted and accepted”—not that the
pediatric indication is ultimately approved).
453. Cf. Eisenberg, supra note 231, at 347 (“If a century ago the goal of drug regulation
was to protect people from poisons, today drug regulation guides the development of
information that turns poisons, used advisedly, into drugs . . . . Information about drug
effects is an extremely valuable resource for guiding sound therapeutic choices, as well as
for guiding the development of better products in the future.”).
454. See Thomas, supra note 25, at 42–47 (describing the rise and success of regulatory
exclusivities).
455. Jennifer S. Li et al., Economic Return of Clinical Trials Performed Under the
Pediatric Exclusivity Program, 297 JAMA 480, 480 (2007) (describing the pediatricexclusivity regime as “creating incentives for studies in children” and a “windfall” for
pharmaceutical developers).
456. Michael Dickson & Jean Paul Gagnon, Key Factors in the Rising Cost of New
Drug Discovery and Development, 3 NATURE REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 417, 418 (2004)
(tethering regulatory exclusivities to drug prices).
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term benefits designed in the program’s favor. Besides, structuring
disclosure incentives around regulatory exclusivity bonuses would not
require a separate appropriation from Congress, making a bonus
system perhaps more politically feasible than direct subsidies.457
Alternatively, a different form of regulatory property could be
used as an incentive: priority review vouchers (“PRVs”). Generally,
PRVs allow an agency to expedite review of a time-limited asset, such
as FDA approval for a drug protected by rapidly expiring patents.458
But as the “voucher” in PRV suggests, the property is alienable and
can be sold to others on the open market.459 This encourages a broad
variety of stakeholders to participate in neglected research, even if
their immediate needs do not contemplate priority review. Indeed,
PRVs were originally implemented to spur the development of
treatments for neglected diseases affecting impoverished parts of the
world.460 And recently, the 21st Century Cures Act expanded the
PRVs to include drugs used to treat agents of bioterrorism.461 Further,
like regulatory exclusivities, PRVs do not necessarily require separate
congressional appropriations, similarly making them politically
feasible incentives.462 For the Moonshot, PRVs could be implemented
as bonuses to companies for disclosing valuable cancer datasets. A
PRV incentive would be strong: in other contexts they have sold for
over $300 million on the open market, with AbbVie recently
purchasing one for $350 million.463
457. Cf. Roin, supra note 312, at 507 (“[U]nlike a government-run drug-development
program, Congress could easily implement the proposed FDA-administered exclusivity
periods because current law already provides for certain short delays in the approval
process for generics.”).
458. 21 U.S.C. § 360n(a)(2) (2012). Priority review vouchers were originally proposed
in a 2006. David Ridley, Henry G. Grabowski & Jeffrey L. Moe, Developing Drugs for
Developing Countries, 25 HEALTH AFFS. 313, 313 (2006). In an amazing alliance between
academia and Congress, the system of priority review vouchers was enacted into law
shortly thereafter. Kyle Wamstad, Note, Priority Review Vouchers – A Piece of the
Incentive Puzzle, 14 VA. J.L. & TECH. 126, 127 (2009).
459. 21 U.S.C. § 360n(b)(2) (“The sponsor of a tropical disease product that receives a
priority review voucher under this section may transfer (including by sale) the entitlement
to such voucher . . . .”).
460. See id. § 360n(a)(2) (limiting priority review vouchers to drug applications for
“tropical diseases”); Ridley et al., supra note 458, at 313 (“To receive a voucher, a therapy
must . . . treat neglected diseases such as African trypanosomiasis, Chagas disease,
leishmaniasis, or dengue fever . . . . “).
461. 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, Sec. 3086, § 565A, 130 Stat. 1033,
1144–47 (2016).
462. 21 U.S.C. § 360n(c)(5) (funding the administration of priority review vouchers
through existing appropriations).
463. John Carroll, That Priority Review Voucher Program? The FDA Hates It, FIERCE
BIOTECH (Mar. 3, 2016), http://www.fiercebiotech.com/r-d/priority-review-voucher-
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This is not to say that these exclusivity incentives—and PRVs in
particular—are without problems. With respect to neglected tropical
diseases, PRVs have been criticized by health scholars as being
ineffective—generating a meager total of four drugs developed under
its auspices from 2007 to 2016.464 In addition, there is some evidence
to suggest that awarding PRVs encourages the purchase and sale of
smaller pharmaceutical companies by larger ones, rather than the
outsized R&D spending contemplated by the program.465 The FDA
itself has been critical of PRVs administrative burden as detracting
from other “important public health work.”466 And there is, of course,
the potential for perpetual price increases that come with such
monopoly provisioning.467 These are important criticisms of PRVs
that should not be taken lightly. Nonetheless, they seem to be more
related to the ineffectiveness of using PRVs as drug development
tools rather than—as contemplated here—information-sharing
regimes.
Squatting, rather, seems more problematic in this context:
developers sitting on exclusivity periods earned as a result of
disclosing information, without using such information to bring
therapies to market.468 Several scholars have recognized analogous
problems in a variety of other contexts. In 2011, Michael Abramowicz
highlighted this problem for “orphan business models”: “business
models previously conceived and disclosed that no one has had

program-fda-hates-it [https://perma.cc/ZA9Z-NPG2] (“AbbVie ($ABBV) plunked down
$350 million for its review voucher back in the spring of 2015. And there’s plenty of
evidence that the industry sees significant value in the vouchers, looking for four added
months of marketing for their top prospects.”).
464. Ana Santos Rutschman, The Priority Review Voucher Program at the FDA: From
Neglected Tropical Diseases to the 21st Century Cures Act, ANNALS OF HEALTH L.
SUMMER 2017, at 71, 80.
465. Aaron S. Kesselheim, Drug Development for Neglected Diseases: The Trouble with
FDA Review Vouchers, 359 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1981, 1981 (2008).
466. Peter Loftus, Drug Makers Buy Pricey Vouchers to Speed Products to Market,
WALL ST. J. (Nov. 1, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/drug-firms-buy-pricey-vouchersto-speed-products-to-market-1445333403 [https://perma.cc/K256-LLWG (staff-uploaded
archive)].
467. Kesselheim, supra note 465, at 1982.
468. See Nicholson W. Price II, Regulating Secrecy, 91 WASH. L. REV. 1769, 1809–10
(2016) (“Voluntary disclosure could be driven by incentives provided to firms, most likely
in the form of regulatory benefits such as agency-enforced exclusivity. . . . Such exclusivity
would have a limited duration and be explicit, resolving some of the problems with
secrecy. . . . However, firms would be expected to game the system; those secrets worth
more than the exclusivity would be kept secret, and those of lesser value would be
disclosed, leading to a socially suboptimal outcome.”).

96 N.C. L. REV. 297 (2018)

2018]

CANCER’S IP

371

sufficient incentives to implement.”469 In Abramowicz’s account,
government-issued exclusivities for orphan business models—patents,
regulatory exclusivities, and even royal prerogatives—suffer from a
lack of “institutional capability to determine which business models
will need legal exclusivity in order to be commercialized.”470 Granting
exclusivities to such business models is plainly inefficient.471 Similarly,
Ian Ayres and Lisa Larrimore Ouellette have recently explored this
phenomenon in the context of university-developed patents.472 Ayres
and Ouellette note that many university-developed patents are
licensed exclusively, narrowing their ambit of commercialization.473
Given that some university-developed patents are broadly
commercialized using nonexclusive licenses, they argue that “a
nonexclusive license is prima facie evidence that the invention ought
not to have been patented at all.”474 And even more broadly, Ted
Sichelman has documented that “[a]s an empirical matter . . . less,
probably much less, than half of all patented product inventions are
commercialized.”475
Interestingly, each of these scholars support analogous marketbased solutions—essentially, auctions—to solve the problem of
regulatory squatting. Abramowicz, for example, proposes several
creative auction schemes designed to either grant only the shortest
period of exclusivity the market would bear or to encourage
competitors to disclose further information in an attempt to thwart
the first-discloser’s exclusivity period entirely.476 Ayres and Ouellette,
in their study of university patents, do essentially the same.477 And
while Sichelman finds that such auctions have some drawbacks in
encouraging the patenting of commercialized productions, as opposed
to “embryonic inventions,” he appears largely supportive.478 One of
469. Michael Abramowicz, Orphan Business Models: Toward a New Form of
Intellectual Property, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1365 (2011).
470. Id. at 1368–69.
471. See generally Paul E. Schaafsma, An Economic Overview of Patents, 79 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 241 (1997) (discussing, inter alia, the efficiency concerns of early
royal letters patent).
472. See Ayres & Ouellette, supra note 265.
473. Id. at 271.
474. Id. at 275–76
475. Ted Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L. REV. 341, 362 (2010).
476. See Abramowicz, supra note 469, at 1396–1407, 1419–20.
477. See Ayres & Ouellette, supra note 265, at 301–05.
478. See Sichelman, supra note 475, at 391, 401 (“In sum, while patent extension
auctions could potentially cure many under-commercialization problems, given the
possible asymmetries between original patentees and third-party bidders that do not arise
from the benefits of development during the term, implementation could be quite difficult
and could lead to marked increases in deadweight losses.”).
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the many virtues of these proposals is the employment of marketbased initiatives to counteract decidedly anti-market regimes. And in
doing so, these proposals leverage what was previously dispersed, and
in some cases, confidential information to decide not only on the
worthiness, but also on the extent of such regulatory monopolies. In
other words, exclusivity auctions as rewards for disclosure indirectly
promote the disclosure of information itself. In writing about these
auctions, Ayres and Ouellette emphasize that “the purpose of [an]
exclusivity auction is not to identify the lowest bidder with the lowest
commercialization cost . . . . [It] is to harness knowledge of the lowestcost commercializer.”479 Ultimately, programs like these are tailored
to avoid—especially for public projects like the Cancer Moonshot—
giving up too much of the public’s goodwill for too little information
in return.
Despite their faults, regulatory exclusivities do appear to be the
best options for promoting the disclosure and use of cancer
information. According to John R. Thomas—a qualified skeptic of
the practice—regulatory exclusivities nonetheless “provide a far more
robust and reliable exclusion mechanism than do patents for rights
holders,” are self-enforcing, are less susceptible to challenge, and are
more aligned with specific products than other traditional forms of
intellectual property.480
3. Use
Lastly, although the primary goals of the Cancer Moonshot
center on the production and disclosure of information, the project
should also further the actual use of this information in the
development of new therapies—what many researchers have
described as “translational medicine.”481 Ideally, the information
developed through a program like the Cancer Moonshot would be
used to create new drugs, biologics, and medical devices for treating
cancer itself, not to mention information about how to best use such
therapies, on which patients, and under what circumstances. While
these may not be the Moonshot’s primary aim—indeed, part of the
Moonshot is preventing such narrow thinking towards products as to
seemingly discourage them482—concrete therapies should be at least
some of the fruits of that labor.
479.
480.
481.
at 2.
482.

See Ayres & Ouellette, supra note 265, at 304.
Thomas, supra note 25, at 42–43.
See, e.g., PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., supra note 141,
See supra notes 168–72 and accompanying text.

96 N.C. L. REV. 297 (2018)

2018]

CANCER’S IP

373

Patents and trade secrets, of course, will likely play their
traditional—or at least, current—roles in ushering these new products
to market. To the extent that commercial developers of therapeutics
see immediate value in the public information developed as a result of
the Cancer Moonshot, they will likely engage in such activity without
further intervention. Indeed, one of the goals of the Moonshot is to
enable the profitable development of newer therapies without
perpetual assistance.483 To be sure, the laws governing patents and
trade secrets in this space could be substantially better aligned to
produce those goods.484 But that realignment is likely to have
significant effects in those regimes beyond the mere encouragement
of using Cancer Moonshot data to develop therapies. Whether
sharpening patent and trade secret law to achieve that makes an
appropriate cut or is too blunt of an instrument for serious
consideration will likely depend on how valuable the information
produced by a project like the Moonshot ends up being.
Similar to the context of the disclosure of cancer data, regulatory
incentives may too have a role to play in enhancing the data’s use.
Indeed, regulatory exclusivities already play an extensive role in
encouraging private investment in the development of new
therapies.485 Such exclusivities could easily be tailored to give
preference to therapies developed from Cancer Moonshot data, such
as data made available to the Genomic Data Commons or for
participants in the project to be used in future applications to the
FDA. These kind of exclusivity rewards may spark enough
encouragement for private industry to produce, disclose, and use
cancer information as a profitable enterprise. Further, this seems
tacitly supported by those scholars, like Abramowicz, who have
advocated for exclusivity procurement auctions: auctions for
regulatory exclusivities for treatments based on cancer data that
produce few bidders signal a lack of utility of the data disclosed;
auctions that produce many, active bidders signal a higher level of
utility in the data.486 Whether such incentives are tailored around
bonus exclusivity periods, PRVs, or some other form of regulatory
property merits further investigation. But holding out additional
incentives to develop the data uncovered by a program like the
Cancer Moonshot is likely to best serve the effort’s goals.

483.
484.
485.
486.

See Simon, supra note 7.
See supra notes 305–10 and accompanying text.
See Thomas, supra note 25, at 42–47.
See Abramowicz, supra note 469, at 1399–1400.
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Public-Private Partnerships, Intellectual Property, and
Information Policy

In some ways the Cancer Moonshot, at least in its ideal form, is
unique in that it is a public-private partnership to uncover
information about a complex disease, a true understanding of which
has eluded physicians for millennia.487 But the project also illuminates
broader difficulties with public-private research in general, namely
problems of intellectual property and information policy. Examining
these difficulties provides several broader lessons about the purpose
and limits of public-private partnerships.
1. Data Privacy
First, the Cancer Moonshot sheds light on public-private
partnerships’ challenges concerning data privacy. The Moonshot,
conceived as an information-sharing regime, immediately raises
several issues concerning the security of patient’s data, an especially
sensitive reality in cancer research.488 Cancer information derived
from human tumors is essentially information about cancer patients’
(ill) health.489 A patient’s tumor type may inform an observer about
the patient’s private behavior, such as a history of smoking or sexual
activity.490 And genetic information derived from that tumor may
contain more health information—such as parentage or dispositions
to diabetes or Alzheimer’s—than just a cancer diagnosis.491
Safeguarding patients’ health data remains one of the more difficult
challenges—both technical and legal—in the privacy world today.492
Public-private partnerships dedicated to sharing personal information
487. Time will tell whether it will be a worthy endeavor. In the meantime, skepticism
abounds. See Peter Lee, Toward a Distributive Commons in Patent Law, 2009 WIS. L.
REV. 917, 919–920.
488. Jane Kaye, The Tension Between Data Sharing and the Protection of Privacy in
Genomics Research, 13 ANN. REV. GENOMICS & HUM. GENETICS 415, 415 (2012) (“Nextgeneration sequencing and global data sharing challenge many of the governance
mechanisms currently in place to protect the privacy of research participants. These
challenges will make it more difficult to guarantee anonymity for participants, provide
information to satisfy the requirements of informed consent, and ensure complete
withdrawal from research when requested.”).
489. See Julien Mancini et al., Consent for Biobanking: Assessing the Understanding
and Views of Cancer Patients, 103 J. NAT’L CANCER INST. 154, 158 (2011) (noting that
cancer information is subject to the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA)).
490. See, e.g., Janet R. Daling et al., Human Papillomavirus, Smoking, and Sexual
Practices in the Etiology of Anal Cancer, 101 CANCER 270, 270 (2004).
491. See Robert C. Green et al., ACMG Recommendations for Reporting of Incidental
Findings in Clinical Exome and Genome Sequencing, 15 GENETICS IN MED. 565, 565
(2013).
492. See Kaye, supra note 488, at 415.
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must therefore recognize these challenges despite their mandates to
disseminate it broadly. In some instances, the threat of political
reprisal and current market forces favoring privacy will be enough to
ensure the security of patients’ data.493 But that does not mean that
private enterprise can be simply deputized to safeguard the broader
citizenry’s health data.494 However well-intentioned, public-private
partnerships’ efforts to structure information sharing about health
data should give us pause.
2. Scientific Reproducibility
Second, the Moonshot counsels forward thinking concerning
scientific reproducibility. Its encouragement to produce and disclose
large quantities of cancer information makes no guarantees about the
quality of such data. Recently, numerous meta-analyses have decried
the lack of reproducibility of much cancer research.495 A review in
Nature of this problem noted that the effort “to translate cancer
research to clinical success has been remarkably low,” and blamed
this lack of success, at least in part, on “the quality of published
preclinical data.”496 But cancer research is not the only field touched
by recent accusations of irreproducibility; much of the life sciences, in
fact, have come under questioning for producing volumes of
essentially irreproducible results.497 Whether this is truly a crisis in the
making or simply a routine part of the scientific method remains to be
seen.498
But public-private partnerships, like the Cancer Moonshot,
should take special efforts to ensure that the information produced as
a result of their programs is, at a minimum, reproducible by others.
This is because public-private partnerships have a public obligation to
produce such data and are likely more susceptible to encourage the
creation of irreproducible. The public funds the public part of the
public-private partnership in the first instance—by providing
government resources needed to conduct the enterprise—and also in
493. See Ryan Calo, Privacy and Markets: A Love Story, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 649,
651 (2015) (developing “a novel account of the relationship between privacy and markets,
positioning the two concepts as sympathetic instead of antithetical”).
494. Wilbanks & Topol, supra note 24, at 346–47.
495. See, e.g., Begley & Ellis, supra note 245, at 532.
496. Id. at 531–32.
497. See Sherkow, supra note 21, at 855–60 (reviewing the literature surrounding
irreproducibility).
498. See Christie Aschwanden, Science Isn’t Broken, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Aug. 19,
2015),
http://fivethirtyeight.com/features/science-isnt-broken/
[http://perma.cc/7TTZGSQC] (arguing that irreproducible results is a normal function of the scientific method).
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the marketplace, if the endeavor is successful. At the same time, the
prizes offered for private participation in the project create conflicts
for companies to produce data of the highest quality.499 The success of
any information-seeking public-private partnership, therefore, hinges
on ensuring that the data produced is, in fact, valid.
3. Overprivatization
Third, as much as some form of intellectual property may be a
necessary incentive for participation in public-private partnerships,
too much protection may ultimately be counterproductive. Numerous
scholars have written at length about the role that stringent IP
protections play in stymieing information production in burgeoning
fields.500 To chose just one example in a galaxy of others, Fiona
Murray and Siobhán O’Mahony recently recounted how intellectual
property protection shaped the use of the Oncomouse, a genetically
engineered mouse with a predisposition to cancer, “widely recognized
as an important building block for further innovations in cancer
biology and drug discovery.”501 After DuPont purchased and began to
enforce the patent rights to the cancer tool, “the use of Oncomice in
drug discovery slowed and . . . [a]cademic research was inhibited as
follow-on innovators turned to different animal models.”502 This
problem of patent enforcement creating hurdles for future research
can be particularly salient for public-private partnerships that invest
the power (and often, money) of the government in private hands.
One potential solution may be to look toward using public-private
partnerships to facilitate the organization of a knowledge commons,
an institutional design created to facilitate the “sharing of knowledge
and information resources to produce innovation and creativity.”503
Several scholars, especially Jorge L. Contreras, have written
considerably about using commons frameworks in the context of
genetic data.504 But whether this strategy is enough to encourage
499. Vertinsky, supra note 26, at 1517 (“[Policymakers] need to find ways of mitigating
the negative effects of market incentives on cooperation without removing market
incentives altogether from this process. This requires strategies for confronting and
reducing the tensions between private and public incentives to create and share
knowledge.”).
500. See, e.g., Burstein, supra note 178, at 232–33; Eisenberg, supra note 23, at 178; Rai,
supra note 178, at 126.
501. Murray & O’Mahony, supra note 314, at 1012.
502. Id.
503. Brett M. Frischmann, Michael J. Madison & Katherine J. Strandburg,
Introduction, in GOVERNING KNOWLEDGE COMMONS, supra note 10, at X.
504. See, e.g., Contreras, supra note 10, at 99–100; Jorge L. Contreras, Bermuda’s
Legacy: Policy, Patents, and the Design of the Genome Commons, 12 MINN. J.L. SCI. &
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private investment in public-private partnerships remains to be seen.
Suffice it to say that public-private partnerships need to take special
care in tailoring their intellectual property incentives to promote the
dissemination of information even potentially at the cost of profitable
private ownership.
4. Transaction Costs
Fourth, even if public-private partnerships can perfectly align
intellectual property rights and information policies in theory, there
may be significant transaction costs to putting them on paper. Tania
Bubela, Jenilee Guebert, and Amrita Mishra have recently discussed
some of the difficulties in creating material transfer agreements
(“MTAs”)—contracts that “set the terms under which [institutions’]
materials and associated data may be obtained and used by others”—
in the context of preclinical research.505 MTAs are a necessary part of
preclinical research; they “provide a mechanism to protect the
interests of the owners of discoveries and inventions, while promoting
data and material sharing in the research community.”506 But their
negotiation, interpretation, and enforcement often create significant
burdens for researchers—so much so, that in several high-profile
cases, they have functioned to halt research rather than ease it.507
Similarly, Jorge L. Contreras and Liza Vertinsky have written about
the Accelerating Medicines Partnership, a public-private partnership
devoted to studying Alzheimer’s, diabetes, arthritis, and lupus.508
Simply creating the partnership—to speak nothing of the research
conducted under its auspices—“took more than two years of intense
negotiations to conclude,” and include intellectual property
provisions among participants that remain confidential.509 This is not
to say that public-private partnerships should abandon their efforts
because the transaction costs are often enormously high. Rather, as
Bubela, Guebert, and Mishra’s work broadly suggests, large, multiTECH. 61, 63 (2011); Jorge L. Contreras, Prepublication Data Release, Latency, and
Genome Commons, 329 SCI. 393, 393–94 (2010); Jorge L. Contreras, Data Sharing,
Latency Variables, and Science Commons, 25 BERK. TECH. L.J. 1601, 1641–52, 1657–58
(2010).
505. Tania Bubela, Jenilee Guebert & Amrita Mishra, Use and Misuse of Material
Transfer Agreements: Lessons in Proportionality from Research, Repositories, and
Litigation, 13 PLOS BIOLOGY 1, 1 (2015).
506. Id.
507. Id. at 6–7 (discussing United States v. Kurtz, No. 04-CR-0155A, 2008 WL 1820903
(W.D.N.Y. Apr. 21, 2008) and United Univ. Professions v. New York, 966 N.Y.S.2d 350
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2013) (unpublished table decision), 2013 WL 203402).
508. Contreras & Vertinsky, supra note 294, at 92–93.
509. Id. at 93–95.
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institutional agreements among partnership participants “should be
kept as simple as possible, so that institutions can realistically monitor
and enforce the terms.”510
5. Political Challenges
Fifth, the Cancer Moonshot provides some broader, synoptic
perspective to why, and under what circumstances, public-private
partnerships tend to arise in the first instance. The Moonshot arose
where neither the market, regulation, nor simple government largess
produced the sort of information or public goods demanded by the
marketplace—namely, a substantial cure for cancer.511 But this does
not necessarily explain why the government sees it fit to intervene
here, as opposed to the many other areas where market demand is
left unfulfilled. Commenting on the short-termism of private
investment, venture capitalist Peter Thiel once quipped, “We wanted
flying cars, instead we got 140 characters.”512 And yet, no one has
proposed a public-private partnership between the Federal Aviation
Administration and Boeing dedicated to producing a flying car. This
suggests that public-private partnerships, like the Moonshot, are more
than solutions to simple market failures; they are an encapsulation of
naked public policy (and political) preferences as to how both the
public and private sectors should allocate research and development
funds. It is not just that the polity demands a cancer cure—it is also
that the polity disagrees with the direction, manner, and effort of
current cancer research.513 The Cancer Moonshot is, essentially, a
political rebuke of therapeutic developers’ current efforts to produce
cancer therapies.514
6. Health Care Costs
At the same time, this rebellion, like others, may eventually
devour its children.515 A successful cancer moonshot may create

510. Bubela et al., supra note 505, at 8.
511. See notes 135–42 and accompanying text.
512. George Packer, No Death, No Taxes, NEW YORKER, Nov. 28, 2011, at 44–45.
513. See Daniel Engber, Cancer Research Is Broken, SLATE (Apr. 19, 2016, 9:21 AM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/future_tense/2016/04/biomedicine_facing
_a_worse_replication_crisis_than_the_one_plaguing_psychology.html
[https://perma.cc
/85EQ-2QBA (staff-uploaded archive)] (chastising the cancer research model).
514. See Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union,
supra note 4.
515. Cf. DEBORAH KENNEDY, HELEN MARIA WILLIAMS AND THE AGE OF
REVOLUTION 113 (2002) (quoting Mallet du Pan on the French Revolution that “the
Revolution devours its children”).

96 N.C. L. REV. 297 (2018)

2018]

CANCER’S IP

379

therapies so expensive for the public to purchase, they constitute a
drain on the public health coffers. This is, in fact, what has recently
occurred for a set of drugs curing hepatitis C that so “severely stress
budget-constrained programs like Medicaid and the Veterans Health
Administration[,] . . . their aggregate cost would [if widely deployed]
overwhelm budgeted resources.”516 But perhaps even more
frighteningly, a successful cancer moonshot may extend the average
citizen’s lifespan to such a degree that we will need to rethink a
variety of social constructions grounded in what we previously
perceived as an average lifespan, including sentences in criminal law,
insurance policies, and the social safety net for elders.517 Whether
political constituencies that bargained for public-private partnerships
recognize the perils of their success remains to be seen. But, in
thinking about the real fruits of projects like the Cancer Moonshot—
informational or otherwise—we should be careful what we wish for.
CONCLUSION
The Cancer Moonshot is ultimately an effort to uncover
information about cancer, the complexity of which is, perhaps,
unrivaled. Yet, the cost, time, and effort of producing cancer
information is enormous—too great of a burden to place on public
resources alone. The Moonshot, like other efforts to study costly,
informationally complex phenomena, has therefore turned to a
public-private partnership as a solution to marshaling resources and
expertise to achieve its goals. At the same time, the attractiveness of
incentives for private participation—namely, intellectual property in
these areas—is unclear. Patents, once the gold standard for cancer
research, face numerous difficulties: subject matter concerns loom
over recent advances; the statutory bars require early, ineffective
disclosures; and patents’ twenty-year term discourages important,
long-term research. Trade secrets and some regulatory exclusivities
harbor similar problems.
Aligning the Cancer Moonshot with intellectual property
incentives requires explicitly recognizing that the project is
informational in nature. To that end, the practical goal of the
Moonshot should be the implementation of a data-sharing regime.
516. Austin Frakt, We Can’t All Have It All: The Economic Limits of Pharmaceutical
Innovation, JAMA FORUM (Apr. 6, 2016), https://newsatjama.jama.com/2016/04/06/jamaforum-we-cant-all-have-it-all-the-economic-limits-of-pharmaceutical-innovation/ [http://perma.cc
/8U2A-ZQCH].
517. See Govind Persad, Lifetimes in the Law 6–13 (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with the North Carolina Law Review).
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More specifically, the Moonshot should encourage the production,
disclosure, and use of cancer information developed from its
partnership. Encouraging private participation, however, will likely
require tailoring various components of the current IP regime. The
production of cancer data, for example, could be encouraged by
formally shielding preclinical and clinical trials from patent law’s
statutory bars, as well as encouraging participants to ensure
interoperability—both legal and technical—among datasets. Private
companies could be encouraged to disclose their data to other
participants by rewarding them with regulatory exclusivity bonuses.
And encouraging therapeutics developers to use the information
generated from such a project could be furthered by doling out
priority review vouchers for their products. To be sure, some of these
solutions would require statutory fixes—not an easy task given the
myriad public health priorities Congress currently faces. But each of
these items is relatively cheap, easy to administer, and—
importantly—politically viable.
More broadly, the Cancer Moonshot sheds light on some of the
difficulties of the phenomenon of information seeking public-private
partnerships. Using the power of the government to encourage
private development of, essentially, public goods is a delicate game.
Information developed under these auspices raises issues concerning
data privacy and scientific reproducibility, not to mention greater
concerns about the role of IP rights for publicly-funded projects,
generally, and the transaction costs required to bring such projects to
fruition. Cancer’s IP, therefore, is equal parts intellectual property and
information policy. But these difficulties aside, the Cancer Moonshot,
like its namesake effort to put a man on the moon, represents the
endurance of the human spirit in attempting to conquer frontiers
unknown. As a quest for information, the Cancer Moonshot strives to
boldly fill the common kitty of human understanding—to “set sail on
this new sea because there is new knowledge to be gained.”518

518. Address at Rice University in Houston on the Nation’s Space Effort, 1962 PUB.
PAPERS 668 (Sept. 12, 1962).

